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Abstract
Today's globally networked society places great demand on the dissemination and sharing of person-
specific data for many new and exciting uses. When these data are linked together, they provide an
electronic shadow of a person or organization that is as identifying and personal as a fingerprint even
when the information contains no explicit identifiers, such as name and phone number. Other distinctive
data, such as birth date and ZIP code, often combine uniquely and can be linked to publicly available
information to re-identify individuals. Producing anonymous data that remains specific enough to be
useful is often a very difficult task and practice today tends to either incorrectly believe confidentiality is
maintained when it is not or produces data that are practically useless.
The goal of the work presented in this book is to explore computational techniques for releasing useful
information in such a way that the identity of any individual or entity contained in data cannot be
recognized while the data remain practically useful. I begin by demonstrating ways to learn information
about entities from publicly available information. I then provide a formal framework for reasoning
about disclosure control and the ability to infer the identities of entities contained within the data. I
formally define and present null-map, k-map and wrong-map as models of protection. Each model
provides protection by ensuring that released information maps to no, k or incorrect entities, respectively.
The book ends by examining four computational systems that attempt to maintain privacy while releasing
electronic information. These systems are: (1) my Scrub System, which locates personally-identifying
information in letters between doctors and notes written by clinicians; (2) my Datafly II System, which
generalizes and suppresses values in field-structured data sets; (3) Statistics Netherlands' pt-Argus
System, which is becoming a European standard for producing public-use data; and, (4) my k-Similar
algorithm, which finds optimal solutions such that data are minimally distorted while still providing
adequate protection. By introducing anonymity and quality metrics, I show that Datafly II can
overprotect data, Scrub and p-Argus can fail to provide adequate protection, but k-similar finds optimal
results.
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Extended Abstract
Today's globally networked society places great demand on the dissemination and sharing of
person-specific data for many new and exciting uses. Even situations where aggregate statistical
information was once the reporting norm now rely heavily on the transfer of microscopically detailed
transaction and encounter information. This happens at a time when more and more historically public
information is also electronically available. When these data are linked together, they provide an
electronic shadow of a person or organization that is as identifying and personal as a fingerprint even
when the information contains no explicit identifiers, such as name and phone number. Other distinctive
data, such as birth date and ZIP code, often combine uniquely and can be linked to publicly available
information to re-identify individuals. Producing anonymous data that remains specific enough to be
useful is often a very difficult task and practice today tends to either incorrectly believe confidentiality is
maintained when it is not or produces data that are practically useless.
The goal of the work presented in this book is to explore computational techniques for releasing
useful information in such a way that the identity of any individual or entity contained in data cannot be
recognized while the data remain practically useful. I begin by demonstrating ways to learn information
about entities from publicly available information. I then provide a formal framework for reasoning
about disclosure control and the ability to infer the identities of entities contained within the data. I
formally define and present null-map, k-map and wrong-map as models of protection. Each model
provides protection by ensuring that released information maps to no, k or incorrect entities, respectively.
The book ends by examining four computational systems that attempt to maintain privacy while
releasing electronic information. These systems are: (1) my Scrub System, which locates personally-
identifying information in letters between doctors and notes written by clinicians; (2) my Datafly II
System, which generalizes and suppresses values in field-structured data sets; (3) Statistics Netherlands'
ji-Argus System, which is becoming a European standard for producing public-use data; and, (4) my k-
Similar algorithm, which finds optimal solutions such that data are minimally distorted while still
providing adequate protection. By introducing anonymity and quality metrics, I show that Datafly II can
overprotect data, Scrub and p-Argus can fail to provide adequate protection, but k-similar finds optimal
results.
11
Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection
Acknowledgments
I thank Professor Hal Abelson at MIT for his professional guidance, for his reading hundreds of
pages that were excluded from this document, for his constantly setting deadlines and for his exhibiting
patience as each deadline was missed or extended. He has been an good role model and guide to
academic life. Thank you.
I also thank Peter Szolovits at MIT for providing an environment that made it possible for me to
learn about and explore the early part of my work in this area independently, in the fulfillment of my own
vision, with little financial concern and with no lack of quality time. A special thanks also goes to Daniel
Weitzner for making time to review this material and for his patience during its creation.
Also at MIT, I thank Patrick Winston for being there over the years. In those occasions when I
sought him out, he was always there, willing to give an ear or lend a hand and in those pivot points, he
made the difference. Professor Sussman made me feel so connected to MIT and I thank him for his
inquisitive spirit and lively conversations on any topic in any part of math, science or engineering. Also
thanks to Patrick Thompson and Jon Doyle for reviewing and commenting on the earliest drafts of my
work in this area. Also thanks to Norman Margolis and Tyrone Sealy for their general support and
assistance. Finally at MIT, I thank the graduate students, staff and faculty of the Laboratory for
Computer Science and of the Artificial Intelligence Lab for a fun and fascinating environment. In the
Boston area, I thank the medical informatics community for sharing data with me so I could take a first
look at issues regarding patient confidentiality, and along these lines, a special thanks goes to Isaac
Kohane at Children's Hospital and to Octo Barnett at Massachusetts General Hospital.
The latter parts of this work were conducted at Carnegie Mellon University. I thank Mark
Kamlet for his tremendous support and willingness to make my transition to the faculty a fantastic
opportunity at every turn. Enormous gratitude goes to Debra Dennison for her administrative support.
The H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management has been an incredibly challenging and
stimulating environment as so many disciplines come together under one roof and the willingness of the
faculty to extend themselves is outstanding. Special thanks in general to Rema Padman, George Duncan,
Marty Gaynor, Stephen Roehrig, Susan McElroy, Janet Cohen and Linda Babcock. I also thank Tom
12
Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection
Mitchell, Diane Stidle, Steve Fienberg and the members of the Center for Automated Learning in the
School for Computer Science for a stimulating and fun environment.
In terms of the wider privacy community, I have to first give special thanks to Beverly
Woodward. While we may not always agree on solutions or even characterizations of problems, her
willingness to provide critical analysis and review and to take the time to read and comment on my work
is greatly appreciated. It has strengthened my work and my thinking. Thank you Beverly.
In the privacy community, I have participated in more than 50 public debates, talks, presentations
and investigations. I thank all who hosted these events and invited me to participate. These include
Deanna Mool, Virginia deWolf, Laura Zayatz, and Bill Winkler. Among the organizations are the
American Psychiatric Association, the medical societies of Maryland and of Massachusetts, the U.S.
Bureau of the Census, the American Statistical Association, the American Medical Informatics
Association, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the National Library of Medicine, the
National Research Council, the Centers for Disease Control Prevention, and the U.S. Senate, to name a
few. Thanks to all those who shared a debate or a discussion with me, in public or private, and who
hurled a criticism or a compliment, for you have all contributed in one way or another to this work.
Special recognition is extended to A.G. Breitenstein, Denise Nagel, Robert Gellman, and Janlori
Goldman. I also want to recognize David Korn, L.J. Melton, and Elliot Stone.
In conducting this work, I traveled extensively and shared ideas and thoughts with many
researchers from many different areas. Thanks again to Bill Winkler at the U.S. Bureau of Census for
introducing me to his work and that of other statisticians. Thanks to Hundepool at Statistics Netherlands
for public conversations and for a copy of p-Argus software. Thanlks to all who hosted me and who
shared a discussion or two, good or bad, down the right path or the wrong path, because they all helped
me find my way. These include Gio Wiederhold at Stanford, members of the Database Group at
Stanford, and members of the security group at SRI, including Pierangela Samarati, Steve Dawson, and
Pat Lincoln. I also credit Pierangela Samarati for naming k-anonymity and thank her for recommending I
engage the material in a formal manner and starting me in that direction.
I also thank those supporters, critics and discussion sharers who wish to remain anonymous and
all those who would like to have been identified but whom I did not explicitly identify.
13
Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection
Let me also take this opportunity for a more personal note. I have been blessed to have to have
in my life those who can see value in the roughest of ordinary looking rocks. They behold beauty where
most of us see nothing of interest, and by their faith alone they transform stone into diamonds for us all
to see. I gratefully acknowledge Chang Sook Barrett, Sylvia Barrett and Joseph Barrett for motivating
and inspiring this work. Their commitment and belief in education continue to inspire and influence all
who know them, and their unwavering belief in me will never be forgotten. I also thank Henry Leitner
and Harvard University DCE for their continued support and commitment to providing educational
opportunities to all. Finally, but not least, I humbly thank Joyce Johnson (my mother), Sylvia Barrett,
Chang Barrett and Joseph Barrett for giving me love for a lifetime. This work has been supported in part
by a Medical Informatics Training Grant (1 T15 LM07092) from the National Library of Medicine, a
grant from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, and the H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and
Management at Carnegie Mellon University.
14
Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection
Chapter 0 Preface
In this chapter, I describe the organization of this embodiment of work. This is done by:
(1) describing the work and my contributions;
(2) identifying the intended audiences; and then,
(3) outlining the overall organization of this book.
0.1 Description of work
In the following paragraphs I describe the work reported in this book by describing it in terms of
its broader implications and promise as a line of research.
0.1.1 Computational disclosure control
The overall objective of the line of research encouraged by this work is to create architectural,
algorithmic and technological foundations for the maintenance of the privacy of individuals, the
confidentiality of organizations, and the protection of sensitive information, despite the requirement that
information be released publicly or semi-publicly. Data holders are finding it increasingly difficult to
produce anonymous and declassified information in today's globally networked society. Most data
holders do not even realize the jeopardy at which they place financial, medical, or national security
information when they erroneously rely on security practices of the past. Technology has eroded
previous protections, leaving the information vulnerable. In the past, a person seeking to reconstruct
private information was limited to visiting disparate file rooms and engaging in the labor-intensive
review of printed material in geographically distributed locations. Today, one can access voluminous
worldwide public information using a standard handheld computer and ubiquitous network resources.
Thus, from seemingly innocuous anonymous data and available public and semi-public information, one
can draw damaging inferences about sensitive information.
However, one cannot seriously propose that all information with any links to sensitive
information be suppressed. Society has developed an insatiable appetite for all kinds of detailed
information for many worthy purposes, and modem systems tend to distribute information widely. A goal
of this work is to control the disclosure of data such that inferences about identities of people and
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organizations and about sensitive information contained in the released data cannot reliably be made. In
this way, information that is practically useful can be shared freely with guarantees that it is sufficiently
anonymous and declassified. I call this effort the study of computational disclosure control.
Motivation for disclosure control
Computational disclosure control is inspired by the astonishing proliferation of public
information made available on the Internet and recent access to inexpensive, fast computers with large
storage capacities. These may now render many declassification standards ineffective. Shockingly, there
remains a common incorrect belief that if data look anonymous, it is anonymous. Data holders will often
remove all explicit identifiers, such as name, address, and phone number, from data so that other
information contained in the data can be shared, incorrectly believing the identities of entities contained
in the data cannot be inferred. Quite the contrary, de-identifying information provides no guarantee of
anonymity. For example, released information often contains other data, such as birth data and ZIP code
that in combination can be linked to publicly available information to re-identify individuals. As another
example, when somewhat aged information is declassified differently by the Department of Defense than
by the Department of Energy, the overall declassification effort suffers; by using two partial releases, the
original may be reconstructed in its entirety.
Promise of computational disclosure control
Because computational disclosure control can provide a responsible means for providing detailed
medical data to researchers, financial information to economists, and military intelligence information to
analysts, society can reap tremendous benefits in allocation of resources, financial efficiencies, and
protection of national information interests. Of course, this is only possible because the abstracted data
does not compromise individuals, organizations or national interests. Computational disclosure control
provides the means to coordinate information from vast numbers of distributed data holders so that
intended disclosure and declassification policies can be collectively enforced, even when related
inferences may not have been explicitly stated. Determining optimal results requires new insight into
measuring the usefulness of anonymous data and the effectiveness of the protection provided.
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0.1.2 Contributions of this work
The major contributions to computer science stemming from this work include: (1) a formal
framework for reasoning about disclosure control problems; (2) methods for integrating disclosure
limitation techniques to achieve a given level of anonymity; (3) the introduction of formal protection
models; and, (4) the definition of metrics to assess quality and anonymity. The major contributions to
computer science and to public policy concern: (1) identifying the nature of disclosure control problems
in today's technological and legal settings; (2) demonstrating how today's policies, practices and
legislation do not provide adequate privacy protection; and (3) proposing directions for new policies that
incorporate new disclosure control technology.
0.1.3 Learning information about entities
In more traditional computer science terms, this work can be characterized as one on learning -
in particular, the learning of information about entities from data. Society is experiencing tremendous
growth in the number and variety of data collected and shared about individuals, companies and other
entities. When these seemingly innocuous facts are combined, strategic or sensitive knowledge can be
learned about entities. Data linkage is the study of algorithms for learning information about entities
from disparate pieces of entity-specific information. An example is linking information gathered on the
World Wide Web with publicly available databases to reveal information about personal behaviors or
relationships between people.
On the other hand, there is often an expectation of privacy (e.g., medical information) or a pledge
of confidentiality (e.g., censuses and surveys) that accompanies shared data. Disclosure control is the
study of algorithms for releasing information about entities such that the privacy of the individuals or
other sensitive inferences that can be drawn from the data are controlled while the data remain
practically useful.
There exists a symbiotic relationship between data linkage and disclosure control. Data linkage
algorithms that exploit disclosure vulnerabilities in data identify ways in which disclosure control must
improve. Conversely, if disclosure control is to provide data that are useful, such algorithms must
identify the inferences that remain.
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Over the past twenty-five years, pursuits in record linkage (a subset of data linkage that relies on
the technique of probabilistic linking) and in disclosure control have utilized various statistical
approaches. However, the nature and extent of data available today has led to a re-examination of these
approaches as well as to the development of new computational methods, which are presented in this
book.
0.2 Intended audiences
This book is intended for graduate students who want to learn to be data protectors in order to
limit the knowledge others can gain from information that is publicly released. Conversely, students also
learn to be data detectives in order to understand ways to gain strategic knowledge about individuals and
other entities. It is assumed that the student reading this book has a working knowledge of computer
programming, data structures and algorithms. In a class setting, students may be responsible for
uncovering sensitive information about individuals by conducting experiments similar to those reported
in Chapter 2. Then, students could assume the responsibility of producing public information for a data
holder using privacy protection methods like those described in chapters 4 through 9. Students could then
attempt to compromise each other's released data and assess the anonymity of each release. Because of
the sensitive nature of this work, it is imperative that students consider the related ethical and societal
pressures inherent in this work. These issues are underscored in Chapter 2 and the broader challenges to
society posed by the work are discussed further in the last chapter.
Other audiences
Maintaining the privacy of individuals and the confidentiality of organizations which are
contained in electronic information released for public or semi-public use affects a wide range of
audiences whose concerns are as diverse as information warfare, financial credit, epidemiological
research and data warehousing, to name a few. In addition there is growing public concern over privacy
and confidentiality as they relate to information made available over the Internet. As a result, the systems
and techniques discussed in this book are quite timely. Demand for information about my work has been
constant and immediate and has stemmed from a wide range of audiences including national security
efforts, the United States Bureau of the Census, the Massachusetts Department of Education, statistical
offices, other government agencies, medical organizations and federal and state legislative committees
working on medical privacy laws. Each of these contexts has brought additional richness to the work that
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extends beyond differences in vocabularies to also offer unique ways of looking at similar problems
given different traditions and practical experiences.
Releasing medical information
In this book, I present technical solutions in the context of real-world problems. For brevity, the
bulk of the book concerns problems and solutions in releasing medical information even though some
emphasis is placed on important distinctions necessary for other audiences such as those concerned with
statistical, financial or marketing data. Producing anonymous medical information is often very difficult,
as I show herein, and attempting to furnish such data provides fertile ground on which to explore the
general nature of disclosure control problems and the effectiveness of proposed solutions. The tension
between maintaining the privacy of the individual and sharing information for the benefit of society is
more taut and more transparent with medical data than with other kind of person-specific data, which is
why I use medical data as the primary example throughout.
0.3 How this work is organized
This book consists of three major parts. The first part, consisting of chapter 2, briefly reports on
re-identification experiments I designed and conducted using publicly available information as a means
of demonstrating the difficulties encountered when attempting to produce anonymous information in
today's technical setting. Simultaneously, this chapter shows how in today's setting, publicly available
information can be exploited to reveal sensitive information about individuals and so, it therefore serves
as a reflection on explorations in data linkage techniques. The second part of this book, consisting of
chapters 3 through 5, includes a formal framework I defined for reasoning about these kinds of problems
and a formal presentation I devised that examines the use of common techniques to thwart unwanted data
linkage efforts. In chapters 6 through 9, I present four computational systems, three of which I created
and produced, that attempt to produce anonymous information for public use. Comparative results are
provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of these systems in light of the re-identification experiments
conducted in the first part. In the final part of this book, consisting of chapters 10, the problems and
proposed computational solutions are briefly examined in terms of their potential impact on privacy
legislation, practices and policies.
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0.4 Computer technology used
Two different machines were used for the re-identification experiments reported in chapter 1, but
much of the work could have been performed with only one machine and that machine need not have
been as powerfully configured. However, these machines were available for the tasks. Each is described
below.
Dell Inspirion 3200 laptop computer
Pentium II, 144MB RAM, 6GB hard drive, CDROM
External 1GB Jaz drive with SCSI PCMCIA adapter
Ethernet (and 56K modem) connection to Internet
Windows 98 operating system
Office 97 with Access
Dell Precision 610
Pentium II, 1GB RAM, 40GB hard drive, CDROM
Internal 1GB SCSI Jaz drive
Ethernet connection to Internet
Windows NT operating system
Office 97 with Access, Oracle, SQL Server
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Chapter 1 Non-Technical Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a concise, non-technical overview of a new emerging
area of study, which I term computational disclosure control. An objective of this document is to provide
fundamental principles on which subsequent work in this area may build. It includes references to my
work beyond what is actually covered in later chapters. This chapter is intended as an overview for the
non-technical reader, who may not read some or all of the subsequent chapters. Other readers can skip
this chapter with no loss of information.
Organizations often release and receive person-specific data with all explicit identifiers, such as
name, address and telephone number, removed on the assumption that privacy is maintained because the
resulting data look anonymous. However, in most of these cases, the remaining data can be used to re-
identify individuals by linking or matching the data to other data bases or by looking at unique
characteristics found in the fields and records of the data base itself. When these less apparent aspects
are taken into account, each released record can be altered to map to many possible people, providing a
level of anonymity that the record-holder determines. The greater the number of candidates per record,
the more anonymous the data.
In this book, I present four general-purpose computer programs for maintaining privacy when
disclosing person-specific information. They are:
* my Scrub System, which locates and suppresses or replaces personally identifying
information in letters, notes and other textual documents;
* my Datafly I System, which generalizes values based on a profile of the data recipient at the
time of disclosure;
* Statistics Netherlands' pL-Argus System, a somewhat similar system which is becoming a
European standard for disclosing public use data; and,
* my k-Similar algorithm, which finds optimal results such that the data are minimally
distorted yet adequately protected.
These systems have limitations. When they are completely effective, wholly anonymous data
may not contain sufficient details for all uses. Care must be taken when released data can identify
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individuals and such care must be enforced by coherent policies and procedures that incorporate the
constantly changing challenges posed by technology.
1.1 Towards all the data on all the people
There has been tremendous growth in the collection of information being collected on
individuals and this growth is related to access to inexpensive computers with large storage capacities.
Therefore, the trend in collecting increasing amounts of information is expected to continue. As a result,
many details in the lives of people are being documented in databases somewhere and that there exist
few operational barriers to restrict the sharing of collected information. In a related work, I proposed a
formal mathematical model for characterizing real-world data sharing policies and defined privacy and
risk metrics to compare policies. These metrics were applied to the real-world practices of sharing
hospital discharge data. Findings include: (1) 25 of the 44 states that collect hospital discharge data share
the information on a public or semi-public basis; (2) the number of people eligible to receive a copy of
the data is greater than the number of people whose information is contained in the data; and, (3)
publicly available data tends to be overly distorted and so more copies of the more sensitive, semi-
publicly available data are more commonly distributed. Having so much sensitive information available
makes it even more difficult for other organizations to release information that are effectively
anonymous.
1.2 Unique and unusual values in statistical data
I conducted experiments using 1990 U.S. Census summary data to determine how many
individuals within geographically situated populations had combinations of demographic values that
occurred infrequently. It was found that combinations of few characteristics often combine in
populations to uniquely or nearly uniquely identify some individuals. Clearly, data released containing
such information about these individuals should not be considered anonymous. Yet, health and other
person-specific data are publicly available in this form. Here are some surprising results using only three
fields of information, even though typical data releases contain many more fields. It was found that 87%
(216 million of 248 million) of the population in the United States had reported characteristics that likely
made them unique based only on {5-digit ZIP, gender, date of birth}. About half of the U.S. population
(132 million of 248 million or 53%) are likely to be uniquely identified by only {place, gender, date of
birth}, where place is basically the city, town, or municipality in which the person resides. And even at
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the county level, (county, gender, date of birth} are likely to uniquely identify 18% of the U.S.
population. In general, few characteristics are needed to uniquely identify a person.
1.3 Linking to re-identify de-identified data
I conducted experiments that demonstrated how de-identified health data can be linked to a
population register in order to re-identify by name the persons who are the subjects of the health
information. Using the voter list for Cambridge, Massachusetts, I showed how a few demographics
combine to uniquely identify individuals. It was found that 12% of the 54,805 voters had unique birth
dates (month, day and year of birth). Therefore, any information on these individuals that included birth
date and city, would almost certainly be specific to the named individuals. Further, birth date and gender
together were unique for 29%, birth date and a 5-digit ZIP (postal code) were unique for 69% and birth
date and the full 9-digit ZIP were unique for 97% of the voters. These results demonstrate that
combinations of characteristics can combine to construct a unique or near-unique identifier which is
termed a quasi-identifier. These results further show that the typical de-identification technique applied
when releasing information for public-use in the United States, does not render the result anonymous.
1.4 Probabilistic inference to re-identify individuals
I conducted an experiment in which five patients in a proposed release of cancer incidence
information consisting of (diagnosis, date of diagnosis (month and year), ZIP (5 digits)} were accurately
identified using only publicly available information. The method of re-identification concerned
probabilistic inferences drawn from the Social Security Death Index based on population demographics
and the specifics of the diseases. Four of the five cases had a diagnosis of Kaposi's Sarcoma which when
found in young men is an indicator of AIDS. The fifth case concerned Neuroblastoma in a child and the
re-identification was successful even though there is far less information available about children than
about adults. It is difficult to believe that such seemingly minimal information could have been so easily
re-identified.
1.5 Re-constructing unreleased data
I conducted an experiment in which a birth certificate database is reconstructed from publicly
available information even though the state's vital records department did not release any of the
information used. A total of 313 explicitly identified birth notices appeared in the Peoria Daily Record
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for April 1991. Hospital births found in publicly available health data reported 321 births for the same
area during that time period which demonstrates a compliance of newspaper birth notices of 313/321 (or
98%). The combination of {hospital, gender, date of birth, ZIP/place} was unique for 234/313 (or 75%)
of the births. The other 79 cases are described as follows. Twins (5 cases) and notices that could not be
distinguished from one other notice (44 notices) were partitioned into 27 sets of two and accounted for
54 (or 17%) of the babies. In these cases, released information would be specific to one of the two named
individuals. Similarly, there was one set of triplets and 18 other notices that could not be distinguished
from two others; these were partitioned into 7 sets and accounted for 21 (or 7%) of the babies. Lastly,
there were four notices that could not be distinguished on the basis of these attributes; these accounted
for four (or 1%) of the notices. Additional sensitive inferences can be weakly implied from birth notices,
such as the ethnicity of the child based on family name, family income based on residence, the child's
general health at birth based on the timing of birth notices and the parent's marital status based on the
absence of a father's name. Inferences from related hospital information can concern payment means or
birth complications and anomalies, some of which may provide inferences to the mother's lifestyle or
health. The resulting data can be used as a population register to re-identify individuals who later become
the subjects of other releases of sensitive information.
1.6 Using patterns to re-identify individuals
I conducted a series of experiments that demonstrate how person-specific neuroblastoma
incidence data, believed to be anonymous and being considered for release, could be re-identified using
publicly available information. The proposed release consisted of 319 Illinois residents reported as being
diagnosed with neuroblastoma from January 1986 through April 1998. Given only {date of diagnosis
(month and year), ZIP (5-digit postal code in which each person resided)}, I employed linking and
pattern matching techniques to re-identify these Illinois residents from seemingly innocent information.
What is further surprising is that these experiments are among the most difficult possible because there is
less publicly available information on children, who are the primary subjects, and because neuroblastoma
is not a single, identified diagnosis code in health data. Instead, I showed that a series of diagnoses imply
neuroblastoma. Information used for these experiments included Web pages, email discussion archives,
health care data, Social Security death index, and birth notices. I correctly identified 20 of the 23
sampled (or 87%), uniquely identified 18 of the 23 sampled (or 78%) and incorrectly identified 0 of the
23 sampled.
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1.7 Summary of problems producing anonymous data
Consider the re-identification experiments just described over the previous paragraphs. They
reveal an array of problems encountered in attempting to produce anonymous information in today's
technological setting. These problems center on:
(1) knowledge the recipient may hold or bring to bear on the data;
(2) unique and unusual combinations of values appearing within the data;
(3) an inability to prove a given release is anonymous.
Finding operational solutions to these problems is the topic of this work.
1.8 Related work
Prior related work comes from work in the statistics community on statistical databases and in
the computer security community on multi-level databases, access control and authentication and
inference control with respect to multiple queries to a database. While many techniques from these fields
seek to effect disclosure control, they do so in different and more limited contexts than are explored in
this work.
The reason for examining disclosure control in a broader context results from the dramatic
increase in the availability of person-specific information from autonomous data holders. In the case of
statistical databases, current demand centers on person-specific details and not aggregated summaries. In
the case of multi-level databases, solutions can result from having absolute control over the entire
collection and dissemination process. Such conditions are not possible with today's decentralized
collections where release decisions are autonomously determined.
For the most part, computer security as a field has not addressed issues concerning data privacy
that are separate and distinct from those of hardware security. Clearly, having competent hardware
security can limit unwanted access to the information contained within the system, but having good
security cannot guarantee privacy. As examples, consider the re-identification experiments mentioned
earlier. In those cases, breaches of privacy resulted from data that were given out freely; no security
breaches occurred.
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1.9 Formal methods
There are numerous disclosure limitation techniques that can be brought to bear, but previously
no formal protection models existed. I developed a formal framework for reasoning about disclosure
control and the ability to infer the identities of entities contained within data. I also defined an
anonymous database system as one that makes individual and entity-specific data available such that
individuals and other entities contained in the released data cannot be reliably identified. I then
introduced formal protection models, named null-map, k-map and wrong-map. Each model provides
protection by ensuring that released information maps to no, k or incorrect entities, respectively.
Anonymous databases differ in many significant ways from statistical databases and from multi-
level databases. Here are a few differences:
(1) all if not most of the data are released rather than a small sample;
(2) the integrity of entity-specific details must be maintained rather than an overall aggregate
statistic; and,
(3) suppressing explicit identifiers, such as name and address, is not sufficient since
combinations of other values, such as ZIP and birth date, can combine uniquely to re-identify
entities.
My formal framework and protection models provide a basis for characterizing and comparing
proposed anonymous database systems. Below are four real-world systems that are proposed to be
anonymous database systems.
1.10 Scrub System
My Scrub System concerns maintaining privacy in textual documents. In field-structured
databases, explicit identifiers, which provide a means to directly communicate with the person who is the
subject of the data, appear within the data, grouped by a field name, such as {name, phone number}.
Locating explicit identifiers in unrestricted text, however, becomes a problem unto itself. In the Scrub
System, I define a new computational approach to locating and replacing personally identifying
information in textual documents that extends beyond straight search-and-replace procedures, which was
the previous norm. The system's approach is based on a model of how humans de-identify textual
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documents. The basic idea is to construct a system of detectors that work in parallel, where each detector
specializes in recognizing a particular kind of explicit identifier.
While the Scrub System was proven to be quite effective, accurately locating 98-100% of all
explicit identifiers found in letters to referring physicians, the final analysis reveals that de-identifying
textual documents (i.e., removal of explicit identifiers) is not sufficient to ensure anonymity. Therefore,
Scrub is not an anonymous database system. Nonetheless, de-identifying textual documents remains in
great demand primarily due to archives of email messages, personal web pages and other information
found on the World Wide Web and a lack of understanding of what renders data sufficiently anonymous.
1.11 Datafly II System
My Datafly II System concerns field-structured databases. Both my Datafly and Datafly II
System use computational disclosure techniques to maintain anonymity in entity-specific data by
automatically generalizing, substituting and removing information as appropriate without losing many of
the details found within the data. For the discussion in this chapter, the terms Datafly and Datafly II can
be consider to refer to the same basic system because the differences between them are not reflected in
the issues presented here. Decisions are made at the attribute (field) and tuple (record) level at the time
of database access, so the approach can be used on the fly in role-based security within an institution, and
in batch mode for exporting data from an institution. As I mentioned in the experiments earlier,
organizations often release person-specific data with all explicit identifiers, such as name, address, phone
number, and social security number, removed in the incorrect belief that the identity of the individuals is
protected because the resulting data look anonymous. However, the experiments showed that in most of
these cases, the remaining data can be used to re-identify individuals by linking or matching the data to
other databases or by looking at unique characteristics found in the attributes and tuples of the database
itself. When these less apparent aspects are taken into account, as is done in my Datafly II System, each
released tuple can be made to ambiguously map to many possible people, providing a level of anonymity
that the data provider determines.
I term this model of protection k-map protection. In my Datafly and Datafly II System, the k is
enforced on the data itself, resulting in a special form of k-map protection called k-anonymity. This is
attractive because adherence to k-anonymity can be determined by the data holder's data alone and does
not require omniscience. Further, in the Datafly System the data holder assigns to each attribute, the
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amount of tolerance for distortion that is desirable. Conversely, the provider of the data assigns to each
attribute, the amount of protection necessary. In this way, the Datafly I System transforms the disclosure
limitation problem into an optimization problem. As a consequence, the final results are adequately
protected while remaining useful to the recipient. It is shown that Datafly is an anonymous database
system.
1.12 pt-Argus System
The pt-Argus System is a computational disclosure system produced by Statistics Netherlands
that is similar to my Datafly System. Both systems utilize the same disclosure limitation techniques to
enforce k-anonymity and in both systems, the data provider assigns to each attribute, the amount of
protection necessary though the granularity of this specification is far more coarse in p-Argus. These
similarities are especially surprising given that the systems were developed at roughly the same time and
with no prior knowledge of each other; and, each work stems from a different academic tradition. But the
systems differ in significant ways. In Datafly II each release is guaranteed to adhere to k-anonymity
where such is not necessarily the case in p-Argus. However, p-Argus tends to provide less distortion than
Datafly II so more of the specificity in the values themselves remains, making the data often more useful.
It is shown that g-Argus is not an anonymous database system.
1.13 The k-Similar algorithm
My k-Similar algorithm finds optimal solutions such that data are minimally distorted while still
providing adequate protection. By introducing anonymity and quality metrics, I show to what extent
Datafly II can over distort data, while Scrub and p-Argus can fail to provide adequate protection in a
given release. In contrast, my k-similar algorithm produces optimal releases that are not overly distorted
nor under-protected. It does so by looking at the computational disclosure control problem as one of data
clustering. In the well-known k-cluster algorithm, for example, data are partitioned into k groups based
on minimizing a distance between tuples. In contrast, the k-similar algorithm divides data into groups
such that the size of each group consists of k or more of the "closest" tuples; in this case, closeness is
based on a minimal distance measure derived from the anonymity and quality metrics. In terms of
computational speed, k-Similar operates in real-time under certain circumstances, but can become
combinatoric in others. It is not nearly as fast as Datafly and p-Argus. However, the resulting releases
from k-Similar are guaranteed to be minimally distorted yet sufficiently protected which is not the case
with the other systems.
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1.14 Putting the systems into action
Revisiting the linkage experiments described in the earlier sections, given the computational
solutions described in the later sections, shows that these solutions can effectively thwart the described
re-identification efforts. Using the quality and anonymity metrics related to my formal methods, I
conducted an experiment that demonstrated that public-use medical data available today is typically over-
distorted yet still inadequately protected. This is not surprising given that these releases do not use any of
the disclosure control systems presented here and do not employ any formal protection models. So, the
impact of this work in the future should be significant.
1.15 Medical privacy legislation
While there may be many other possible academic approaches to protecting privacy, most of
them are not practical in today's social settings. Therefore, it is important for those working in this area
to understand the constraints the social setting places on the disclosure control problem. Consider
medical privacy legislation, policies and best practices.
Policy makers appear to be unaware of the kinds of disclosure control problems examined herein
and the role that technology plays in rendering our past approaches to privacy policies futile. Basically,
no medical privacy legislation proposed by Congress addresses the problems demonstrated in the earlier
sections. That is, if any were to pass, the problems would remain. Major shortcomings center on:
(1) an incorrect belief that de-identifying data renders the result anonymous;
(2) an incorrect belief that data linkage and re-identification can be controlled by encryption
alone;
(3) an incorrect belief that following established computer security practices provides adequate
privacy protection; and,
-(4) an inability to construct a policy framework for privacy legislation that does not require
enumerating all sources, recipients and uses of data a priori.
New technology offers better choices than the all-or-nothing positions voiced in the medical
privacy debates, but technical solutions alone remain inadequate. Technology must work with policy for
the most effective solutions.
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1.16 Challenge to society
While medical data has been used to motivate the work described here, the problem is certainly
not limited to medical data. Given the explosion in the collection and sharing of person-specific
information described earlier, along with the growing ability to automatically process video and speech
surveillance data and the ease of collecting information over the World Wide Web, populations are
coming under increasingly intense data surveillance. For the United States, this is especially alarming
because it undermines the philosophical cornerstones of the American way of life. It is not clear what
terms like "freedom" and "liberty" mean in the absence of personal privacy. An inability to release
entity-specific information that is anonymous is becoming one of the biggest and most significant
challenges facing today's society.
For example, the Freedom of Information Act has historically provided a mechanism to help
ensure government accountability, but when many such releases are not effectively anonymous, they can
easily become weapons to reveal sensitive information about individuals or businesses. Conversely, this
becomes grounds on which the government refuses to release many of the kinds of information currently
reported. Similarly, the American legal system requires law enforcement to acquire search warrants
based on a review of evidence by a judge. However, by using the linkage techniques described earlier,
law enforcement can gain access to sensitive information about members of the population without the
protection of a search warrant or even a reported case. These are just two examples that show how an
inability to provide entity-specific data that are not anonymous tears at the underpinnings of American
society and begs for society to re-examine itself in the wake of these problems.
1.17 Summary
On the one hand, having so much information available about entities provides many new and
interesting ways to conduct research, but on the other hand, having so much information available about
entities makes it increasingly difficult to provide personal privacy. So, this book focuses on several of my
contributions including a formal framework for reasoning about these kinds of problems, 3
computational solutions to tackle this problem and a set of anonymity and quality metrics to help
characterize solutions. Despite these contributions, care must be taken to use policy to tie the technology
that brought forth the problem with the technology that can offer solutions.
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Chapter 2 Introduction
Society is experiencing exponential growth in the number and variety of data collections as
computer technology, network connectivity and disk storage space become increasingly affordable. Data
holders, operating autonomously and with limited knowledge, are left with the difficulty of releasing
information that does not compromise privacy, confidentiality or national interests. In many cases the
survival of the database itself depends on the data holder's ability to produce anonymous data because
not releasing such information at all may diminish the need for the data, while on the other hand, failing
to provide proper protection within a release may create circumstances that harm the public or others.
Ironically, the broad availability of public and semi-public information makes it increasingly difficult to
provide data that are effectively anonymous.
Let me begin by introducing my terminology and explaining my use of medical privacy as a
constant example. In general, I will discuss collections of information whose granularity of details are
specific to an individual, a business, an organization or other entities and I term such collections, entity-
specific data. If the entities represented in the data are individuals, then I may refer to the collection as
person-specific data; however, even in these cases, the concepts being presented typically apply to
broader collections of entity-specific data as well. By primarily using person-specific data and focusing
on issues surrounding medical privacy, the motivations and risks often become transparent even though
the underlying issues apply to many other kinds of data such as financial, statistical and national security
information.
2.1 Tensions in releasing data
In the next two subsections, I look at different ways in which society has made decisions about sharing
data, and I provide a way to reason about these findings. In the end, this examination motivates my use of
medical data as an example throughout this work, even though the issues presented are not limited to
medical data.
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Quality versus anonymity
There is a natural tension between the quality of data and the techniques that provide anonymity
protection. Consider a continuum that characterizes possible data releases. At one end of the continuum
are person-specific data that are fully identified. At the other end are anonymous data that are derived
from the original person-specific data, but in which no person can be identified. Between these two
endpoints is a finite partial ordering of data releases, where each release is derived from the original data
but for which privacy protection is less than fully anonymous. See Figure 1.
The first realization is that any attempt to provide some anonymity protection, no matter how
minimal, involves modifying the data and thereby distorting its contents. So, as shown in Figure 1,
movement along the continuum from the fully identified data towards the anonymous data adds more
privacy protection, but renders the resulting data less useful. That is, there exists some tasks for which
the original data could be used, but those tasks are not possible with the released data because the data
have been distorted.
So, the original fully identified data and the derived anonymous data are diametrically opposed.
The entire continuum describes the domain of possible releases. Framed in this way, a goal of this work
is to produce an optimal release of data so that for a given task, the data remain practically useful yet
rendered minimally invasive to privacy.
I I I I I
identifiable anonymous
more privacy more useful
Figure 1 Optimal releases of data
Tug-of-war between data holders and recipients
The second realization that emerges from Figure 1 is that the usefulness of data is determined by
the task to which the recipient puts the data. That is, given a particular task, there exists a point on the
continuum in Figure 1 that is as close to anonymous as possible, yet the data remain useful for the task. A
release of data associated with that point on the continuum is considered optimal. In the next paragraphs,
I provide a skeletal depiction of current practices that determine who gets access to what data. I show
that the result can be characterized as a tug-of-war between data holders and data recipients.
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In general, the practices of data holders and related policies do not examine tasks in a vacuum.
Instead, the combination of task and recipient together are weighed against privacy concerns. This can be
modeled as a tug-of-war between the data holder and societal expectations for privacy on one side, and
the recipient and the recipient's use for the data on the other. In some cases such as public health
legislation, the recipient's need for the data may overshadow privacy protections, allowing the recipient
(a public health agent) to get the original, fully identified health data. See Figure 2 in which a tug-of-war
is modeled. The privacy constraints on the data holder versus the recipient's demand for the data are
graphically depicted by the sizes of the images shown. In the case illustrated, the recipient receives the
original, fully identified data.
Distortion, anonymity Accuracy, quality
/Ann 10/2/61 02139 cardiac\
Abe 7/14/61 02139 cancer
\Al 3/8/61 02138 liver
Holder
Recipient
Figure 2. Recipient's needs overpower privacy concerns
Figure 3 demonstrates the opposite extreme outcome to that of Figure 2. In Figure 3, the data holder and
the need to protect the confidentiality or privacy of the information overshadows the recipient and the
recipient's use for the data and so the data is completely suppressed and not released at all. Data collected
and associated with national security concerns provides an example. The recipient may be a news-
reporting agent. Over time the data may eventually be declassified and a release that is deemed
sufficiently anonymous provided to the press, but the original result is as shown in Figure 3, in which no
data is released at all.
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Distortion, anonymity Accuracy, quality>
II
Recipient
Holder
Figure 3 Data holder and privacy concerns overpower outside uses of the data
Figure 2 and Figure 3 depict situations in which society has made explicit decisions based on the
needs of society as a whole. But secondary uses of medical data, for example, by marketing firms,
pharmaceutical companies, epidemiological researchers and others do not in general lend themselves to
such an explicit itemization. Figure 4 demonstrates situations in which the needs for privacy are weighed
equally against the demand for the data itself. In such situations, a balance should be found in which the
data are rendered sufficiently anonymous yet remain practically useful. As an example, this situation
often occurs with requests by researchers for patient-specific medical records in which researchers seek
to undertake clinical outcomes, or administrative research that could possibly provide benefits to society.
At present, decisions are primarily based on the recipient receiving the original patient data or no data at
all. Attempts to provide something in-between typically results in data with poor anonymity protection or
data that is overly distorted. This work seeks to find ways for the recipient to get data that has adequate
privacy protection, therefore striking an optimal balance between privacy protection and the data's
fitness for a particular task.
Distortion, anonymity Accuracy, quality
A* 1961
A* 1961
A* 1961
Holder
Figure 4. An optimal balance is needed
0213* cri
0213* cancer>
0213* liver
Recipient
between privacy concerns and uses of the data
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At present, many data holders often make decisions arbitrarily or by ad hoc means. Figure 5
portrays the situation some state and federal agencies find themselves when they seek to produce public-
use files for general use. Over the past few years, there has been a tremendous effort to make more data
that is collected by government agencies available over the World Wide Web. In these situations,
protecting the reputation of the agency, and the guarantees for privacy protection for which some
agencies are legally bound, outweighs the demands of the recipient. In many of these cases, a strongly
distorted version of the data is often released; the released data are typically produced with little or no
consideration to the tasks required. Conversely, many other state and federal agencies release poorly
protected data. In these cases, the individuals contained in the data can be easily re-identified. Examples
of both of these kinds of released data are found in publicly and semi-publicly available hospital
discharge data.
Neither way of releasing data yields optimal results. When strongly distorted data are released,
many researchers cannot use the data, or have to seek special permission to get far more sensitive data
than what are needed. This unnecessarily increases the volume of sensitive data available outside the
agency. On the other hand, data that do not provide adequate anonymity may harm individuals.
Distortion, anonymity Accuracy, quality
Jcd crdiac
Jwq cancer
Jxy liver
Recipient
Holder
Figure 5. Data holder and privacy concerns limit uses of the data
In examining the different struggles between privacy and the sharing of person-specific data, I
make the following claims:
Informal claim 1. Many current policies and practices support crude decisions. A recipient today
too often receives the sensitive data itself, no data at all, overly distorted data that is of little or
no use, or poorly protected data in which individuals can be re-identified.
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Informal claim 2. Ultimately, the data holder must be held responsible for enforcing privacy
protection because the data holder typically reaps a benefit and controls both data collection and
dissemination.
While the claims above are independent of the content of data, the study of secondary uses of
medical data in particular provides a natural incentive to find optimal solutions between researchers and
data holders. After all, there are no legislative guidelines to empower one party so that it can overwhelm
the other as was shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Also, state and federal agencies tend to be small in
number and highly visible in comparison to the dramatic number of holders of medical data. Because
there are so many holders of health data, it is hard to scrutinize their actions, and the resulting damage to
individuals can be devastating yet hard to prove. And there exists strong financial incentives not to
provide adequate protection in health data. On the other hand, research from data may lower health costs
or save lives. For these reasons, focusing on the collection and sharing of medical data throughout this
work provides motivation for finding optimal releases of data and for integrating technology with policy
for maximal benefit. Even though I focus on anonymity protection in medical data, the issues presented
are just as pertinent to the confidentiality of businesses, governments and other entities in financial,
marketing and other forms of data.
2.2 Introduction to privacy in medical data
I begin with some informal definitions. Identifiable personal health information refers to any
information concerning a person's health or treatment in which the identity of the person can be
determined. The expressions personal health information and patient-specific health data refer to health
information that may or may not identify individuals. As I will show, in many releases of personal health
information, individuals can be recognized. Anonymous personal health information, by contrast,
contains details about a person's medical condition or treatment but the identity of the person cannot be
determined.
In general usage, confidentiality of personal information protects the interests of the organization
while privacy protects the autonomy of the individual; but, in medical usage, both terms often mean
privacy.
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2.2.1 Privacy protection and the Hippocratic oath
The historical origin and ethical basis of medical confidentiality begin with the Hippocratic
Oath, which was written between the sixth century BC and the first century AD:
"Whatsoever I shall see or hear in the course of my dealings with men, if it be what should not be
published abroad, I will never divulge, holding such things to be holy secrets."
Various professional associations world-wide reiterate this oath, and by pledging this oath,
clinicians - licensed professionals such as doctors, nurses, pharmacists, radiologists, and dentists who
access in the line of duty identifiable personal health information - assume the responsibility of securing
this information. The resulting trust is the cornerstone of the doctor-patient relationship, allowing
patients to communicate with their physicians and to share information regarding their health status.
However, the doctor-patient privilege offers very limited protection to patients regarding the
confidentiality of their health information. Legal protection is very narrow, only applying in some cases
when a physician is testifying in court or in related proceedings.
2.2.2 Role of information technology
The role of information technology is critical to confidentiality. On the one hand, information
technology offers comprehensive, portable electronic records that can be easily accessed on behalf of a
given patient no matter where or when a patient may need medical care [1]. That very portability, on the
other hand, makes it much easier to transmit quickly and cheaply records containing identifiable personal
health information widely and in bulk, for a variety of uses within and among health care institutions and
other organizations and agencies. The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) found that current laws
generally do not provide consistent or comprehensive protection of personal health information [2].
Focusing on the impact of computer technology, OTA concluded that computerization reduces some
concerns about privacy of personal health information while increasing others.
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2.2.3 Past policy efforts and computational disclosure control
Previous policy efforts to protect the privacy of personal health information were limited to
decisions about who gets access to which fields of information. I examine here four new computer
programs that attempt to disclose information in such a way that individuals contained in the released
data cannot be identified. These programs provide a spectrum of policy options. Decisions are no longer
limited to who gets which fields of information, but to how much generality or possible anonymity will
exist in the released information.
2.2.4 Public concern over privacy
The public's concern about the confidentiality of personal health information is reflected in a
1993 poll conducted by Harris and Associates for Equifax. The results of the survey found that 96
percent of the respondents believed federal legislation should designate all personal health information as
sensitive, and should impose severe penalties for unauthorized disclosure. Eighty percent of respondents
were worried about medical record privacy, and 25 percent had personal experience of abuse related to
personal health information [3].
A 1994 Harris-Equifax consumer privacy survey focused on how the American public felt about
having their medical records used for medical research and how safeguards would affect their opinions
about such systems and uses. Among a list of thirteen groups and organizations, doctors and nurses
ranked first in terms of the percentage of Americans who were "very" confident (43 percent) that this
group properly handled personal and confidential information. After hearing a description about how
medical records are used by researchers to study the causes of disease, 41 percent of Americans surveyed
said they would find it at least somewhat acceptable if their records were used for such research without
consent. Twenty-eight percent of those who initially opposed having their records used would change
their position if a federal law made it illegal for any medical researcher to disclose the identity or any
identifiable details of a person whose health records had been used. This would increase acceptance of
this practice to over half those surveyed (58 percent) [4]. By extension, this survey implies strong public
support for releases of personal health information in which persons contained in the information could
not be identified.
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2.2.5 Sharing medical data offers benefits to society
Analysis of the detailed information contained within electronic medical records promises many
social advantages, including improvements in medical care, reduced institutional costs, the development
of predictive and diagnostic support systems [5], and the integration of applicable data from multiple
sources into a unified display for clinicians [6]. These benefits, however, require sharing the contents of
medical records with secondary viewers such as researchers, economists, statisticians, administrators,
consultants, and computer scientists, to name a few. The public would probably agree that these
secondary parties should know some of the information in the record, but such disclosure should not risk
identifying patients.
2.2.6 Lots of medical data available from many sources
Beverly Woodward makes a compelling argument that, to the public, patient confidentiality
implies that only people directly involved in one's health care will have access to one's medical records,
and that these health professionals will be bound by strict ethical and legal standards that prohibit further
disclosure [7]. The public is not likely to accept the notion that records are "confidential" if large
numbers of people have access to their contents.
In 1996, the National Association of Health Data Organizations (NAHDO) reported that 37
states had legislative mandates to electronically gather copies of personal health information from
hospitals [8] for cost-analysis purposes. Community pharmacy chains, such as Revco, maintain
electronic records for over 60 percent of the 2.4 billion outpatient prescriptions dispensed annually.
Insurance claims typically include diagnosis, procedure and medication codes along with the name,
address, birth date, and SSN of each patient. Pharmaceutical companies run longitudinal studies on
identified patients and providers. As more health maintenance organizations and hospitals merge, the
number of people with authorized access to identifiable personal health information will increase
dramatically because, as the National Research Council (NRC) recently warned, many of these systems
allow full access to all records by any authorized person [9]. For example, assume a billing clerk at
hospital X can view all information in all medical records within the institution. When hospital X
merges with hospitals Y and Z, that same clerk may then be able to view all records at all three hospitals,
even though the clerk may not need to know information about the patients at the other institutions.
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2.2.7 Problems have been found
The NRC report also warns against inconsistent practices concerning releases of personal health
information. If I approach a hospital as a researcher, I must petition the hospital's institutional review
board (IRB) and state my intentions and methodologies; then the IRB decides whether I get data and in
what form. But, if I approach the same hospital as an administrative consultant, data are given to me
without IRB review. The decision is made and acted on locally.
Recent presentations by the secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
emphasize the threats to privacy stemming from misuse of personal health information [10]. There have
been abuses; here are just a few:
" A banker reportedly cross-referenced a list of patients with cancer against a list of people
who had outstanding loans at his bank. Where he found matches, he called in the
outstanding loans [11].
" A survey of 87 Fortune 500 companies with a total of 3.2 million employees found that 35
percent of respondents used medical records to make decisions about employees [12].
" Cases have been reported of snooping in large hospital computer networks by hospital
employees [13], even though the use of a simple audit trail - a list of each person who
looked up a patient's record - could curtail such behavior [14].
" Consumer Reports found that 40 percent of insurers disclose personal health information to
lenders, employers, or marketers without customer permission [15].
Abuses like the preceding underscore the need to develop safeguards.
2.3 All the data on all the people
Before I look at inference problems inherent in producing anonymous information, I first want to
consider why concern over the problem appears to be escalating. There is currently unprecedented
growth in the number and variety of person-specific data collections and in the sharing of this
information. The impetus for this explosion has been the proliferation of inexpensive fast computers
with large storage capacities operating in ubiquitous network environments.
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In an attempt to characterize the growth in person-specific data, I introduce a new metric termed
global disk storage per person or GDSP, which is measured in megabytes per person. GDSP is the total
rigid disk drive space in megabytes of new units sold in a year divided by the world population in that
year. Figure 6 uses GDSP figures to compute the amount of a person's time that can be documented on a
page of text using a regularly spaced fixed font.
1983 1996 2000
Storage space (TB) 90 160,623 2,829,288
Population (million) 4,500 5,767 6,000
GDSP (MB/person) 0.02 28 472
Time per page 2 months 1 hour 3.5 minutes
GDSP over Time
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Figure 6 Global disk storage per person
In 1983 a half a page could be used to document each month of a person's life in that year.
These recordings included itemized long distance phone calls, credit card purchases, volume of
electricity used, and so forth. In 1996, a page could be used to document each hour of a person's life.
Recordings expanded in both size and number. Examples of new collections included items purchased at
the grocery store, web sites visited, and the date and time in some locations a car proceeded through a
tollbooth. By the year 2000, with 20 gigabyte drives leading the industry, it is projected that a page could
be used to document every 3.5 minutes of a person's life. Most likely collections will expand to include
biometric information such as, heart rate, pulse and temperature. One of the leading proponents of the
information explosion is the health care industry, acting in the belief that having such information will
help reduce cost and improve care.
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Examples 1983 1996
Each birth 280 1864
Each hospital visit 0 663
Each grocery visit 32 1272
Figure 7 Estimated growth in data collections (per encounter) in Illinois (in bytes)
Figure 7 demonstrates how some data collections expanded from 1983 to 1996 for some person-
specific encounters in the State of Illinois. The values are the number of bytes (letters, digits and other
printable characters) that were stored for each person per encounter in the collection shown.
These examples exemplify recent behavioral tendencies recently found in the collection practices
of person-specific data. These informally observed "trends" are enumerated below.
Behavior 1. Given an existing person-specific data collection, expand the number of fields being
collected. I casually refer to this as the "collect more" trend.
Behavior 2. Replace an existing aggregate data collection with a person-specific one. I casually
refer to this as the "collect specifically" trend.
Behavior 3. Given a question or problem to solve or merely provided the opportunity, gather
information by starting a new person-specific data collection related to the question, problem or
opportunity. I causally refer to this as the "collect it ifyou can" trend.
No matter how you look at it, all three tendencies result in more and more information being
collected on individuals. Not only has there been a dramatic increase in the collection of person-specific
data, but also in the sharing of collected data. I define four classes of access restrictions to person-
specific data based on current practices. These are described in Figure 8.
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Insiders only (Pr) "private".
Data collections that are available to authorized "insiders only" are considered to be privately held
information because the only people who gain access are almost exclusively those who directly
collected the information.
Limited Access (SPr) "semi-private".
Data collections denoted as having "limited access" are those where access extends beyond those who
originally collected the information, but only an identifiable small number of people are eligible for
access in comparison to a substantially larger number of people who are not eligible for access. This
access policy typically includes an extensive application and review process.
Deniable Access (SPu) "semi-public".
Data collections having "deniable access" are those where an application and review process may
exist but only an identifiable small number of people are denied access in comparison to a
substantially larger number of people who are eligible for access.
No restrictions (Pu) "Public".
Data collections having "no restrictions" are those where an application process may or may not exist,
but the data collections are generally made available to all who request them.
Figure 8 Levels of access restrictions by data holders to person-specific data
There is no doubt that society is moving towards an environment in which society could have
almost all the data on all the people. As a result, data holders are increasingly finding it difficult to
produce anonymous and declassified information in today's globally networked society. Most data
holders do not even realize the jeopardy at which they place financial, medical, or national security
information when they erroneously rely on security practices of the past. Technology has eroded
previous protections leaving the information vulnerable. In the past, a person seeking to reconstruct
private information was limited to visiting disparate file rooms and engaging in labor-intensive review of
printed material in geographically distributed locations. Today, one can access voluminous worldwide
public information using a standard handheld computer and ubiquitous network resources. Thus from
seemingly anonymous data, and available public and semi-public information, one can often draw
damaging inferences about sensitive information. However, one cannot seriously propose that all
information with any links to sensitive information be suppressed. Society has developed an insatiable
appetite for all kinds of detailed information for many worthy purposes, and modem systems tend to
distribute information widely.
Primarily society is unaware of the loss of privacy and its resulting ramifications that stem from
having so much person-specific information available. When this information is linked together it can
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provide an image of a person that can be as identifying as a fingerprint even if all explicit identifiers like
name, address, and phone number are removed. Clearly a loss of dignity, financial income and credit
worthiness can result when medical information is widely and publicly distributed. A goal of the work
presented in this book is to control the release of data such that inferences about the identities of people
and organizations and other sensitive information contained in the released data cannot be reliably made.
In this way, information that is practically useful can be shared with guarantees that it is sufficiently
anonymous and declassified. I call this effort the study of computational disclosure control.
In the next section, I introduce the basic problems of producing anonymous data.
2.4 Problems producing anonymous data
I now present examples that demonstrate why the problem of producing anonymous data is so
difficult. Consider the informal definition of anonymous data below. While it is easy to understand what
anonymous data mean, I will show by examples that it is increasingly difficult to produce data that are
anonymous.
Definition (informal). anonymous data
The term anonymous data implies that the data cannot be manipulated or linked to identify an
individual.
A common incorrect belief is that removing all explicit identifiers from the data will render it
anonymous; see the informal definition of de-identified data below. Many policies, regulations and
legislation in the United States equate de-identified data and anonymous data.
Definition (informal). de-identified data
De-identified data result when all explicit identifiers such as name, address, and phone number
are removed, generalized, or replaced with a made up alternative.
Data holders often collect person-specific data and then release derivatives of collected data on a
public or semi-public basis after removing all explicit identifiers, such as name, address and phone
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number. Evidence is provided in this chapter that this process is not sufficient to render data anonymous
because combinations of attributes often combine uniquely to re-identify individuals.
2.4.1 A single attribute
The frequency with which a single characteristic occurs in a population can help identify
individuals based on unusual or outlying information. Figure 9 contains a frequency distribution of birth
years found in the list of registered voters for Cambridge, Massachusetts as of February 1997 [16]. It is
not surprising to see fewer people present with earlier birth years. Clearly, a person born in 1900 in
Cambridge is unusual and by implication less anonymous in data.
2
C.
E
z
3500-
3000-
2500-
2000-
1500-
1000-
500-
0..
1900 1908 1916 1924 1932 1940 1948 1956 1964 1972 1980
Birth Year
Figure 9 Frequency of birth years in Cambridge Voter List
2.4.2 More than one attribute
What may be more surprising is that combinations of characteristics can combine to occur even
less frequently than the characteristics appear alone.
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Figure 10 Data that look anonymous
Consider Figure 10. If the three records shown were part of a large and diverse database of
information about Illinois residents, then it may appear reasonable to assume that these three records
would be anonymous. However, the 1990 federal census [17] reports that the ZIP (postal code) 60602
consisted primarily of a retirement community in the Near West Side of Chicago and therefore, there
were very few people (less than 12) of an age under 65 living there. The ZIP code 60140 is the postal
code for Hampshire, Illinois in Dekalb county and reportedly there were only two black women who
resided in that town. Likewise, 62052 had only four Asian families and the census further revealed that
each of these households were headed by Filipino women and all their children were under 18 years of
age. In each of these cases, the uniqueness of the combinations of characteristics found could help re-
identify these individuals.
As another example, Figure 11 contains de-identified data. Each row contains information on a
distinct person, so information about 12 people is reported. The table contains the following fields of
information (Race/Ethnicity, Date of Birth, Gender, ZIP, Medical Problem}.
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Race Birth Gender ZIP Problem
Black 09/20/65 m 02141 short of breath
Black 02/14/65 m 02141 chest pain
Black 10/23/65 f 02138 hypertension
Black 08/24/65 f 02138 hypertension
Blackt 11/07/64 f 02138 obesity
Blackc 12/01/64 f 02138 chest pain
Whiite 110/23/64 m 02138 chest pain
White 08/13/64 m 02139 obesity
Wh ite 05/05/64 m 02139 short of breath
White 02/13/67 m 02138 chest pain
White 03/21/67 m 02138 chest pain
Figure 11 De-identified data
In Figure 11, there is information about an equal number of African Americans (listed as Black)
as there are Caucasian Americans (listed as White) and an equal number of men (listed as m) as there are
women (listed asf), but in combination, there appears only one Caucasian female. No Asian Americans
are listed in Figure 11. These distributions are shown in Figure 12.
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Figure 12 Distributions of gender and race in Figure 11
2.4.3 Learned from the examples
These examples demonstrate that in general, the frequency distributions of combinations of
characteristics have to be examined in combination with respect to the entire population in order to
determine unusual values and cannot be generally predicted from the distributions of the characteristics
individually. Of course, obvious predictions can be made from extreme distributions -such as values that
do not appear in the data will not appear in combination either. As an example, there were no Asians
listed in Figure 11 and so, there were no Asian females or Asian males listed either.
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2.4.4 Real-world examples
Diagnosis Diagnosis date ZIP
Figure 13 Cancer registry that looks anonymous
Recently, a state Department of Public Health received a Freedom of Information request from a
newspaper that was researching occurrences of a rare cancer in a small region of the state. Although the
paper only wanted diagnosis, date of diagnosis (month, day and year) and ZIP code (5 digits) for each
patient in question, the state refused claiming that sensitive information might be gleamed from these
data. In an attempt to discover how anonymous such information in question could be, I conducted an
experiment. Within a few hours the name, and in some cases the Social Security number of five out of
five patients submitted were accurately identified using only publicly available information. Further,
four of the five cases had a diagnosis of Kaposi's Sarcoma which when found in young men is an
indicator of AIDS and revealing such may have been prohibited by state law. Figure 13 shows an
example of this data schema. A more extensive re-identification experiment, using similar data and
achieving similar results was performed on cancer data with respect to children. It is difficult to believe
that such seemingly innocuous information can be so easily re-identified.
* Patient ZIP Code
* Patient Birth Date
* Patient Gender
* Patient Racial Background
* Patient Number
* Visit Date
* Principal Diagnosis Code (ICD9)
* Procedure Codes (up to 14)
* Physician ID#
* Physician ZIP code
* Total Charges
Figure 14 Attributes often collected statewide
I will now demonstrate how linking can be used to perform such re-identifications. The National
Association of Health Data Organizations (NAHDO) reported that 37 states have legislative mandates to
collect hospital level data and that 17 states have started collecting ambulatory care data from hospitals,
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physicians offices, clinics, and so forth [18]. Figure 14 contains a subset of the fields of information, or
attributes, that NAHDO recommends these states accumulate. The few attributes listed in Figure 14
include the patient's ZIP code, birth date, gender, and ethnicity. Clearly, the data are de-identified. The
patient number in earlier versions was often the patient's Social Security number and in subsequent
versions was a scrambled Social Security number [19]. By scrambled I mean that the digits that compose
the Social Security number are moved around into different locations. If a patient's record is identified
and their Social Security number known, then the scrambling algorithm can be determined and used to
identify the proper Social Security numbers for the entire data set.
Ethnicity Name
V is it date ZIP Address
Diagnosis BDrth
registered
Procedure date
Party
Medication Sex affiiation
Total charge Date last
voted
Medical Data Voter List
Figure 15 Linking to re-identify data
For twenty dollars I purchased the voter registration list for Cambridge Massachusetts and
received the information on two diskettes [20] in an attempt to complete the re-identification. Figure 15
shows that these data included the name, address, ZIP code, birth date, and gender of each voter. This
information can be linked using ZIP code, birth date and gender to the medical information described in
Figure 14, thereby linking diagnosis, procedures, and medications to particularly named individuals. The
question that remains of course is how unique would such linking be.
The 1997 voting list for Cambridge Massachusetts contained demographics on 54,805 voters. Of
these, birth date, which is the month, day, and year of birth, alone could uniquely identify the name and
address of 12% of the voters. One could identify 29% of the list by just birth date and gender; 69% with
only a birth date and a five-digit zip code; and 97% when the full postal code and birth date were used.
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Notice that these are only one and two way combinations and do not include three way combinations or
beyond. These values are summarized in Figure 16.
Attribute Combinations Uniqueness
Birth date alone (mm/dd/yr) 12%
Birth date and gender 29%
Birth date and 5-digit ZIP 69%
Birth date and full postal code 97%
Figure 16 Value uniqueness in voter list
In general I can say that the greater the number and detail of attributes reported about an entity,
the more likely that those attributes combine uniquely to identify the entity. For example, in the voter
list, there were 2 possible values for gender and 5 possible five-digit ZIP codes; birth dates were within a
range of 365 days for 100 years. This gives 365,000 unique values, but there were only 54,805 voters.
I conducted experiments using 1990 U.S. Census summary data to determine how many
individuals within geographically situated populations had combinations of demographic values that
occurred infrequently. It was found that 87% (216 million of 248 million) of the population in the United
States had reported characteristics that likely made them unique based only on {5-digit ZIP, gender, date
of birth}. About half of the U.S. population (132 million of 248 million or 53%) are likely to be uniquely
identified by only {place, gender, date of birth), where place is basically the city, town, or municipality
in which the person resides. And even at the county level, {county, gender, date of birth} are likely to
uniquely identify 18% of the U.S. population. In general, few characteristics are needed to uniquely
identify a person.
In Massachusetts, the Group Insurance Commission (GIC) is responsible for purchasing health
insurance for state employees. GIC collected de-identified patient-specific data with nearly one hundred
fields of information per encounter along the lines of the fields discussed in the NAHDO list for
approximately 135,000 state employees and their families. Because the data were believed to be
anonymous, GIC gave a copy of the data to researchers and sold a copy to industry [21]. William Weld
was governor of Massachusetts at that time and his medical records were in that data. Governor Weld
lives in Cambridge Massachusetts. According to the Cambridge Voter list, six people had his particular
birth date; only three of them were men; and, he was the only one in his five-digit zip code.
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Clearly the risks of re-identifying data depend both on the content of released data and on other
related information. Most municipalities and states sell population registers such as voter lists, local
census data, birth records and motor vehicle information. There are other sources of population registers
such as trade and professional association lists. Such information can often be uniquely linked to de-
identified data to provide names, addresses, and other personal information.
These real-world examples demonstrate two major difficulties in providing anonymous data: (1)
knowledge a viewer of the data may hold or bring to bear on the data is usually not known beforehand by
the data holder at the time of release; and, (2) unique and unusual values and combinations of values
appearing within the data themselves often makes identification of related entities easier. The examples
also underscore the need to develop solutions that limit the ability to link external information to data
and therefore control the inferences that can be drawn.
The outline for the remainder of this work is as follows. In the next chapter, chapter 3, I discuss
related work. I then survey disclosure control techniques and the nature of disclosure control in chapter
4. A formal presentation with accompanying definitions of protection models is also presented in chapter
4. Finally, four systems are presented and compared in chapter 5.
53
Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection
Chapter 3 Background
The problem of controlling inferences that can be drawn from released data is not new. There are
existing works in the statistics community on statistical databases and in the computer security
community on multi-level databases to consider. However, none of these works provide solutions to the
broader problems experienced in today's setting that are the topic of this work. Before examining these
traditions, I establish a common vocabulary by adopting the following definitions.
Unless otherwise stated, the term data refers to entity-specific information that is conceptually
organized as a table of rows (or records) and columns (or fields). Each row is termed a tuple. A tuple
contains a relationship among the records or set of values associated with an entity. Tuples within a table
are not necessarily unique. Each column is called an attribute and denotes a field or semantic category of
information that is a set of possible values; therefore, an attribute is also a domain. Attributes within a
table are unique. So by observing a table, each row is an ordered n-tuple of values <d, d2, ... , d,> such
that each value d is in the domain of thej-th column, forj=l, 2, ... , n where n is the number of columns.
In mathematical set theory, a relation corresponds with this tabular presentation, the only difference is
the absence of column names. Ullman provides a detailed discussion of relational database concepts [22].
Throughout the remainder of this work each tuple is assumed to be specific to one entity and no
two tuples pertain to the same entity. This assumption simplifies discussion without loss of applicability.
To draw an inference is to come to believe a new fact on the basis of other information. A
disclosure means that explicit or inferable information about an entity was released that was not
intended. This definition may not be consistent with colloquial use but is used in this work consistent
with its meaning in statistical disclosure control. So, disclosure control attempts to identify and limit
disclosures in released data. Typically the goal of disclosure control with respect to person-specific data
is to ensure that released data are anonymous.
3.1 Statistical databases
Federal and state statistics offices around the world have traditionally been entrusted with the
release of statistical information about all aspects of the populace [23]. The techniques, practices and
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theories from this community however, have historically had three tremendous advantages. First, most
statistics offices held centralized, sole-source exhaustive collections of information and therefore could
often determine the sensitivity of many values using their data alone. Second, statistics offices primarily
produced summary data, which by the nature of aggregation could often hide entity-specific information
though care still had to be taken to protect against inferences. Finally, statistics offices previously
released information in an environment whose computational power and access to other data was
extremely limited. These advantages have been eroded in today's environment. Today's producers of
useful publicly available data must contend with autonomous releases of entity-specific information by
other data holders and with recipients who are technologically empowered.
Like other data holders, statistics offices are also facing tremendous demand for entity-specific
data for applications such as data mining, cost analysis, fraud detection and retrospective research. But
many of the established statistical database techniques, which involve various ways of adding noise [24]
to the data while still maintaining some statistical invariant [25, 26], often destroy the integrity of tuples
and so, for many new uses of data, these established techniques are not appropriate. I will further discuss
disclosure limitation techniques commonly employed to protect the confidentiality of statistical
databases in chapter 4; Willenborg and De Waal [27] provide more extensive coverage. However, I will
mention Markov perturbation now as an example of a technique used in statistical disclosure control
[28].
Given local census data that includes income, number of children and age, values can be slightly
perturbed so overall statistics remain the same, but specific values are no longer available, thereby
making it harder to link the information to other sources with confidence. Examples of such actions
include: (1) decrementing the value associated with the child attribute in one tuple and then incrementing
the value associated with a child attribute in another; and, (2) reducing the value associated with a salary
attribute by $10,000 in one tuple and then adding $5000 to the values of two others. Unfortunately, many
new applications that learn from data and detect correlation rely on the integrity of the tuple. Also many
statistical disclosure limitation techniques have severely limited applicability because many new data
collections are characterized as having primarily categorical attributes and not continuous ones. In a
medical database, for example, how does one perturb a diagnosis of lung cancer?
Summary data is the result of aggregating information. Even in releases of summary data
statistical offices are finding their established practices failing given the increase of entity-specific data
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and the proliferation of computing power because more data and more powerful tools are available for
unwanted linking. The European Union in response to these growing concerns has recently funded a
tremendous effort to develop solutions. Their first computational result was p-Argus from Statistics
Netherlands [29]. I will examine this system in chapter 5 and show the first release of p-Argus does not
provide adequate protection.
3.2 Multi-level databases
Another related area is aggregation and inference in multi-level databases [30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35]
which concerns restricting the release of lower classified information such that higher classified
information cannot be derived. Denning and Lunt [36] described a multilevel relational database system
(MDB) as having data stored at different security classifications and users having different security
clearances.
Su and Ozsoyoglu [37] formally investigated inference in MDB. They showed that eliminating
precise inference compromise due to functional dependencies and multi-valued dependencies is NP-
complete. By extension to this work, the precise elimination of all inferences with respect to the
identities of the individuals whose information is included in person-specific data is typically impossible
to guarantee. Intuitively this makes sense. Consider two fictitious people named Bob and Alice and Bob
is asked to protect his home against invasion from Alice. First, Bob puts locks on his doors and windows.
Alice then breaks the glass of a window. Bob responds by installing bars on the windows. Alice now
drills through the ceiling. Bob is baffled. The problem is Bob cannot consider a priori every possible
attack. This is the case in trying to produce anonymous data as well, so this works seeks to primarily
protect against known attacks. As was discussed in chapter 2, the biggest problems result from inferences
that can be drawn after linking the released data to other knowledge, so in this work, it is the ability to
link the result to foreseeable data sources that must be controlled.
Morgenstern [38] introduced a framework for MDB concerning imprecise inference analysis. His
approach involved "spheres of influence" to characterize inference. In comparison to this work, the
forward-chained inference process employed in spheres of influence is analogous to linking in this work.
That is, Figure 15 could be extended to link more and more data collections beyond the medical data and
voter list shown until a chain of links emerged; in this sense, the links extend the sphere. However in this
work, attributes are assumed to be independent and only their association with other attributes in a data
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collection relates them. Morgenstern provides an example in which protecting a person's address should
include the person's telephone number because the address can determine the single area code and a
limited set of exchanges. Clearly, knowledge from such inferences exploits the semantic relationships
between attributes. To combat this problem in this work, I do not require such knowledge be explicitly
recognized, but instead rely on the ability to link related attributes. This work assumes related attributes
appear in the same collections and in data sources that contain related attributes. For example, phone
directories typically contain name, address and phone number as attributes. Therefore, any linking to a
phone directory will automatically relate these attributes and protecting one reveals a need to consider
the others sensitive.
Catalytic inference analysis was introduced by Hinke [39] and formalized by Hale and Shenoi
[40]. Common sense knowledge and discoveries of indirect but related information can provide
additional inference when to brought to bear on sensitive information. The approaches taken by Hinke
and by Hale and Shenoi are computationally intensive, combating NP-complete problems with dynamic
programming used on small data sets. In contrast, this work concerns large and very large databases with
algorithms that typically work in real-time. Complexity is substantially reduced by leveraging the fact
that the choice of attributes in a collection is an artifact of society and their natural grouping implies a
relationship between them [41]. This of course does not capture all the possible ways and kinds of other
information that could be brought to bear on the data, which work on catalytic inference analysis
attempts to address. In this work, attention is narrowly focused on directly linking data sources using
their stated attributes.
Buczkowski [42] used Bayesian probability to estimate security risks due to imprecise inference.
In this work however, it is the actual inferred information that is needed and not an estimate of the
probability to which a value is inferred.
Many aggregation inference problems can be solved by database design [43, 44], but this
solution is not practical in the entity-specific data setting described in chapter 2. In today's environment,
information is often divided and partially replicated among multiple data holders and the data holders
usually operate autonomously in making disclosure control decisions. The result is that disclosure control
decisions are typically made locally with incomplete knowledge of how sensitive other holders of the
information might consider replicated data. For example, when somewhat aged information on joint
projects is declassified differently by the Department of Defense than by the Department of Energy, the
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overall declassification effort suffers; using the two partial releases, the original may be reconstructed in
its entirety. In general, systems that attempt to produce anonymous data must operate without the degree
of omniscience and level of control typically available in the traditional aggregation problem.
In both aggregation and MDB, the primary technique used to control the flow of sensitive
information is suppression, where sensitive information and all information that allows the inference of
sensitive information are simply not released [45]. Suppression can drastically reduce the quality of the
data, and in the case of statistical use, overall statistics can be altered, rendering the data practically
useless. When protecting national interests, not releasing the information at all may be possible, but the
greatest demand for entity-specific data is in situations where the data holder must provide adequate
protections while keeping the data useful, such as sharing person-specific medical data for research
purposes. In chapters 4 and 5, I will present other techniques and combinations of techniques that
produce more useful data than using suppression alone.
3.3 Computer security is not privacy protection
An area that might appear to have a common ancestry with disclosure control is access control
and authentication, which are traditional areas associated with computer security. Work in this area
ensures that the recipient of information has the authority to receive that information. While access
control and authentication protections can safeguard against direct disclosures, they do not address
disclosures based on inferences that can be drawn from released data. The more insidious problem in
disclosure control is not so much whether the recipient can get access or not to the information as much
as what values will constitute the information the recipient will receive. A general doctrine of the work
presented herein is to release all the information but to do so in a way in which designated properties are
protected. Therefore, disclosure control lies outside of traditional work on access control and
authentication.
3.4 Multiple queries can leak inference
Denning [46] and others [47, 48] were among the first to explore inferences realized from
multiple queries to a database. For example, consider a table containing only (physician, patient,
medication). A query listing the patients seen by each physician, i.e., a relation R(physician, patient),
may not be sensitive. Likewise, a query itemizing medications prescribed by each physician may also not
be sensitive. But the query associating patients with their prescribed medications may be sensitive
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because medications typically correlate with diseases. One common solution, called query restriction,
prohibits queries that can reveal sensitive information. This is effectively realized by suppressing all
inferences to sensitive data. In contrast, this work poses a real-time solution to this problem by
advocating that the data be first rendered sufficiently anonymous, and then the resulting data used as the
basis on which queries are processed.
3.5 Research on population uniqueness
Skinner and Holmes [49] developed and tested methods for estimating the percent of unique
values in the general population based on a smaller database. These methods are based on subsampling
techniques and equivalence class structure. Unfortunately, even if these methods provide near-perfect
answers they are of limited use in this setting. For example, Figure 16 reports that 12% of the Cambridge
voters had unique birth dates. Knowing such underscores the sensitivity of the attribute, but when
releasing person-specific information about Cambridge voters, knowing that fact does not help identify
which persons in a data collection need their birth date information protected.
3.6 Inference, learning and artificial intelligence
Privacy protection, profiling and link analysis have not been traditional areas within artificial
intelligence (AI). However, the American Association for Artificial Intelligence held a symposium a
couple of years ago to introduce Al researchers to link analysis recognizing that such work could draw on
techniques from semantic networks, ontological engineering, graph theory, social network analysis and
knowledge discovery in data [50]. These areas, as well as most areas within Al, are concerned with some
kind of inference [51]. The best understood is deduction, which logically draws true conclusions from
true premises. A second kind of inference is abduction, which is the process of generating explanations
from observations and causal relationships. A third kind of inference is induction, which is more
commonly known as learning because it occurs when particular examples are used to reach general
conclusions. Both abduction and induction can allow false conclusions; nevertheless, they are very
useful. While linking data is primarily a deductive process, disclosure control uses all three kinds of
inference. Understanding the sensitivity of attributes and the interpretation of associated values often
result from abductive and inductive processes.
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3.7 The k-nearest neighbor algorithm
One of the oldest and most analyzed inductive learning procedures is the well-known k-nearest
neighbor algorithm. Cover and Hart [52] present early theoretical results. Duda and Hart [53] provide a
good overview. In this kind of learning method, examples are simply stored as points in n-dimensional
space. Neighboring points are measured in terms of Euclidian distances between points. The overall
space is divided into k partitions such that each partition is considered a class. Then, when a new
instance is encountered, its relationship to previously stored examples is examined and a classification
made based on the Euclidian distance from the new point to neighboring points and therefore, by the
division or class in which the new point resides.
While these methods are a cornerstone of the machine learning or knowledge discovery in data
field, they have not been used in disclosure control. Yet, such methods could be applied to tabular data.
Let each attribute in a table corresponds to a dimension. Let the values themselves, or alternatively the
domains of the values, have a numeric presentation with Euclidian properties. Then, a table with n
attributes and m tuples corresponds to m points in n-dimensional space. The k-nearest neighbor algorithm
could then be applied, though admittedly, the results would be of limited use, if of any use at all, to
disclosure control.
One problem is the number of attributes found in a table. As the number of attributes increases
so do the number of dimensions; and, as the number of dimensions increases, finding similarity matches
in high dimensional space becomes extremely difficult because of troubles measuring distance. Weights
can be applied to each dimension in cases where some dimensions are considered more or less important
than others [54]. This equates to lengthening or shortening the axes in Euclidean space. Moore and Lee
[55] provide strategies for eliminating the least relevant dimensions from the space. In particular, they
provide efficient ways to repeatedly leave one dimension out and then examine the results in order to
validate the utility of each dimension.
Another problem concerns the benefit of the results to disclosure control. What is needed is a
way to detect the closeness of unusual values in data as the data are being distorted to provide anonymity
protection. So in this work, I will present a related algorithm I developed, which I term k-Similar, that
produces sufficiently anonymous data. This algorithm divides data into groups such that the size of each
group consists of k or more of the "closest" tuples based on a metric with Euclidian properties.
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Summary
In summary, the catalyst for now examining disclosure control in a broader context has been the
dramatic increase in the availability of entity-specific data from autonomous data holders. These changes
have expanded the scope and nature of inference control problems and exasperated established operating
practice. The goal of this work is to provide comprehensive models for understanding, evaluating and
constructing computational systems that control inferences in this setting.
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Chapter 4 Methods
This chapter ends with a formal presentation and real-world systems are evaluated with respect
to the formalism in the next chapter. But first, I provide a framework for reasoning about disclosure
control and I survey some disclosure limitation techniques using this framework.
4.1 Survey of disclosure limitation techniques
I begin by introducing commonly employed disclosure limitation techniques; Figure 17 contains
a listing. Here is a quick description of each technique though some were introduced earlier. De-
identification [56] and suppression [57] were introduced earlier. Encryption is a process of making
values secret by replacing one value with another in such a way that certain properties with respect to
reversing the process are maintained. Swapping values involves exchanging the values associated with an
attribute in two tuples where the value from the first tuple becomes the value for the second and vice
versa. Generalization replaces a value with a more general, less specific alternative. Substitution replaces
a value with another value in its equivalence class. Sampling restricts the number of tuples that will be
released. Scrambling is a reordering of tuples and is used when the order of appearance of tuples in a
release allows inference'. Changing outliers to medians requires detecting unusual values and replacing
them with values that occur more commonly. Perturbation involves making changes to values, usually to
maintain some overall aggregate statistic. Rounding is often used on continuous variables to group values
into ranges. Adding additional tuples dilutes the number of tuples containing real information but values
within the newly generated tuples can be chosen to maintain certain aggregate properties. Additive noise
involves the random incrementing or decrementing of values.
This is slightly inconsistent with the relational model, but in practical use is often an issue.
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De-identification Substitution
Value and Attribute Suppression Outlier to medians
Based Encryption Perturbation
Swap values Rounding
Generalize values Additive noise
Tuple based Sampling
Add tuples
Scramble tuples
Other Query restriction
Summaries
Figure 17 Disclosure limitation techniques
Query restriction [58] and summary data [59] described earlier are not disclosure limitation
techniques but rather special circumstances in which disclosure control is required. In summary data and
query restriction, values are often suppressed so as not to reveal sensitive information. This work poses a
solution to many problems in query restriction and summarizing by basing queries and summaries on
data released from data already determined to be sufficiently anonymous.
Notice that all of these techniques have the advantage that a recipient of the data can be told
what was done to the data in terms ofprotection. For data to be useful and results drawn from data to be
properly interpreted, it is critical to share what techniques and associated parameters were employed in
protecting the confidentiality of entities within the data. Of course usefulness is determined from the
point of view of a recipient of the data and what is useful to one recipient is not necessarily beneficial to
another. For example, using perturbation can render data virtually useless for learning entity-specific
information from the data or identifying entity-specific correlation. On the other hand, using suppression
can render data virtually useless for statistical purposes.
During the application of any technique, decisions must be made and these decisions can
dramatically impact the data's fitness for a particular purpose. For example, consider a situation in which
it is necessary to suppress either values associated with the attribute ethnicity or those associated with the
attribute ZIP. If the recipient of the data is an epidemiologist studying cancer rates near toxic waste sites,
then the suppression of ZIP may render the data useless. Conversely, if the epidemiologist was studying
the prevalence of heart disease among various ethnic groups, then the suppression of Ethnicity may have
the same ill result. Notice that the data holder cannot release both versions, because doing so may allow
the two releases to be linked and reveal all information. Data holders must typically decide a priori for
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which uses released information will be best suited in order to select the disclosure limitation techniques
most appropriate for the task.
4.2 Reasoning about disclosure control
The goal of this section is to provide a framework for constructing and evaluating systems that
release information such that the released information limits what can be revealed about properties of the
entities that are to be protected. For convenience, I focus on person-specific data and the property to be
protected is the identity of the subjects whose information is contained in the data. A disclosure implies
that an identity was revealed. Consider the informal definition below. Basically, an anonymous data
system seeks to effect disclosure control. I use the framework presented in this section to describe the
requirements of an anonymous data system and in the next section I formally define such.
Definition (informal). anonymous data system
An anonymous data system is one that releases entity-specific data such that particular
properties, such as identity, of the entities that are the subject of the data cannot be inferred from
the released data.
I can be more specific about how properties are selected and controlled. Recall the real-world
examples provided in chapter 2. In those cases, the need for protection centered on limiting the ability to
link released information to other external collections. So the properties to be controlled are
operationally realized as attributes in the privately held collection. The data holder is expected to identify
all attributes in the private information that could be used for linking with external information. Such
attributes not only include explicit identifiers such as name, address, and phone number, but also include
attributes that in combination can uniquely identify individuals such as birth date and gender. The set of
such attributes has been termed a quasi-identifier by Dalenius [60] and an identificate by Smith [61]. So
operationally, an anonymous data system releases entity-specific data such that the ability to link to other
information using the quasi-identifier is limited.
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External Information Released Information
Ann 10/2/61 02139 1...1.110/2/61102139
Jed
Jwq Dan f
Jxyn
JXYDon Abe
Al
Dave
Subjects
Population Ann 10/2/61 02139
Universe Private Information
Figure 18 Release using de-identification
Figure 18 provides an overview of the disclosure control process. Population consists of persons
who are identified as {Dan, Don, Dave, Ann, Abe, Al}, A subset of Population called Subjects is the set
of people, in this case {Ann, Abe, Al}, whose information appears in PrivateInformation. Universe
consists of Population and the set of pseudo-entities {Jcd, Jwq, Jxy}. Pseudo entities are not considered
real individuals, as are the members of Population. Instead, the existence of a pseudo-entity is implied
by a set of values, which are associated with attributes that identify people, when in fact no such person
is associated with that particular set of values.
There exists a collection function c: Subjects -> PrivateInformation that maps information
about members of Subjects into PrivateInformation. The functionf is a disclosure limitation function
such thatf PrivateInformation -> ReleasedInformation. In the example shown in Figure 18,f simply
de-identifies tuples from PrivateInformation; and so, the explicit identifier Ann is not found in
Releasedl nformation.
ExternalInformation results from joining all publicly (and semi-publicly) available information.
The relations gj and g2 illustrate how a tuple in Released Information can be linked to a tuple in
ExternalInformation to re-identify Ann, the original subject. The problem of producing anonymous
information can be described as constructing the function f such that some desired invariant exists or
some specific assertion can be made about gi and g2. Such an invariant or assertion forms the basis for
protection.
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In the example shown in Figure 18, the functionf is simply the de-identification function and the
functions g, and g2 show that f is not sufficient; it allows a disclosure. Therefore, merely suppressing
explicit identifiers is inadequate.
External Information Released Information
JAn n 110/2/61102139 
.L_ g
Jcd
Jwq Dan Ann
Jxy Don Abe
Al
Dave
Subjects
Population Ann 10/2/6102139 -
Universe Private Information
Figure 19 Release using encryption
Consider Figure 19. The functionf seeks to protect the entire quasi-identifier {name, birth date,
ZIP} by simply encrypting the associated values. If strong encryption is used and the encrypted values
are not used with other releases, then as the diagram in Figure 19 illustrates, the relation g will map to a
pseudo-entity, being unable to link to ExternalInformation. If on the other hand,f used weak encryption
then the relation g would be able to map directly to Ann by simply invertingf Using this approach with
strong encryption clearly provides adequate protection, but such protection is at the cost of rendering the
resulting information of limited use. Similar results are realized if f involved suppression rather than
encryption. As shown in Figure 19, the only attribute that remains practically useful is diagnosis with no
consideration to age or geographical location.
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External Information Released Information
Al 3/8/6102138 8.1
92
Jcd
Jwq Dan Annf
JxYDon Abe
Dave
Subjects
Population Ann 10/2/61102139 -
Universe Private Information
Figure 20 Release using swapping
In Figure 20, the functionf uses swapping [62]. The values associated with the attributes of the
quasi-identifier are swapped among tuples. This clearly destroys the integrity of the tuples themselves;
however, it maintains overall aggregate statistics. Enforced at the attribute level, this technique can cause
extensive distortion. For example if the data are medical information and swapping is employed at the
attribute level, a resulting tuple could imply that a 10 year old boy gave birth to a 50 year old woman.
Such data would not be very useful for discovering entity-specific patterns pertaining to healthcare cost,
outcome or fraud.
A less severe deployment of swapping is shown in Figure 20. In this depiction, the attributes of
the quasi-identifier are swapped as a unit among the tuples. A tuple in ReleasedInformation contains
the demographic information of Al associated with Ann's diagnosis. The relations g, and g2 show that this
tuple can be linked to ExternalInformation because after all, Al is a real entity. Suppose A's original
diagnosis involved a cancer whose typical long-term prognosis is excellent, but Ann's diagnosis involved
a cancer that is almost always terminal in the short-term. After swapping, Al is reported as having the
more serious illness. Statisticians who use this technique typically post a notice that warns that the
integrity of tuples has been compromised. Even still, the warning usually appears separate and distinct
from the data themselves and so, the warning may not be considered during the use of the data and the
results can be damaging. For example, the consequences to Al in terms of life insurance, employment and
credit worthiness may be quite severe and the source of confusion may not be recognized. Also, if the
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entities whose information is the subject of Released Information all have cancer, then while a recipient
of Released Information may not know the seriousness of Al's cancer, a recipient does know that Al has
cancer. This underscores an important point. Implicit attributes often exist in ReleasedInformation and
their associated values are the same for all tuples --namely, the identity of the source of the information
and the date and time of its creation. Sensitive particulars about the source and/or creation time may be
available in External/nformation and therefore allow unwanted inferences.
External Information Released Information
Dan. . .....................
Ann 11-..16Ann
Jwq
Jxy
Don ... Abe
-AAl
Dave
Subjects
Population Ann 10/2/61 02139
Universe Private Information
Figure 21 Release using generalization
Consider Figure 21. The function f generalizes the attributes of the quasi-identifier. I will take a
moment to discuss what is meant by generalizing an attribute and then I will return to this scenario for
disclosure limitation.
The idea of generalizing an attribute is really a simple concept. A value is simply replaced by a
less specific, more general value that is faithful to the original value. In Figure 21 the original ZIP codes
{02138, 02139} can be generalized to 0213*, thereby stripping the rightmost digit and semantically
indicating a larger geographical area. Likewise {02141, 02142} are generalized to 0214*, and (0213*,
0214*} could be further generalized to 021 **.
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Z2={021** 21**
ZI={0213*,0214*} 0213* 0214*
Zo={02138,02139,02141,02142} 02138 02139 02141 02142
Postal (ZIP) code
E 1={person} eson
EO={ Asian,Black,White} Asian Black White
Ethnicity
Figure 22 Generalizing an attribute
Generalization is effective because substituting values with their more generalized values
typically increases the number of tuples having the same values. The single term requirement on the
maximal element insures that all values associated with an attribute can eventually be generalized to a
single value. All values of all attributes can be semantically organized into generalization hierarchies.
Notice in Figure 22 that the values {Asian, Black, White} generalize to Person. This means that a
generalization of an Ethnicity attribute given this hierarchy is similar to suppressing the entire attribute.
This demonstrates that generalizing an attribute to its maximal element provides almost the same
protection and distortion as suppressing the attribute. The relationship between generalization and
suppression will be further discussed in chapter 5.
I now return to Figure 21. The disclosure limitation function f generalizes the attributes of the
quasi-identifier to produce ReleasedInformation. Tuples in ReleasedInformation can then be linked
to Externalinformation ambiguously. In Figure 21, the tuple shown in Releasedinformation links to
both Al and Ann in ExternalInformation and so, it relates back to both of them in Subjects. The
disclosed diagnosis cannot be confidently attributed to either Al or Ann. In fact, a k can be chosen such
thatf generalizes tuples from PrivateInformation in such a way that there are at least k possible entities
to which each released tuple may refer. Additional protection can often be realized when tuples in
ReleasedInformation are ambiguously linked to tuples in ExternalInformation such that the resulting
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identifications do not only refer to entities in Subjects but also refer to other entities in Universe that
are not in Subjects.
A problem however is choosing the right size for k. It is based on several parameters including
direct and economical communication connections to Subjects. Here is an example. I reviewed some
archives from old email exchanges on a newsgroup list and found a couple of email messages pertaining
to a chance encounter in Cambridge, Massachusetts between a young woman, whom I will call Alice,
and a young man, whom I will call Bob. During the brief conversation between Alice and Bob, no names,
addresses or phone numbers were exchanged. Several days later Alice engaged in an email exchange on a
newsgroup list in which she provided a casual description of Bob. I constructed a composite of Bob from
the email messages. Here is an overview of the details. Bob was about 5'8" in height with dark features.
His parents were from Greece. He was believed to live near the water, to enjoy playing soccer and to be
an MIT graduate student in electrical engineering or computer science. Given this basic description, I
sent a single email message to all members of the electrical engineering and computer science
department at MIT. Approximately 1,000 people could have received the message. Five replies were
received. All of them had one name, which turned out to be the correct individual. The man himself was
quite shocked because he had merely had a private conversation carried in a personal situation and he
had not even given his name, phone number, or address. With respect to this disclosure control model, k
would be about 100 in this case and still that was not sufficient because of the direct and economical
communication connection to all-possible subjects and sources of additional information.
This concludes my survey of disclosure limitation techniques and introduction of this framework
for reasoning about disclosure control. In the next section I introduce formal models of protection.
Following that, I compare and contrast some real-world systems in the next chapter.
4.3 Formal protection models
In this section, I formally bring the pieces together; namely, the lessons learned in the real-world
examples from chapter 2, the issues presented in the discussion of related work in chapter 3 and the
framework for reasoning about disclosure control that was presented earlier in this chapter. Terms
mentioned casually and defined informally will be presented formally. So, I begin this section by
formally defining the terms I have been using, leading up to the definition of a basic anonymous data
system termed ADSO. From there, I introduce basic protection models termed null-map, k-map and
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wrong-map which provide protection by ensuring that released information maps to no, k or incorrect
entities, respectively. The non-technical reader may elect to skip this section altogether and continue with
the next chapter, which examines four real-world systems that attempt to effect disclosure control.
As stated earlier, I assume the classical relational model of databases [63]. The definition below
defines a table and attributes consistent with this model.
Definition. attributes
Let B(A1 ,...,An) be a table with a finite number of tuples. The finite set of attributes of B are
Given a table B(A 1,...,A {A...,A} < {A1,.. .,An}, and a tuple te B, I use t[A,,...,AJ to denote
the sequence of the values, v,...,vj, of A ,...,4A in t. I use B[A,,...,A 1] to denote the projection, maintaining
duplicate tuples, of attributes .,,... A in B.
Definition. entity
Let p, = { (Ai, v,) : A; is an attribute and vi is its associated value}. I say p, is an entity.
U = {pi : pi is an entity} is a finite set I term a population of entities.
Definition. collection function
Given a population of entities U and a table T, I say f, is a collection function on U.
That is, f,: U -> T is a collection function and T is an entity-specific table. I say that T is a
person-specific table if the entities are people.
If T is an entity specific table containing information about entities in U and T contains no
additional tuples, then each tuple in T corresponds to information on at least one entity in U. This is
memorialized in the following theorem.
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Theorem 1
Given a population of entities U, a table T(A1 ,...,An), a collection functionfc: U -> T, and
f, is onto -> Vt[A ,...,A]eT, ]pje U such that V(A,, v)Epi where Ae {A,,...,j} and v, = t[A].
Proof.
By definition, a functionf, from U to T is onto (or a surjection) if and only if for every element
in te T there is an element pe U withfc(p)=t.
Example.
Let T be a table of visits to a hospital emergency room. Let U reflect the population of people
within the geographical area serviced by the hospital. Then, f,: U -> T is the process for
recording hospital visits. Notice thatf, is the collection function andf, is onto.
Definition. disclosure control function
Given a table T and a finite set of tables B, I say f is a disclosure control function on {T}. That
is, f: {T} -> B is a disclosure controlfunction .
Definition. re-identification relation
Given a population of entities U, an entity-specific table T and fc: U - T,
I sayfg is a re-identification relation if and only if:
3pi EU such that pe fg(fc(p)) and tfg(fc(pj))j = k, where 1 k << Ut.
I also say thatfg is a re-identification ofp, and I say thatfg uniquely identifies p, if k= 1.
Pseudo entities are not real entities but their existence is implied by a set of values, one or more
of which are false, that are associated with attributes that seem to identify them as entities. This is
described in the definition below.
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Definition. pseudo-entities
Given a population of entities U, an entity-specific table T, f,: U -+ T and a re-identification
relationfg: T -+ U' where U c U'. I say (U'-U) is the finite set ofpseudo-entities.
The following definition formally introduces a quasi-identifier [64] as set of attributes whose
associated values may be useful for linking to re-identify the entity that is the subject of the data.
Definition. quasi-identifier
Given a population of entities U, an entity-specific table T(A1,...,A), f,: U -> T and fg: T - U',
where U c U'. A quasi-identifier of T, written QT, is a set of attributes {Ai,...,Aj} c {A 1,...,An}
where:
-pe U such thatfg(f(p,)[QT]) = pi.
Example.
Let V be the voter-specific table described earlier in Figure 15 as the voter list. A quasi-identifier
for V, written Qv, is {name, address, ZIP, birth date, gender}.
Linking the voter list to the medical data as shown in Figure 15, clearly demonstrates that {birth
date, ZIP, gender} c Qv. However, {name, address} g Qv because these attributes can also appear in
external information and be used for linking.
The goal of disclosure control is to limit the extent to which released information can be
confidently linked to other available information. In the case of anonymity, it is usually publicly
available data on which linking is to be prohibited and so attributes which appear in private data and also
appear in public data are candidates for linking; therefore, these attributes constitute the quasi-identifier
and the disclosure of these attributes must be controlled. It is believed that these attributes can be easily
identified by the data holder.
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Assumption.
The data holder can identify attributes in their private information that may also appear in
external information.
Consider an instance where this assumption is incorrect; that is, the data holder misjudges which
attributes are sensitive for linking. In this case, the released data may be less anonymous than what was
required, and as a result, individuals may be more easily identified. Clearly, this risk cannot be perfectly
resolved by the data holder because the data holder cannot always know what each recipient of the data
knows but policies and contracts can help. Also, the data holder may find it necessary to release data that
are only partially anonymous. Again, policies, laws and contracts can provide complementary
protections. These are discussed in chapter 6. In the remainder of this work, I assume a proper quasi-
identifier has been recognized.
Definition. explicit-identifier
Let T(A,..., A,) be a person-specific table and Q7 (A1,...,A 1) be a quasi-identifier for T. Further,
let {A.,...,A,} _ QT and D be the set of direct communication methods, such as email, telephone,
postal mail, etc., where with no additional information, gdE D is a relation from T[AX,..., A,] to
the population reachable by gd's communication method. Let X(s) be a random variable on the
sample space s={lg( t[A,,..., Ay])J : te T}. I say {A,,...,4} is an explicit identifier of T if the
expected value of X(s) is 1 and 1/a- of X(s)~oo. 2
Basically, the definition above states that an explicit identifier is a set of attributes than can be
used together with a direct communication method, and no additional information, to distinctly and
reliably contact the entity that is the subject of those values for the attributes. Recognizing that such
communications are not perfect, the definition implies the method should be almost perfect.
2 Because communication method is not itself also defined here, some readers may prefer to more formally consider
an explicit identifier as some subset of a quasi-identifier.
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Definition. explicit-identifiers
Let T(A,..., A) be an entity-specific table and Q1(A,... ,A) be a quasi-identifier for T. The
explicit identifiers of T, written, ET = {e, : e, is an explicit identifier of T}.
The definition above states that the explicit identifiers of a table is a set of attribute sets, where
each member set is an explicit identifier of the table.
Lemma.
The explicit identifiers of table T is E if and only if the explicit identifiers of a quasi-identifier
of T is ET.
Example.
The following are examples of explicit identifiers: (email address}, (name, address}, {name,
phone number}. The following are quasi identifiers, but are not explicit identifiers: {name},
(Social Security number}, {phone}, {phone, Social Security number}.
Given entity-specific data, an anonymous data system releases entity-specific data such that the
identities of the entities that are the subject of the original data are protected. Such protection typically
relies on a quasi-identifier for the original entity-specific data. The definition below defines a basic
anonymous data system.
Definition. basic anonymous data system
A basic anonymous data system, ADSO, is a nine-tuple (S, P, PT, QI, U, R, E, G,]), where the
following conditions are satisfied:
1. S is the finite set of entities with attributes to be protected.
2. P is the finite set of possible entities. S c P.
3. PT is the finite multi-set of privately held information about each member of S. There exists
a collection function,fe: S-> PT, where PT={k * ts : t =fc(s) and [fi(fc(s))| = k, Vse S }.
4. Q/ is the quasi-identifier of PT denoting attributes to be protected.
5. U is a finite set of possible entities and pseudo-entities. P c U.
6. R is the set of possible releases. Each release RTe R is a finite multi-set.
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7. E is the collection of possible external information.VTi=1 .,m where Ti is a collection of
external information about a subset of the members of P, then E =T 1 x ... x T".
8. G is the set of possible relations from R -> U.
G = (g 1 ,g 2 ):9 1 0o 2 where R g' > E g2 > U
Given a QI for PT, written QIpf= A,,... ,A, a release RT e R where RT =(PT[Q1]), and a set
of explicit identifiers named EIg2 where g 2(g(RT)[EIg2]) c U, then
gj(RT) = {k e t.[2,...,Am] : tu[QIpT] E RT, tu[EIg2] e E and Jtu[QIT,,EIg2|= k,
Vtu E E, QIPT g A,,...,A m and EIg2 g A,,...,An 1 }.
g2 and g2 are relations and g2 is a direct communication method.
9. f is a disclosure control function such thatf:{PT}- R and given a release RTe R where
RT =f(PT[Q]), one of the following conditions must be satisfied:
a. if 3 g e G, 3 t e RT, whereflf(s)) = t and g((ff(s))) = s then 3 ue U, such that u s and
g(f(fi(s))) = u.
b. if 3 (g,, g2) e G where GT = gj(ftt[Q1])), 3 ts[Ql]e RT and t[QI, EIg2]e GT wherefi(s)
= ts and g2(gl(ftts[Q1]))[EIg2]) = s, then 3 tu[QI, EIg2]e GT such that ts tu and g2(tu[QI,
EIg2])= S.
c. Given PT(A ,...,An) and RT (A,,...,A) , let Ap,...Aq= ({A,...,An} - Q) (-h {,...,4,}. If
3 g e G, 3 ts] [A,,...,Aq] e RT, wherefc(s) = ts, and g(f(ts1[QI])) = s and ts][A,.Aqls*
and if 3 ts2[Ap,...,A] E PT such thatfc(s)= ts2 and(t 2) = tsi and ts2 [A,,...,A] =
tsJ[Ap,...,Aq], then condition (a) or condition (b) above must be satisfied on ts.
The overall concept is of an anonymous data system is that a derivate of privately collected data
are released such that the subjects of the data cannot be confidently or uniquely identified.
The main property is property 9. It says that iff produces a release RTe R based on PT[QJ], then
there can not exist a function or composite of functions which can confidently associate any of the
original subjects uniquely with their information in PT.
If an entity is correctly associated with a released tuple in RT, then the three conditions required
in property 9 are: (1) there must be more than one such entity to which the tuple in the release could be
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associated; (2) there must be more than one such tuple in the release that could be associated with the
subject; or, (3) the non-controlled information, if present, can not be accurate.
Properties 3, 7 and 8 describe multiset collections of information where collections of elements
can occur as a member more than once.
The definition above describes what is termed a basic anonymous data system. The word "basic"
is used and the subscript 0 attached because the definition does not allow for probabilistic linking or the
temporal nature of data quality (i.e., older data can be less reliable). For anonymous data systems to be
defined to include these issues requires a modification and extension to ADSO and so, the naming
convention reserves ADS1 and ADS 2 and so on, for future enhancements.
Remark.
The level of protection provided by an ADSO depends on the correctness of the selection of
attributes within QI, on the specifics off and on assertions and invariants that can be made about
g, and g2, V(g, g2)eG. The validity of this remark stems directly from the definition of an
ADSo.
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Figure 23 Values for S, P, PT, QI, U and E
In the following examples, I assume the values for S, P, PT, QI, U, and E shown in Figure 23.
These values are consistent with the presentations in Figure 18, Figure 19, Figure 20 and Figure 21.
Example (identity release).
Given the assignments in Figure 23, and the following definition for f that constructs RT as a
copy of PT, the system A(S, P, PT, Q/, U, {RT}, E, G,J) is not an ADSO.
f is defined as follows:
step 1. Let RT be 0
step 2. Vte PT, RT +- RT u {t}
Note. RT is a multi-set, so duplicates are maintained.
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Proof:
Let g, be the relation g1(name, birth date, ZIP, diagnosis) on RT.
Therefore A is insecure and a disclosure is made, so A is not an ADSO.
Example (complete suppression).
Given the definitions in Figure 23, and the following definition for f that constructs RT as a
blank table, the system A(S, P, PT, QI, U, {RT}, E, G,J) is an ADSO.
f is defined as follows:
step 1. Let RT be 0
step 2. Vte PT, RT <- RT u {null, null, null, null}
Note. RT is a multi-set, so duplicates are maintained.
Proof:
The first two conditions of property 9 in the definition of an ADSO are both satisfied Vte RT.
Therefore A is considered secure, so A is an ADSO.
The two examples above demonstrate the natural tension that exists in disclosure control. At one
end is specificity and usefulness, which is not secure, and at the other end is distortion and security,
which is not useful. These opposites pose a continuum of disclosure control options along which
tradeoffs must be made. I defined and used an information theoretic (entropy) metric [65] and measured
the distortion to data caused by common disclosure limitation techniques and then plotted the measures
along the continuum. The relative ordering of the results is shown below in Figure 24.
Identity ---- ---- -- -- -- ----- - - -- ---- Complete
reloase cell cell attribute attribute suppression
generalization suppression generalization suppression
Stronger protection more useful data
more entropy
Figure 24 Relative comparison of techniques
The technique cell generalization is generalization enforced at the cell level and likewise cell
suppression is suppression enforced at the cell level. Similarly, attribute generalization is generalization
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enforced at the attribute level and attribute suppression is suppression enforced at the attribute level. Do
not interpret the tick marks along the continuum as points. Each of these techniques had results in a range
along the continuum and the ranges overlapped; further there was significant variation depending on the
character of the data. However, the tick marks do provide a relative ordering of the medians of average
case results.
I now present three protection models for ADSO. These are wrong-map, null-map and k-map as
defined below.
Definition. null-map protection
Let A be an ADSO,f(PT) = RT and Re RT. If Vte RT, there does not exist geG where g(t) eS,
then A adheres to null map protection.
In null-map protection each tuple in the released information may or may not map to an actual
entity in the population P, but none of the tuples can be mapped to an entity in the set of subjects S.
Examples of disclosure limitation techniques that can achieve null-map protection include strong
encryption of the QI, extensive swapping of the values in QI and systematic use of additive noise. Figure
19 provides an example.
Definition. wrong-map protection
Let A be an ADSo,f(PT) = RT and Re RT. If IRTI > 2 and Vte RT, 3ge G wherej(fc(s)) = t, and
g(f(fc(s))) =s and there does not exist g'e G where g'wg such that g'(t)eS, then A adheres to
wrong map protection.
Wrong map protection requires each tuple in the released information to be identified to only one
entity in subjects but that entity is not the entity to which the original information was collected. The
ADSO requirement ensures the values with attributes outside QI contained in the release are not the same
as those originally collected. Notice if there exists only one entity in the subjects S, then wrong-map
protection cannot be done and with only two entities in S, the release is compromised. An example of a
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disclosure limitation technique that can achieve wrong map protection is swapping the attributes of QI as
a unit. Figure 20 provides an example.
Definition. k-map protection
Let A be an ADSo,f(PT) = RT and Re RT. IfV'eRT, 3 g e G, whereflf(s))= t and g(fWf,(s)))=
s and {u1 , u2, uk.j} e U such that for i1,..., k-1, u,#s, and g(f(fi(s))) = uj, then A adheres to k-
map protection.
k-map protection maintains the invariant that each tuple in the released information refers
indistinctly to at least k members of U. Notice that k does not rely on ISI > k or on IRTI > k. Figure 21
provides an example.
The protection models k-map, null-map and wrong-map provide a means for characterizing the
kind of protection provided to a release of information. Of course a release may be anonymous, but
proving it in the absence of a protection model is extremely difficult. Optimal releases that offer
adequate protection with minimal distortion are believed to typically require a combination of disclosure
limitation techniques as well as a combination of protection models.
4.4 Future work
1. The protection models defined in this chapter, namely, k-map, wrong-map and null-
map, are not necessarily a complete set of all possible protection models. Develop a
new protection model or compare and contrast the relative protection provided by
each of these models.
2. Recall the word "basic" is used and the subscript 0 attached to a basic anonymous
data system (ADSO) because the definition does not allow for probabilistic linking or
the temporal nature of data quality (i.e., older data can be less reliable). For
anonymous data systems to be defined to include these issues requires a modification
and extension to ADSO and so, the naming convention reserves ADS 1 and ADS 2 and
so on, for future enhancements. Extend ADSO along these lines.
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Chapter 5 Methods Extended - Preferred Minimal Generalization
Algorithm
The goal of this chapter is to extend the formal methods provided in the previous chapter and
formally present an algorithm that adheres to k-map protection using generalization and suppression. The
real-world systems Datafly [66], ji-Argus [67] and k-Similar [68] motivate this extension.
5.1 The k-anonymity protection model
As you may recall, the k-map protection model [69] states an anonymity constraint that requires
certain characteristics and combinations of characteristics found in the data to combine to match at least
k individuals. To determine how many individuals each released tuple actually matches requires
combining the released data with externally available data and analyzing other possible attacks. Making
such a determination directly can be an impossible task for the data holder who releases information.
Although I can assume the data holder knows which data in PT also appear externally, and therefore
what constitutes a quasi-identifier, the specific values of external data and knowledge of other possible
inference attacks cannot be assumed. I therefore seek to protect the information by satisfying a slightly
different constraint on released data, which I term the k-anonymity requirement. This is a special case of
k-map protection where k is enforced on the released data.
Definition. k-anonymity
Let RT(A ,...,An) be a table and QIRT be the quasi-identifier associated with it. RT is said to
satisfy k-anonymity if and only if each sequence of values in RT[QIRT] appears with at least k
occurrences in RT[QIRT]-
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Ethnicity Birth Gender ZIP Problem
tl Black 1965 m 0214* short breath
t2 Black 1965 m 0214* chest pain
t3 Black 1965 f 0213* hypertension
t4 Black 1965 f 0213* hypertension
t5 Black 1964 f 0213* obesity
t6 Black 1964 f 0213* chest pain
t7 White 1964 m 0213* chest pain
t8 White 1964 m 0213* obesity
t9 White 1964 m 0213* short breath
t10 White 1967 m 0213* chest pain
til White 1967 m 0213* chest pain
Figure 25 Example of k-anonymity, where k=2 and QI={Ethnicity, Birth, Gender, ZIP}
Example.
Figure 25 provides an example of a table T that adheres to k-anonymity. The quasi-identifier for
the table is QIT= {Ethnicity, Birth, Gender, ZIP} and k=2. Therefore, for each of the tuples
contained in the table T, the values of the tuple that comprise the quasi-identifier appear at least
twice in T. That is, for each sequence of values in T[QIT] there are at least 2 occurrences of those
values in T[QIT]. In particular, tJ[QIT] = t2[QIr], t3[QIT] = t4[QIT], t5[QIT] = t6[QIT], t 7[QIT]
t8[QIT] = t9[QIT], and tJO[QIT] = tlJ[QIT].
Lemma.
Let RT(A ,...,An) be a table, QIRT =(A,..., Aj) be the quasi-identifier associated with RT, A,,...,4j
g A,...,An, and RT satisfy k-anonymity. Then, each sequence of values in RT[AX] appears with
at least k occurrences in RT[QIRT] for x=i,... .
Example.
Figure 25 provides an example of a table T that adheres to k-anonymity. The quasi-identifier for
the table is QIT= {Ethnicity, Birth, Gender, ZIP} and k2. Therefore, each value that appears in a
value associated with an attribute of QI in T appears at least k times. T[Ethnicity ="black"] = 6.
IT[Ethnicity ="white"] = 5. JT[Birth ="1964"]l = 5. IT[Birth ="1965"]= 4. IT[Birth ="1967"] =
2. IT[Gender ="m"] = 6. fT[Gender ="f']l = 5. IT[ZIP ="0213*"]l = 9. And, IT[ZIP ="0214*"1] =
2.
It can be trivially proven that if the released data RT satisfies k-anonymity with respect to the
quasi-identifier QIPT, then the combination of the released data RT and the external sources on which
QIPT was based, cannot link on QIPT or a subset of its attributes to match fewer than k individuals. This
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property holds provided that all attributes in the released table RT which are externally available in
combination (i.e., appearing together in an external table or in a possible join of external tables) are
defined in the quasi-identifier QIPT associated with the private table PT. This property does not
guarantee individuals cannot be identified in RT; there may exist other inference attacks that could
reveal the identities of the individuals contained in the data. However, the property does protect RT
against inference from linking to known external sources; and in this context, the solution can provide an
effective guard against re-identifying individuals.
As an aside, there are many ways in which I could expand the notion of a quasi-identifier to
provide more flexibility and granularity. Both Datafly [70] and p-Argus [71] weight the attributes of the
quasi-identifier. For my purposes in this chapter, however, I begin by considering a single quasi-
identifier based on attributes, without weights, appearing together in an external table or in a possible
join of external tables; and then later in this chapter, I add weights to specify preferences among the
attributes of the quasi-identifier.
5.2 Generalization and suppression as disclosure limitation techniques
In this section, I formally present the disclosure limitation techniques known as generalization
[72] and suppression [73]. This chapter ends by my proposing an algorithm that produces a version of PT
such that a given k-anonymity requirement is satisfied by re-coding values to make them more general
(i.e., using generalization and suppression).
In a classical relational database system, domains are used to describe the set of values that
attributes assume. For example, there might be a ZIP code domain, a number domain and a string
domain. I extend this notion of a domain to make it easier to describe how to generalize the values of an
attribute. In the original database, where every value is as specific as possible, every attribute is
considered to be in a ground domain. For example, 02139 is in the ground ZIP code domain, Zo. In
order to achieve k-anonymity I can make ZIP codes less informative. I do this by saying that there is a
more general, less specific domain that can be used to describe ZIP codes, say Z 1, in which the last digit
has been replaced by 0 (or removed altogether). There is also a mapping from Zo to Z 1, such as 02139
-+02130.
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Given an attribute A, I say a generalization for an attribute is a function on A. That is, eachf. A
-+ B is a generalization. I also say that:
is a generalization sequence or a functional generalization sequence.
Given an attribute A of a private table PT, I define a domain generalization hierarchy DGHA
for A as a set of functionsfi : h=O,...,n-1 such that:
A ) A1  ... An
A=AO and Anl = 1. DGHA is over: UA
h=O
Clearly, the fh's impose a linear ordering on the Ah's where the minimal element is the ground
domain AO and the maximal element is An. The singleton requirement on An ensures that all values
associated with an attribute can eventually be generalized to a single value. Since generalized values are
used in place of more specific ones, it is important that all domains in the hierarchy be compatible.
Using the same storage representation form for all domains in the generalization hierarchy can ensure
compatibility. In my ZIP code example above, replacing the last digit with 0, rather than removing it or
changing it to *, maintains the 5 digit storage representation. In this presentation I assume Ah, h=0,...,n,
are disjoint; if an implementation is to the contrary and there are elements in common, then DGHA is
over the disjoint sum of Ah's and subsequent definitions change accordingly.
Z2={02100} 02100
+ El={person} person
Z ={02130,021401 02130 0 40
ZO={02138, 02139, 02140, 02141) 0213f 02 39 02141f 02 42 E={Asian,Black,White} A ian Black White
DGHzo VGHzo DGHEO VGHEO
Figure 26 Examples of domain and value generalization hierarchies
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Eth:Eo ZIP:Zo
Asian 02138
Asian 02139
Asian 02141
Asian 02142
Black 02138
Black 02139
Black 02141
Black 02142
White 02138
White 02139
White 02141
White 02142
PT
Eth:E1  Zip:Zo
Person 02138
Person 02139
Person 02141
Person 02142
Person 02138
Person 02139
Person 02141
Person 02142
Person 02138
Person 02139
Person 02141
Person 02142
GT[l 0]
Figure 27
Eth:E1  ZIP:Z 1  Eth:Eo ZIP:Z2
Person 02130 Asian 02100
Person 02130 Asian 02100
Person 02140 Asian 02100
Person 02140 Asian 02100
Person 02130 Black 02100
Person 02130 Black 02100
Person 02140 Black 02100
Person 02140 Black 02100
Person 02130 White 02100
Person 02130 White 02100
Person 02140 White 02100
Person 02140 White 02100
GT[1,] GT[o,2]
Examples of generalized tables for PT
Eth:Eo ZIP:Z1
Asian 02130
Asian 02130
Asian 02140
Asian 02140
Black 02130
Black 02130
Black 02140
Black 02140
White 02130
White 02130
White 02140
White 02140
GT[o,]
Given a domain generalization hierarchy DGHA for an attribute A, if vjEA, and vjeAj then I say vi
v if and only if i ]j and:
This defines a partial ordering on: UAh
h=O
Such a relationship implies the existence of a value generalization hierarchy VGHA for
attribute A. Figure 26 illustrates an example of domain and value generalization hierarchies for domain
Zo, representing ZIP codes for Cambridge, MA, and EO representing ethnicity.
5.2.1 Generalization including suppression
In the value generalization hierarchy VGHEO shown in Figure 26, the values {Asian, Black,
White} generalize to Person. This means that a generalization of Ethnicity is similar to suppressing that
value for the attribute. Generalizing an attribute to its maximal element provides almost the same
protection and distortion as suppressing the attribute.
Therefore, I can expand my presentations of generalization to include suppression by imposing
on each value generalization hierarchy a new maximal element, atop the old maximal element. The new
maximal element is the attribute's suppressed value. The height of each value generalization hierarchy is
therefore incremented by one. No other changes are necessary to incorporate suppression into the earlier
presentation of generalization. Figure 28 and Figure 29 provide examples of the domain and value
generalization hierarchies shown earlier in Figure 26, but expanded here to include the suppressed
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maximal element. From now on, all references to generalization include the new maximal element atop
each domain and value generalization hierarchy.
Z 2={021**}
ZI={0213*,0214*}
Zo={02138, 02139, 02141, 02142}
DGHzo
t
021**
0213* 0214*
02138 02139 02141 02142
VGHzo
Figure 28 ZIP domain and value generalization hierarchies including suppression
Z2={***}
Z 1={Person}
Zo={Asian,Black,White}
DGHEO
t
Person
Asian Black White
VGHEO
Figure 29 Ethnicity domain and value generalization hierarchies including suppression
5.3 Minimal generalization of a table
Given a private table PT, generalization can be effective in producing a table RT that is based on
PT but that adheres to k-map protection because values in RT are substituted with their generalized
replacements. The number of distinct values associated with each attribute is non-increasing, and so the
substitution tends to map values to the same generalized result, thereby possibly decreasing the number
of distinct tuples in RT.
A generalization function on tuple t with respect to A,,..., An is a function f on Aix... xA, such
that:
ft (Ai,q..., An)= (fjAj)..., ffn(An))
where for each i: 1,...,n, f' is a generalization of the value t[Aj. The functionf is a set function. I sayf
is generated by thef,'s.
Given f, A,...,An, a table T(A,...,An) and a tuple te T, i.e., t(a,...,an)
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g(T)= {k -f(t): t e T and f 1 (f(t)) = k
The function g is a multi-set function. I say that g is the multi-set function generated byf and by
the f's. Further, I say that g(T) is a generalization of table T. This does not mean, however, that the
generalization respects the value generalization hierarchy for each attribute in T. To determine whether
one table is a generalization with respect to the value generalization hierarchy of each attribute requires
analyzing the values themselves.
Let DGHi be the domain generalization hierarchies for attributes A1, where i=,...,An Let
TI[Azt,. .. ,AlAn] and Tm[AmJ,...,AmAn] be two tables such that for each i:1,..,n, Alj,AmeDGHi. Then, I say
table Tm is a generalization of table TI, written T, Tm, if and only if there exists a generalization
function g such that g[TI] = Tm and is generated byf's where: Vtte T, a, f(a 1 ) = am, and f : At, ->
Am, and eachf is in the DGHi of attribute A;i. From this point forward, I will use the term generalization
to denote a generalization of a table. Otherwise, I will explicitly refer to the set or multi-set function
when it is not otherwise clear from context.
In this work, I examine cell, or value-level generalization, as well as, generalization enforced at
the attribute level. When decisions about the values an attribute can assume are specific to a single
domain - that is, each value associated with an attribute in a table must be a member of the same domain
in the domain generalization hierarchy specific to that attribute -- then I say the decision is at the attribute
level. On the other hand, if different values associated with the same attribute in a table can have
different domains in the domain generalization hierarchy specific to that attribute, then I say the decision
is at the cell or value level.
Definition. k-anonymity requirement
Let T(A1,...,An) be a generalized table, QIT={Ai,...,Aj} be the quasi-identifier associated with it
where {Ai,...,Aj} g {A,...,A,}, teT[QIT] and k, be the integer denoted in g forJ(t). T is said to
satisfy a k-anonymity requirement of k with respect to QIT if Vte T[QIT], k, k.
The k-anonymity requirement of a generalized table forms the basis for k-map protection. Given
a table PT(A1 ,...,A,), a QIPT={Ai,...,Aj}, where {A,,...,A 1} g {A,...,An}, and a generalization of PT with
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respect to QIPT named RT(A,,... ,A), satisfaction of the k-anonymity requirement guarantees each te RT
is indistinguishable from at least k-1 other members of table RT[QIPT]-
Example
Consider the table PT illustrated in Figure 27 and the domain and value generalization
hierarchies for Eo and ZO illustrated in Figure 28 and Figure 29. The remaining four tables in the
figure are examples of generalized tables for PT where generalization is enforced at the attribute
level. For the clarity of the example, every table reports, together with each attribute, the domain
for the attribute in the table. With respect to k-anonymity: GT[oj] satisfies k-anonymity for k =
1,2; GT[lo] satisfies k-anonymity for k = 1, 2, 3; GT[o,2] satisfies k-anonymity for k = 1,...,4; and,
GT[ll] satisfies k-anonymity for k= 1,...,6.
It is easy to see that the number of different domain generalizations of a table T, when
generalization is enforced at the attribute level, is equal to the number of different combinations of
domains that the attributes in the table can assume. Suppose I have domain generalization hierarchies
DGHi for Aj, i: 1,...,n; then, the number of generalizations, enforced at the attribute level, for table
T(A ,...,An) is:
H DGHj +1)
Equation 1
Similarly, when generalization is enforced at the cell level, the number of different
generalizations of a table T is equal to the number of different combinations of values the cells within T
can assume. Given domain generalization hierarchies DGHi for A, i:1,...,n; then, the number of
generalizations, enforced at the cell level, for table T(A1 ,...,An) is:
HjDGH, +)I
Equation 2
Clearly, not all such generalizations are equally satisfactory. A trivial possible generalization,
for instance, is the one that generalizes each attribute to the highest possible level of generalization, thus
collapsing all tuples in the table to the same list of values. This provides k-anonymity at the price of a
strong generalization of the data. Such extreme generalization is not needed if a less generalized table
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(i.e., containing more specific values) exists which satisfies k-anonymity. This concept is captured by
the following definition of k-minimal generalization.
Definition. k-minimal generalization
Let Tj(A 1,...,An) and Tm(Ai,...,An) be two tables such that TI[QIT] Tm[QIT], where
QI1T={AI,...,Aj} is the quasi-identifier associated with the tables and (A,,...,A 1 } c {Aj,...,4}. Tm
is said to be a minimal generalization of a table T, with respect to a k anonymity requirement
over QIT if and only if:
1. Tm satisfies the k-anonymity requirement with respect to QIT
2. VTz: T, Tz, Tz Tm, Tz satisfies the k-anonymity requirement with respect to QIT ->
Tz[A-,...,An] = Tm[A,,...,An].
Example.
Figure 27 shows examples of generalizations of the table labeled PT with respect to the quasi-
identifier {Ethnicity, ZIP}. Each of these generalizations, enforced at the attribute level, satisfy
k-anonymity for k=2. That is, each tuple in the released tables, labeled GT[o, GT[1 ,1 ], GT[o,2],
GTro], appears at least 2 times. GTto,1] shows that generalizing ZIP one level up its domain
generalization hierarchy is sufficient to achieve k=2. Similarly, GT1,O] shows that generalizing
Ethnicity one level up its domain generalization hierarchy is sufficient to achieve k=2. Therefore,
GT[l 1], and GT[o,2] perform more generalization than is necessary, because table GT[0 ,2], which
satisfies the anonymity requirement, is a generalization of GT[O,11. Analogously, GT 1,1] cannot be
minimal, being a generalization of both GT 1 ,o] and GT[o,1]. Further, because both GTo0,] and
GT1 ,O] satisfy the requirement and are minimal, there may exist a preference among these
minimal generalizations.
Intuitively, a table Tm, generalization of TI, is k-minimal if it satisfies k-anonymity and there does
not exist any generalization of T, which satisfies k-anonymity and of which Tm is a generalization.
It is trivial to see that a table that satisfies k-anonymity has a unique k-minimal generalization,
which is itself. It is also easy to see that the necessary and sufficient condition for a table T to satisfy k-
anonymity is that the cardinality of the table must be least k, as stated the following theorem. The
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requirement of the maximal elements of each DGHi to be a singleton ensures the sufficiency of the
condition.
Theorem 2
Let T be a table and k be a natural number. If ITI > k, then there exists at least a k-minimal
generalization for T. If TI < k there is no k-minimal generalization for T.
5.3.1 Distance vectors and generalization strategies
I introduce a distance vector metric with Euclidean properties that measures distances between
tuples and between tables based on the number of generalizations or on the length of the functional
generalization sequence required to have the tuples or tables share the same generalized values.
Definition. Distance vector
Given DG HAI, withfh : h=O,...,p, where i=l,...,n, and tables Tj(Aj1,...,A 1 ,) and Tm(Amj,...,Amn)
such that Tis;Tm, the distance vector of T, to Tm is the vector DVi,m = [d 1 ,...,dn] where each di is
the length of the unique path between Alh,which is A,, in DGHAHI, and Amh, which is Am, in DGHAHI
or simply mh-lh.
(E1,Z2) (E 1,Z2) (E1 ,Z2) (E1,Z2)
(E1, 2) (E1,Z1) (EZ1) (EoZ 2)
(EtZo) (Eoti) (E1,Zo) (Eo,Z 1) (Eo,Z 1)
(Eo,Zo) (Eo,Zo) (Eo,Zo)
GHT GS 1  GS 2  GS 3
Figure 30 Generalization hierarchy GHT and strategies for T =<EO,Zo>
Intuitively the distance vector captures how many generalizations table Tm is from Table Tj for
each attribute. To illustrate, consider private PT and its generalized tables illustrated in Figure 27. The
distance vectors between PT and its different generalizations are the vectors appearing as subscripts to
GT for each table.
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The relationship between distance vectors and minimal generalizations, which is the basis of the
correctness of my approach, is stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 3
Given tables T, and Tm such that T Tm and Tm satisfies k-anonymity. Tm is k-minimal <> there
does not exist a T, such that T, # TI, T, # Tm and T T, and Tz Tm, T, satisfies k-anonymity,
and DVI,z DVim.
Intuitively, the minimal generalizations of table T, are exactly those tables Tj satisfying k-
anonymity with minimal distance vectors DVim. For instance, with reference to the generalized tables
illustrated in Figure 27, I have already noticed how, for k=3, GT[1 ,1] cannot be minimal because GT[o,1]
and GT[,o] also satisfy k-anonymity. Recall that the subscript indicates the distance vector of the
generalized table GT from PT.
Given DGHAI, withfArh : h=0,...,pAL, where i=1,...,n, and table T(A1,. ..,A), the set of all possible
generalizations of T comprise a generalization hierarchy, GHT= DGHA1 x ... x DGHAnl, assuming the
Cartesian product is ordered by imposing coordinate-wise order [74]. GHT defines a lattice whose
minimal element is T. For instance, Figure 30 illustrates the generalization hierarchy GH(EO,ZO) where the
domain generalization hierarchies of EO and Zo are as illustrated in Figure 26.
The generalization hierarchy of table T defines different ways in which T can be generalized. In
particular each path from T to the unique maximal element of GHT in the graph describing GHT defines a
possible alternative path they can be followed in the generalization process. I refer to the set of nodes in
each such path together with the generalization relationships between them as generalization strategy for
GHT. The different generalization strategies for GH(EO,zo) are illustrated in Figure 30. The number of
different possible strategies for a generalization hierarchy is stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 4
Given DGHAj, with fAih : h=O,...,pAL, where i=1,...,n, and table T(A,.. .,An), the number of
different generalization strategies for T is:
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n
P~i
11PAt!
where each pAL is the length of the path from A, to the maximal element in DGHAi-
For each strategy a minimal local generalization can be defined as the table satisfying k-
anonymity, with sequence of domains DT' belonging to the strategy such that there are no other tables
satisfying k-anonymity with sequence of domains DT" in the strategy and such that DT" DT'. This says
the strategy is a total order and the minimal local generalization is always unique. The following
theorem states the correspondence between k-minimal generalization and the local minimal
generalization with respect to a strategy.
Theorem 5
Let T(A1 ,...,A,) be a table to be generalized and let GHr be a generalization hierarchy for T.
Every k-minimal generalization of T is a local minimal generalization for some strategy of GHT.
The converse is not true; a local minimal generalization with respect to a strategy may not
correspond to a k-minimal generalization. For instance, consider the table PT and its generalized tables
illustrated in Figure 27, whose minimal results have been discussed in a previous example. For k = 3 the
minimal local generalizations are: GTj,o] for strategy 1, GT[1,1 ] for strategy 2 and GT[o,2] for strategy 3.
However, as I have shown in a previous example, GT[,,1] is not k-minimal for k = 3. For k = 2 the
minimal local generalizations are: GT 1 ,o] for strategy 1 and GT[oi] for strategies 2 and 3. Directly from
Theorem 5, a table has at most as many generalizations as the number of generalization strategies of its
generalization hierarchy. The number of k-minimal generalizations can be smaller if the generalized
table, locally minimal with respect to a strategy, is a generalization of a table locally minimal to another
strategy (GTej 1] for k = 3 in the example above), or if different strategies have the same local minimal
generalization (GT[ol] for k = 2 in the example above).
5.4 Minimal distortion of a table
When different minimal generalizations exist, preference criteria can be applied to choose a
preferred solution among them. For example, tables which generalize (or not) specific attributes, or
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which return the highest number of distinct tuples can be preferred. For instance, for a k-anonymity
requirement with k = 2, GT1,0] and GT[o,1] are both minimal, as shown in Figure 27, but GT[o,1] may be
preferred because it contains a larger number of distinct tuples.
A natural measure for preferring one minimal generalization over another is based on selecting
the minimal generalization whose information is least distorted. The application of any disclosure
limitation technique [75] to a table T results in a table T' that has less information than T, and is
therefore less pure than T; I say T' is a distorted version of T. In order to define the information loss
precisely and specifically to the disclosure limitation techniques employed, I define an information
theoretic metric that reports the amount of distortion of a table caused by generalization and suppression.
While entropy is the classical measure commonly used in information theory to characterize the purity of
data [76], and while information loss can therefore be simply expressed as the expected increase in
entropy resulting from the application of a disclosure limitation technique, a metric based on the
semantics of particular disclosure limitation techniques can be shown to be more discriminating than the
direct comparison of the encoding lengths of the values stored in the table.
I can measure the distortion in a cell of the generalized table RT by computing the ratio of the
domain of the value found within the cell to the height of the attribute's domain generalization hierarchy.
The sum of the distortions found in each cell of the table RT provides an overall measure of the
distortion of the table. The definition below defines the precision of a generalized table RT to be one
minus the sum of the distortions found in the cells of the table (normalized by the total number of cells).
Definition. precision metric
Let PT(A1,...,ANa) be a table, tPjEPT, RT(A1 ,...,ANa) be a generalization of PT, tpje- PT, each
DGHA be the domain generalization hierarchy for attribute A, and f]s be generalizations on A.
The precision of RT, written Prec(RT), based on generalization and suppression is:
N N h
PrDRH=I-where f( ...Ifh [,])... )=tRJ[]Prec(RT)= I 1 IT N hr l(f tj[j tj
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Example.
Consider the trivial case where PT = RT. I that case, each value found within RT is in the
ground domain of its attribute's domain generalization hierarchy and so each h,= 0; therefore,
Prec(RT) = 1. Conversely, consider the trivial case where each value in each cell of RT is
suppressed -i.e., the maximal element found in its attribute's domain generalization hierarchy. In
that case, each h,=IDG HAil; and so, Prec(RT) = 0.
Example.
Using the domain generalization hierarchies found in Figure 28 and Figure 29, I can compute the
precision of the generalizations of the table labeled PT with respect to the quasi-identifier
{Ethnicity, ZIP} that are found in Figure 27. The Prec(PT) = 1 because all values in this table
are in their ground domains. Prec(GT[,o]) = 0.75, the Prec(GT[1 ,1 ) = 0.58, Prec(GTo02 1) = 0.67,
and Prec(GT[o,1]) = 0.83. Each of these generalizations satisfy k-anonymity for k=2, but GT[0 ,1]
does so with minimal distortion.
As was shown in the previous example, there is inherent bias within Prec based on the height of
the domain generalization hierarchies associated with the attributes of the table. Primarily,
generalizations based on attributes with taller domain generalization hierarchies maintain precision better
than generalizations based on attributes with shorter domain generalization hierarchies. For example,
from Figure 27, GT1 ,o] and GT[o,1] each generalize values up one level of an attribute's domain
generalization hierarchy. But, from Figure 28 and Figure 29, JDGHEthCicy = 2 and IDGHzpI = 3 and so,
Prec(GT[oj]) > Prec(GT[,o]).
Requirement on domain generalization hierarchies
For the semantics of the precision metric to be most accurate, domain generalization hierarchies
used within the computation must be streamlined to contain no unnecessary or unattainable domains.
Otherwise, the height of the domain generalization hierarchy will be arbitrarily increased and the
precision metric cannot reach 0 with respect to the attribute. For example, if suppression is fixed atop the
domain generalization hierarchy, then it should be removed from the precision analysis in cases where
suppression cannot be achieved.
Of course the usefulness of a generalized table is specific to the application to which the data
will be put [77]. Therefore, determining which minimal generalization is most useful relies on user-
96
Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection
specific preferences. These preferences can be provided as: (1) weights incorporated in the weighted
precision metric defined below; and, (2) a selection process for selecting among a set of minimal
generalizations all of which have the same weighted precision.
Definition. weighted precision metric
Let PT(A1 ,...,ANa) be a table, tpjE PT, RT(A ,...,ANa) be a generalization of PT, tpE PT, each
DGHA be the domain generalization hierarchy for attribute A, f's be generalizations on A, and W
be the set of weights to specify preference where woe W is a weight assigned to tp;[A,] such that 0
Precw(RT) 1. The precision of RT, written Precw(RT), based on generalization and
suppression is therefore:
NA N h
Prec(RT)= 1- DGHAi
RTe NA
where f,(...fh(tpj[A, ...) Rj [A, ] and 0 Precw(RT) 1
Example.
Recall in a previous example involving generalization enforced at the attribute level, both GT[o0,]
and GT[o] in Figure 27 were found to be minimal generalizations of PT [78]. A preference
among minimal generalizations can be based on merely summing the level of generalization of
each attribute with respect to the heights of the domain generalization hierarchies for those
attributes. One level of generalization corresponds to the values within the table being associated
with the next domain up the domain generalization hierarchy. In these cases preference is based
on the minimal generalizations having the smallest sum of values found in the corresponding
distance vectors. The weight wo in the weighted precision metric in this case is:
DGHA, NA
Ii NA
Z|DGHAk |
k=1
Equation 3
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This simplifies Precw to:
NA
Yhj
Precw(RT)=1- 
NA
ZDGHAkI
k=1
The weighted precision for the generalizations in Figure 27 using the weight in Equation 3 is:
Precw(GT 1 ,o)=0.8, Precw(GT[1,1j)=0.6, Precw(GT[o,2])=0.6, and Precw(GT[o,1])=0.8. In this
scheme, the minimal generalizations GTo,1] and GT[1,o] are of equal preference and minimal
distortion.
Notice that the regular precision metric Prec is a special case of the weighted precision metric
Precw, where Vwje W, wy = 1. In that case, Prec(T) = Precw(T). As was shown in the earlier example,
not all minimal generalizations are equally distorted and preference can be based on the minimal
generalization having the most precision. This concept is captured by the following definition of k-
minimal distortion.
Definition. k-minimal distortion
Let TI(A 1,...,A,) and Tm(Aj,...,An) be two tables such that TI[QIr] Tm[QIT, where
QIT={Aj,...,4} is the quasi-identifier associated with the tables and {A,...AA} _; {A 1,...,A,} and
Vx=i,...,j, DGHm are domain generalization hierarchies for QIT. Tm is said to be a minimal
distortion of a table T, with respect to a k anonymity requirement over QIT if and only if:
1. Tm satisfies the k-anonymity requirement with respect to QIT
2. VT,: Prec(TI) Prec(T,), Prec(Tz) Prec(Tm), T, satisfies the k-anonymity requirement
with respect to QIT -> Tz[A1,. . .,An] = Tm[Ai,. .-.,An].
Example.
Figure 27 shows examples of generalizations of the table labeled PT with respect to the quasi-
identifier {Ethnicity, ZIP}. Of these, only GT[O, 1 is a k-minimal distortion.
A k-minimal distortion is based on the precision metric Prec. Domain generalization with
different heights can provide different Prec measures for the same table. So a k-minimal distortion is
98
Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection
specific to a table, a quasi-identifier and a set of domain generalization hierarchies for the attributes of
the quasi-identifier.
Also, the definition of k-minimal distortion can be modified to use the weighted precision metric
Precw rather than Prec. I term this result a weighted k-minimal distortion.
It is trivial to see that a table that satisfies k-anonymity has a unique k-minimal distortion, which
is itself. It is also easy to see that a generalized table RT that is a k-minimal distortion of table PT is also
a k-minimal generalization of PT, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 6
Given tables T, and Tm such that T ; Tm and Tm satisfies k-anonymity. Tm is a k-minimal
distortion of T, => Tm is k-minimal generalization of T1.
5.5 An algorithm for determining a minimal generalization with minimal distortion
Figure 31 presents an algorithm, called MinGen, which, given a table PT(AX,...,A,), a quasi-
identifier Qk={A 1 ,...,A,}, where {A 1 ,...,A4,} g {A,...,4}, a k-anonymity constraint, domain
generalization hierarchies DGHAj, produces a table MGT which is a k-minimal distortion of PT[Q]. It
assumes that k < IPTI, which is necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a minimal
generalized table (see Theorem 2). The MinGen algorithm ties together the formal methods presented in
this chapter and provides a model against which real-world systems will be compared in subsequent
chapters.
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Preferred Minimal Generalization (MinGen) Algorithm
Input: Private Table PT; quasi-identifier QI = (A I, ... , An), k-anonymity constraint k;
domain generalization hierarchies DGHAi, where i=1,...,n,
and preference specifications apreferred() function.
Output: MGT containing a minimal distortion of PT[QI] with respect to k-anonymity chosen
according to the preference specifications
Assumes: IPT 1 k
Method:
3. if PT[QI] satisfies k-anonymity requirement with respect to k then do
3.1 MGT <- { PT} //PT is the solution
4. else do
4.1 allgen <- {Tj : Ti is a generalization of PT over QI }
4.2 protected <- {T: T e allgen A T satisfies k-anonymity requirement of k}
4.3 MGT <- {Ti : T e protected A there does not exist Tz E protected such that Prec(T.) > Prec(Ti) }
4.4 MGT <- preferred(MGT) // select the preferred solution
5. return MGT.
Figure 31 Preferred MinGen Algorithm
There are few steps in the MinGen algorithm. Step 1 determines if the original table, named PT,
itself satisfies the k-anonymity requirement; and if so, it is the k-minimal distortion. Step 2 is the core of
the algorithm executed in all other cases. Sub-step 2.1 stores the set of all possible generalizations of PT
over the quasi-identifier QI in allgens. Recognizing that some of the generalizations in allgens satisfy the
k-anonymity requirement and others do no, sub-step 2.2 stores those generalizations in allgens that do
satisfy the k-anonymity requirement in protected. Sub-step 2.3 filters out those generalizations from
protected that are not minimally distorted with respect to Prec and stores the resulting generalizations in
MGT. Notice that VGT 1 , GT2 e MGT, Prec(GT1) = Prec(GT2). That is, after sub-step 2.3, MGT is the
set of all k-minimal distortions of PT. It is guaranteed that IMG71 1. The function preferred() in sub-
step 2.4 selects a single generalization from MGT based on user-defined specifications.
The algorithm is straightforward, so its correctness relies on the definitions of generalization
[79], the k-anonymity requirement [80], and Prec [81]. It can be proved that a generalization of a table T
over a quasi-identifier QI, that satisfies a given k-anonymity requirement, and has the least amount of
distortion of all possible generalizations of T over QI, is a k-minimal distortion of T over QI with respect
to Prec. From Theorem 6, the solution is also a k-minimal generalization of T over QI.
The MinGen algorithm assumes there are at least k tuples in PT. The maximal element
requirement atop each domain generalization hierarchy assures [protecteal 1 in all cases. For example,
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protected always includes the table consisting of tuples which are all the same and indistinguishable,
where each value within each tuple is the maximal generalized element for its attribute.
With respect to complexity, MinGen makes no claim to be efficient. The lallgensl was expressed
in Equation 1, if generalization is enforced at the attribute level, and in Equation 2, if generalization is
enforced at the cell level. In both cases, the computational cost is tremendous, making an exhaustive
search of all possible generalizations impractical on even the most modest of tables.
Care must be taken that the domain generalization hierarchies used by MinGen contain domains
that are attainable by MinGen; otherwise, the height of the domain generalization hierarchy is inflated
and so, Prec can never be 0. For example, the domain generalization hierarchies based on the depictions
in Figure 32 include only those domains that can be attained by the MinGen algorithm. The depictions in
Figure 33 include an additional domain atop each hierarchy, where the additional domain contains the
suppressed value for the attribute. However, the MinGen algorithm would never provide a solution that
contained any suppressed values given those hierarchies. Therefore, the hierarchies in Figure 33 when
used by MinGen fail the requirement that Prec can achieve 0 [82]; so, the hierarchies in Figure 32 should
be used with MinGen.
In sub-step 2.4 of the MinGen algorithm, in cases where IMG71 > 1, each table in MGT is a
solution, but the preferred() function can return only one table as a solution. This single solution
requirement is a necessary condition because the chosen solution is then considered to become part of the
join of external information against which subsequent linking and matching must be protected. This
places additional constraints on the subsequent release of any other tables in MGT and of other
generalizations of the privately held information. Here are three related attacks and their solutions.
5.5.1 Unsorted matching attack against k-anonymity
This attack is based on the order in which tuples appear in the released table. While I have
maintained the use of a relational model in this discussion, and so the order of tuples cannot be assumed,
in real-world use this is often a problem. It can be corrected of course, by randomly sorting the tuples of
the solution. Otherwise, the release of a related table can leak sensitive information.
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Example.
Using a weighted precision metric with the weight described in Equation 3, GT[o,l] and GT[,o in
Figure 27 are both k-minimal distortions of PT, where k=2. If GT[o,1] is released and a
subsequent release of GT[,O] is then performed, but where the position of the tuples in each table
correspond to the same tuple in PT, then direct matching of tuples across the tables based on
tuple position within the tables reveals sensitive information. On the other hand, if the positions
of the tuples within each table are randomly determined, both tables can be released.
5.5.2 Complementary release attack against k-anonymity
In the previous example, all the attributes in the generalized tables were in the quasi-identifier.
That is typically not the case. It is more common that the attributes that constitute the quasi-identifier are
themselves a subset of the attributes released. As a result, when a k-minimal solution, which I will call
table T is released, it should be considered as joining other external information. Therefore, subsequent
releases of generalizations of the same privately held information must consider all of the released
attributes of T a quasi-identifier to prohibit linking on T, unless of course, subsequent releases are
themselves generalizations of T.
Example.
Consider the private table PT in Figure 34. The tables GT1, GT2 and GT3 in Figure 35 were
identified by MinGen (after step 2.3) as k-minimal distortions of PT, where k=2, the quasi-identifier
QI={Race, BirthDate, Gender, ZIP} and the domain generalization hierarchies are based on the
depictions in Figure 32. Suppose table GT1 is released as the preferred k-minimal solution. If
subsequently GT3 is also released, then the k-anonymity protection will no longer hold, even if the tuple
positions are randomly determined in both tables. Linking GT1 and GT3 on {Problem} reveals the table
LT shown in Figure 36. Notice how [white, 1964, male, 02138] and [white, 1965, female,
02139] are unique in LT and so, LT does not satisfy the k-anonymity requirement enforced by GT1 and
GT3. This problem would not exist if GT3 used the quasi=identifier Q1 u {Problem} or if a
generalization of GT1 had been released instead of GT3.
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021**
0213* 0214*
02138 02139 02141 02142
ZIP code
human
male female
Gender
person
Asian Black White
Race
10 year range:
5 year ranges:
1 year range
moth/year
full date
1960-69
1960-64 1-9 5-69
1 0 1 1962 1 63 1 64 196196 1967 1 8 19
:S
*0
:
*0
:
*
:0
*0
:0
*0
:0
*0
:
0
Birth Date
Figure 32 Value generalization hierarchies for {ZIP, Gender, Race, BirthDate)
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t
021**
0213*
02138 02139
0214*
02141 02142
ZIP code
T
human
male female
Gender
per ton
Asian Black White
Race
Suppressed value
10 year range:
5 year ranges:
1 year range
month/year
full date
T
1960-69
1960-64 9 5-69
1 0 19 19621 63 64 19 196 167 19 8 69
:0
0 * 0 * 0
:0
*0 * 0 *
:
0
Birth Date
Figure 33 Value generalization hierarchies for {ZIP, Gender, Race, BirthDate} with suppression
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id Race Brthate Gender ZIP Problem
ti black 9/1965 male 02141 short of breath
t2 black 2/1965 male 02141 chest ain
t3 black 10/1965 female 02138 ainful e e
t4 black 8/1965 female 02138 wheezin
t5 black 11/1964 female 02138 obesit
t6 black 12/1964 female 02138 chest ain
t7 whte 1011964 male 02138 short of breath
t8 white 3/1965 female 02139 h rtonsion
t9 white 8/1964 male 02139 obesit
t1O white 5/1964 male 02139 fever
t11 white 2/1967 male 02138 vomiting
t12 white 3/1967 male 02138 back pain
Figure 34 Private Table PT
- rth e nder roblem
black 1965 male 02141 short of breath
black 1965 male 02141 chest pain
rson 1965 female 0213* painful eye
rson 1965 female 0213* wheezing
black 1964 female 02138 obesit
black 1964 female 02138 chest ain
white 1964 male 0213* short of breath
l 1965 female 0213* h ertension
white 1964 male 0213* obesi
white 1964 male 0213* fever
white 1967 male 02138 vomiting
white 1967 male 02138 back pain
GT1
[Race lBir te Gender I PrObM
black 1965 Imale 02141 short of breath
black 1965
black 1965
black 1965
black 1964
black 1964
white 1960-69
white 1960-69
white 1960-69
white 1960-69
white 1960-69
white 1960-69
02141
02138
02138
02138
02138
02138
02139
02139
,02139
02138
chest pain
painful eye
wheezing
obesity
chest pain
short of breath
hypertension
o besity
fever
vomiting
male 02138 back pain
GT3
iacK II 04
black 1964 female 02138 chest Dain
white 1960-9 male 02138 short of breath
person 1965 female Q213 | hypertension
white 1964 male 02139 obesity
white 1964
white '190.
white |||96|||$
male 02139 fever
ale 02138 vomiting
ale 02138 back pain
Figure 35 k-minimal distortions for PT in Figure 34 where k=2
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Race BirthDate Gender ZIP Problem
black 1965 male 02141 short of breath
black 1965 male 02141 chest pain
black 1965 female 02138 painful eye
black 1965 female 02138 wheezin
black 1964 female 02138 1 obesity
black 1964 female 02138 chest ain
white 1964 male 02138 short of breath
white o1965 female 02139 hn yrtension
white 1964 male 02139 obesity
white 1964 male 02139 fever
white 1967 Imale 02138 vomiting
1white 1967 male 02138 1back pain
LT
Figure 36 Table resulting from linking GT1 and GT3 in Figure 35
5.5.3 Temporal attack against k-anonymity
Data collections are dynamic. Tuples are added, changed, and removed constantly. As a result,
releases of generalized data over time can be subject to a temporal inference attack. Let table To be the
original privately held table at time 1=0. Assume a k-minimal solution of To, which I will call table RTO,
is released. At time t, assume additional tuples were added to the privately held table TO, so it comes Tt.
Let RTt be a k-minimal solution of Tt that is released at time t. Because there is no requirement that RTt
respect the distortions of RTO, linking the tables RTO and RTt may reveal sensitive information and
thereby compromise k-anonymity protection. As was the case in the previous example, to combat this
problem, RTO should be considered as joining other external information. Therefore, either all of the
attributes of RTO would be considered a quasi-identifier for subsequent releases, or subsequent releases
themselves would be generalizations of RTo.
Example.
At time to, assume the privately held information is PT in Figure 34. As stated earlier, GT1,
GT2 and GT3 in Figure 35 are k-minimal distortions of PT over the quasi-identifier QI={Race,
BirthDate, Gender, ZIP} where k=2. Assume GT1 is released. At a later time tI, PT becomes
PTt1, which is PT u {[black, 9/7/65, male, 02139, headache], [black, 11/4/65,
male, 02139, rash]}. MinGen executes on PTt1 as it has on PT and returns a k-minimal
distortion, which I will call GTt1 . Assume this table contains GT3 in Figure 35; specifically,
GTt1 = GT3 u {[black, 1965, male, 02139, headache], [black, 1965, male, 02139,
rash]}. As was shown in an earlier example, GT1 and GT3 can be linked on {Problem} to
reveal unique tuples over QI. Likewise, GT1 and GTt1 can be linked to reveal the same unique
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tuples. One way to combat this problem is run MinGen on GT1 u (PTt, - PT), making the result
a generalization of GT1. In that case, a result could be GT1 u {[black, 1965, male, 02139,
headache], [black, 1965, male, 02139, rash]}, which does not compromise the distorted
values in GT1.
5.5.4 MinGen as an anonymous data system
MinGen uses the generalization and suppression as disclosure limitation techniques. Below is a
description of the framework in which MinGen operates.
S = {subjects whose information is included in PT}
P = set of all people whose information could possibly be in PT
PT = privately held information about S
QI = set of attributes with replications in E
U = P
RT = MinGen(PT)
E = set of publicly available information in today's society
G = set of standard communication methods.
f = MinGen
The system A(S, P, PT, QI, U, {RT}, E, G, MinGen) is an ADSO.
Informal proof.
If QI contains all attributes replicated in E, A adheres to k-map protection,
where k is enforced on RT. That is, for each value of QI released in RT,
there are at least k tuples having that value.
So, A is an ADSO.
The practical significance of releasing individualized data, such that linking of the data to other
sources to re-identify individuals cannot be done, offers many benefits to our electronic society. This
work provides an effective and optimal solution to this problem.
In the next chapters, I present four computational systems that attempt to maintain privacy while
releasing electronic information. These systems are: (1) my Datafly II System, which generalizes and
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suppresses values in field-structured data sets [83]; (2) Statistics Netherlands' pt-Argus System, which is
becoming a European standard for producing public-use data [84]; (3) my k-Similar algorithm, which
produces optimal results in comparison to Datafly and t-Argus [85]; and, (4) my Scrub System, which
locates personally-identifying information in letters between doctors and notes written by clinicians [86].
The Datafly, pt-Argus and k-Similar systems primarily use generalization and suppression for disclosure
limitation and provide protection by seeking to adhere to k-anonymity. As was shown in Equation 1 (on
page 90) and Equation 2 (on page 90), the number of possible generalizations prohibits an exhaustive
search, as was done by MinGen. As a result, these systems make approximations, which may not always
yield optimal results. In the next chapters, I assess the anonymity protection provided by each of these
systems in terms of whether each system is an ADSO and compare the performance of each to MinGen.
The presentation returns to an informal style.
5.6 Future work
1. The size of and conditions for k necessary to ensure k-anonymity must be further
investigated. The Social Security Administration (SSA) releases public-use files based on
national samples with small sampling fractions (usually less than 1 in 1,000); the tuples
contain no geographic codes, or at most regional or size of place designators [87]. The SSA
recognizes that data containing individuals with unique combinations of characteristics can
be linked or matched with other data sources. So, the SSA's general rule is that any subset
of the data that can be defined in terms of combinations of characteristics must contain at
least 5 individuals. This condition for k includes a sampling fraction and no geographical
specification. Current demand requires releasing all data with geographical specification.
How does this change the size of k? Studies could be based on a cost of communication
model, where the size of k is related to the cost of communicating with candidates to
determine the correct identity of persons who are the subject of the data.
2. The quality of generalized data is best when the attributes most important to the recipient do
not belong to any quasi-identifier. For public-use files this is acceptable, but determining the
quality and usefulness in other settings must be further researched. Survey published results
and determine which studies, if any, could have been achieved with sufficiently anonymous
data rather than identified data and which, if any, could not have used sufficiently
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anonymous data without skewing results or prohibiting them altogether. Candidate studies
include epidemiological studies and surveys. Classify the results.
3. This chapter extended some of the foundational methods provided in the previous chapter. In
particular, this chapter focused on one version of k-map protection, namely k-anonymity, and
employed two disclosure limitation techniques, namely generalization and suppression.
There are other protection models [88] and other techniques [89]. Select another protection
model and/or other disclosure limitation techniques and extend the methods.
4. Disclosure limitation has been performed in different communities on different kinds of data
-such as summary tables, geographical information systems, textual documents and even,
DNA sequences. While the list of disclosure limitation techniques provided earlier (on page
62), crosses these boundaries, some techniques may work better with some kinds of data and
uses than others. Perform an analysis to see which kinds of disclosure limitation techniques
work best with which kinds of data and uses and why.
5. Weighted metrics were defined among the methods introduced in this chapter. Consider data
in a given application area, such as hospital discharge data, and introduce strategies for how
weights could be strategically applied to convey notions that some fields of information
contain information more sensitive than others. Try out the proposed schemes and compare
the semantics of the results to the non-weighted version.
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Chapter 6 Results: Datafly II
In this chapter, I present my Datafly and Datafly II Systems whose goal is to provide the most
general information useful to the recipient. From now on, the term Datafly will refer to the Datafly II
System unless otherwise noted. Datafly maintains anonymity in released data by automatically
substituting, generalizing and suppressing information as appropriate. Decisions are made at the
attribute and tuple level at the time of database access, so the approach can be incorporated into role-
based security within an institution as well as in exporting schemes for data leaving an institution. The
end result is a subset of the original database that provides minimal linking and matching of data because
each tuple matches as many people as the data holder specifies.
6.1 Overview of the Datafly System
Original Medical Database
SSN Race Birth
819491049 Caucasian 10/23/64
749201844 Caucasian 03/15/64
819181496 Black 09/20/64
859205893 Asian 10/23/64
985820581 Black 08/24/64
Data Holder -attributes & tuples
-recipient profile
-anonymit 0.7
Resultin
Sex ZIP SSN
M 02138 986345935
M 02139 Datafly 207502632
M 02141 729247573
02157
m 02138J
1 982574833
Database, anonymity 0.7, k=2
Race Birth Sex ZIP
Caucasian 1964 m 02100
Caucasian 1964 m 02100
Black 1964 m 02100
Black 1964 m 02100
Figure 37. Data holder overview of the Datafly System
Figure 37 provides an overview of the Datafly System from the data holder's perspective for
generating a table for release. The original table is shown on the left. Input to the Datafly System is the
original privately held table and some specifications provided by the data holder. Output is a table whose
attributes and tuples correspond to the anonymity level specified by the data holder; in Figure 37 the
anonymity level is noted as being 0.7. These terms and the process used by Datafly to generate a table for
release are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Before any releases are generated, each attribute in the original table is tagged as using either an
equivalence class substitution algorithm or a generalization routine when its associated values are to be
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released. If values of an attribute tagged as using equivalence class substitution are to be released, made-
up alternatives replace values of the attribute in the released data. The Social Security number attribute
labeled SSN provides an example in Figure 37 and a strong one-way hashing (encryption) algorithm is
used.
Alternatively, if an attribute is tagged as using generalization, then an accompanying
generalization hierarchy is assigned to the attribute; example hierarchies are shown in Figure 33 on page
104. The Datafly System iteratively computes increasingly less specific versions of the values for the
attribute until eventually the desired anonymity level is attained. For example, the birth date attribute
would first have the full month, day and year for each value. If further generalization were necessary,
only the month and year would be used, and then only the year and so on, as the values get less and less
specific, moving up the generalization hierarchy. The iterative process ends when there exists k tuples
having the same values assigned across a group of attributes (or quasi-identifier); this is termed a k
requirement and provides the basis for k-anonymity protection discussed earlier [90]. [Note in the earliest
version of Datafly, k was enforced on each attribute individually and a complicated requirement was
enforced across attributes; but in later versions which are named Datafly II, k is enforced across the
quasi-identifier as described here.] In Figure 37 the quasi-identifier under consideration, because of the
size of the database shown, is only {Race, Birth, Sex, ZIP} and k=2; therefore, in the released data, there
are at least two tuples for each combination of {Race, Birth, Sex, ZIP} released.
To use the system, the data holder (1) declares specific attributes and tuples in the original
private table as being eligible for release. The data holder also (2) groups a subset of the released
attributes into one or more quasi-identifiers and provides (3) a number from 0 to 1 is assigned to each
attribute eligible for release that identifies the likelihood each attribute within a quasi-identifier will be
used for linking; a 0 value means not likely and a value of 1 means highly probable. I term such a list a
profile. Finally, the data holder (4) specifies a minimum overall anonymity level that computes to a value
of k and (5) a threshold (called loss) that determines the maximum number of tuples that can be
suppressed, where loss must correspond to at least k tuples.
Datafly then produces the released table from the eligible attributes and tuples of the private
table such that each value of a quasi-identifier in the released table appears in at least k tuples. The k
requirement is accomplished by generalizing attributes within a quasi-identifier as needed and
suppressing no more than loss tuples.
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In Figure 37, notice how the record containing the Asian entry was removed; Social Security
numbers were automatically replaced with made-up alternatives; birth dates were generalized to the year
and ZIP codes to the first three digits. In the next two paragraphs I examine the overall anonymity level
and its relationship to k and loss.
The overall anonymity level is a number between 0 and 1 that relates to the minimum k for each
quasi-identifier. An anonymity level of 0 provides the original data and a level of 1 forces Datafly to
produce the most general data possible given the profile of the recipient. All other values of the overall
anonymity level between 0 and 1 determine the operational value for k. (The institution is responsible
for mapping the anonymity level to particular values of k.) Information within each attribute is
generalized as needed to attain the minimum k and outliers, which are extreme values not typical of the
rest of the data, may be removed. Upon examination of the resulting data, every value assigned to each
quasi-identifier will occur at least k times with the exception of one-to-one replacement values, as is the
case with Social Security numbers.
Anonymity (A) k Birth Date maxDrop%
--- .9 --- 493 24 4%
--- .8 --- 438 24 2%
--- .7 --- 383 12 8%
--- .6 --- 328 12 5%
--- .5 --- 274 12 4%
--- .4 --- 219 12 3%
---. 3 --- 164 6 5%
---. 2 --- 109 4 5%
---. 1 --- 54 2 5%
0
Figure 38. Anonymity generalizations for Cambridge voters' data with corresponding values of k.
Figure 38 shows the relationship between k and selected anonymity levels (A) using the
Cambridge voters' database [91]. As A increased, the minimum requirement for k increased, and in order
to achieve the k-based requirement, values within an attribute in a quasi-identifier, for example, Birth
Date, were re-coded in ranges of 2, 4, 6, 12 or 24 months, as shown. Outliers were excluded from the
released data, and their corresponding percentages of N (where N is the number of tuples in the privately
held table eligible for release) are noted. An anonymity level of 0.7, for example, required at least 383
occurrences of every value of the quasi-identifier. To accomplish this in only Birth Date, for example,
required re-coding dates to reflect only the birth year. Even after generalizing over a 12 month window,
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the values of 8% of the voters still did not meet the requirement so these voters were dropped from the
released data.
In addition to an overall anonymity level, the data holder also provides a profile of the needs of
the person who is to receive the data by specifying for each attribute that is to be in the release whether
the recipient could have or would use information external to the database that includes data within that
attribute. That is, the data holder estimates on which attributes the recipient might link outside
knowledge. Thus, each attribute has associated with it a profile value between 0 and 1, where 0
represents full trust of the recipient or no concern over the sensitivity of the information within the
attribute, and 1 represents full distrust of the recipient or maximum concern over the sensitivity of the
attribute's contents. Semantically related attributes that are sensitive to linking, with the exception of
one-to-one replacement attributes, are treated as a single concatenated attribute (a quasi-identifier) that
must meet the minimum k requirement, thereby thwarting linking attempts that use combinations of
attributes. The role of these profiles is to help select which attribute within the quasi-identifier will be
selected for generalization. If all attributes in the quasi-identifier have the same value, then the attribute
having the greatest number of distinct values will be generalized.
Consider the profiles of a doctor caring for a patient, a clinical researcher studying risk factors
for heart disease, and a health economist assessing the admitting patterns of physicians. Clearly, these
profiles are all different. Their selection and specificity of attributes are different; their sources of
outside information on which they could link are different; and their uses for the data are different. From
publicly available birth certificates, driver license, and local census databases, the birth dates, ZIP codes
and gender of individuals are commonly available along with their corresponding names and addresses;
so these attributes could easily be used for re-identification. Depending on the recipient, other attributes
may be even more useful. If the recipient is the patient's caretaker within the institution, the patient has
agreed to release this information to the care-taker, so the profile for these attributes should be set to 0 to
give the patient's caretaker full access to the original information.
When researchers and administrators make requests that require less specific information than
that originally provided within sensitive attributes, the corresponding profile values should warrant a
number as close to 1 as possible, but not so much so that the resulting generalizations provide useless
data to the recipient. But researchers or administrators bound by contractual and legal constraints that
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prohibit their linking of the data are trusted, so if they make a request that includes sensitive attributes,
the profile values would ensure that each sensitive attribute adheres only to the minimum k requirement.
The goal is to provide the most general data that are acceptably specific to the recipient. Since
the profile values are set independently for each attribute, particular attributes that are important to the
recipient can result in less generalization than other requested attributes in an attempt to maintain the
usefulness of the data. A profile for data being released for public use, however, should be 1 for all
sensitive attributes to ensure maximum protection. The purpose of the profiles are to quantify the
specificity required in each attribute and to identify attributes that are candidates for linking; and in so
doing, the profiles identify the associated risk to patient confidentiality for each release of data.
Using a pediatric medical record system [92] consisting of 300 patient records with 7617 visits
and 285 attributes stored in over 12 relational database tables, I conducted test in which the Datafly
System processed all queries to the database over a spectrum of recipient profiles and anonymity levels
to show that all attributes in medical records can be meaningfully generalized as needed because any
attribute can be a candidate for linking. Of course, which attributes are most important to protect
depends on the recipient. Attention was paid primarily to attributes commonly exported to government
agencies, researchers and consultants. Diagnosis codes have generalizations using the International
Classification of Disease (ICD-9) hierarchy (or other useful semantic groupings). Geographic
replacements for states or ZIP codes generalize to use regions and population size. Continuous variables,
such as dollar amounts and clinical measurements, can be converted to discrete values. Replacement
values must be based on meaningful subdivisions of values; and, replacement need only be done in cases
where the attributes are candidates for linking.
In the real-world example mentioned earlier on page 52, the Group Insurance Commission in
Massachusetts (GIC) collected patient-specific data with almost 100 attributes of information per
physician visit for a population of more than 135,000 state employees, their families and retirees. In a
public hearing, GIC reported giving a copy of the data to a researcher, who in turn stated that she did not
need the full date of birth, just the birth year [93]. The average value of k based only on {birth date,
gender} for that population is 3, but had the researcher received only {year of birth, gender}, the average
value of k would have increased to 1125. Furnishing the most general information the recipient can use
minimizes unnecessary risk to patient confidentiality.
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6.2 Abstract of the Datafly algorithm
Here is a summary of the setting in which the core Datafly algorithm operates. The data holder
provides an overall anonymity level (A), which is a value between 0 and 1. The data holder also provides
a profile of the recipient by providing a linking likelihood (Pf) for each attribute that is also a value
between 0 and 1. Based on these values an overall value for k is computed and quasi-identifier(s) are
determined. For example, subsets of attributes where P=1 are treated as one concatenated attribute, or
quasi-identifier, which must satisfy a k-anonymity requirement. Each attribute has a replacement
algorithm that either uses equivalence class substitution, such as SSNs, or generalization based on a
domain generalization hierarchy specific to that attribute. Datafly also has a special facility for cases
involving multiple tuples attributable to the same person because the number of occurrences and other
information contained in the tuples, such as relative dates, can combine to reveal sensitive information.
For simplicity however, I will remove many of these finer features of the Datafly System from my
analysis of the underlying algorithm, with no loss of overall characterization. I describe the core Datafly
algorithm as working with a quasi-identifier and a k-anonymity requirement that is to be enforced on the
quasi-identifier. For convenience, I consider all attributes of the quasi-identifier as having equal weights
(specifically, Pp=1 for each attribute of the quasi-identifier), so they can be considered as not having
weights at all; and, I address only generalizable attributes of the quasi-identifier in isolation.
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Core Datafly Algorithm
Input: Private Table PT; quasi-identifier QI = (A1, ... , A,), k-anonymity constraint k; domain
generalization hierarchies DGHAi, where i=1,...,n with accompanying functionsfAl, and
loss, which is a limit on the percentage of tuples that can be suppressed. PT[id] is the set
of unique identifiers (key) for each tuple.
Output: MGT a generalization of PT[Ql] that enforces k-anonymity
Assumes: IPT J> k, and loss * IPT = k
algorithm Datafly:
II Construct afrequency list containing unique sequences of values across the quasi-identifier in PT,
II along with the number of occurrences of each sequence.
1. let freq be an expandable and collapsible Vector with no elements initially.Each element is of the
form (Q I,frequency, SID), where SID = {id : 3t[id] e PT[id] t[id]=id,}; and,frequency = ISIDI.
Therefore, freq is also accessible as a table over (QI,frequency, SID).
2. let pos +- 0, total <- 0
3. while total # JPTJ do
5.1 freq[pos] +- (t[Ql], occurs, SID)
where t[QI]e PT[QI], (t[Q],_, _e freq; occurs = PT - IPT[QI] - {t[QI]}|;
and, SID = {id,: 3t[id]e PT[id]st[id]=id}
5.2 pos +- pos + 1, total +- total + occurs
II Make a solution by generalizing the attribute with the most number of distinct values
II and suppressing no more than the allowed number of tuples.
6. let belowk <- 0
7. for pos <- I to 1freq do
7.1 (_, count) <- freq[pos]
7.2 if count < k then do
7.2.1 belowk <- belowk + count
8. if belowk > k then do: IINote. loss * PTI = k
8.1 freq +- generalize(freq)
8.2 go to step 4
9. else do
IIassert: the number of tuples to suppress in freq is loss * PT|
9.1 freq <- suppress(freq, belowk)
9.2 MGT +- reconstruct(freq)
10. return MGT.
Figure 39 Core Datafly algorithm
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Datafly generalize Algorithm
II This algorithm identifies the attribute within the quasi-identifier having the most number of distinct
IIvalues in the tuples stored in freq and then generalizes those values in freq. Generalization is
II enforced at the attribute level, so all the values associated with an attribute are in the same domain.
1. let max <- 0
2. for each aeQl do:
2.1 let values <- 0
2.2 for pos <- 1 to 1freqj do:
2.2.1 (t, _, _) <- freq[pos]
2.2.2 values <- values u { t[a] }
IIassert: values contains set of values assigned to attribute a in the tuples of freq
2.3 if max < values I then do:
2.3.1 max <-Ivalues
2.3.2 attr +- a
IIassert: attr is the attribute of QI having the most number of distinct values (max) in the tuples offreq
3. let V be a frequency list of the same type as freq. V initially has no elements.
4. if max = I then do:
4.1 halt on error /I PTJ < k
II generalize values assigned to attr
5. for pos <- 1 to 1freqj do:
5.1 ([val, ... , van], count, sid) +- freq[pos]
5.2 if attr = a, then do
5.2.1 V <- VectorAdd(V, [fa,,(vaj),...,van], count, sid)
5.3 else if attr = a, then do:
5.3.1 V +- VectorAdd(V, [va,... fattr(van)], count, sid)
5.4 else V <- VectorAdd(V, [val,. .. ,fatt,(Vaur),. .. ,vaJ, count, sid)
freq +- V
return freq
6.
7.
Figure 40 generalizeO, supporting method for core Datafly algorithm
Datafly VectorAdd Algorithm
Input: V, t, occurs, sid
Output: Updates and returns V, a frequency list
// This method adds the tuples associated with (t,occurs, sid) to V avoiding duplication
algorithm VectorAdd:
1. forpos <- I to IVJ do:
1.1. let (t1 , occurs,, sid,) <- V[pos]
1.2. if t1 = t then do:
1.2.1. V[pos] <- (t, occurs + occurs,, sid, u sid)
1.2.2. return V
2. V[pos+1 ] +- (t, occurs, sid) I/ add to end
3. return V
Figure 41 Datafly VectorAdd algorithm
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algorithm suppress(freq, belowk):
II This algorithm suppresses the tuples within freq that do not satisfy the k requirement; these
II should total belowk number of tuples.
II Assume freq has no more than loss * PTI tuples to suppress, and loss * PTl = k.
1. let smallest +- PT
2. for pos +- 1 to Ifreql do:
2.1 (t, count,_) +- freq[pos]
2.2 if count < k then do:
2.2.1 freq[pos] +- (null, count,)
where null is the suppressed values for the tuple
2.2.2. belowk <- belowk - count
2.3 else do:
2.3.1 if count <smallest then do:
2.3.1.1 smallest +- count
3 if (belowk > 0) and (belowk < k) then do: II Note. loss * PTJ = k, belowk _<k
3.1 (t, count,_) +- freq[smallest]
3.2 if (count - belowk) > k then do:
3.2.1 freq[pos+1] <- (t, count-belowk,__)
3.2.2 freq[smallest] +- (null, belowk,_)
3.3 else do:
3.3.1 freq[smallest]+- (null, count,_)
4 return freq
algorithm reconstruct(freq):
// This algorithm produces a table based on the tuples within freq and their reportedfrequencies.
1. let T <- 0 II T is a table and so it is a multiset, which maintains duplicates
3. forpos +- I to jfreql do:
4.1 (t, countsid) +- freq[pos]
4.2 for each ide sid do:
4.2.1 T +- T u{t[Q1, id]}
5 return T
Figure 42 suppresso and reconstructo, supporting methods for core Datafly algorithm
Figure 39 lists the core Datafly algorithm. It contains only a few major steps. Step 1 through step
3 construct a frequency list containing unique sequences of values across the quasi-identifier in PT,
along with the number of occurrences of each sequence. The frequency list, freq, stores the result.
Therefore, each tuple in freq is unique and Ifreql ! IPTI. The generalize() method of sub-step 6.1 is listed
in Figure 40. It uses a heuristic to guide its generalization strategy. Specifically, the attribute having the
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most number of distinct values in the tuples stored in freq is selected. All the values associated with that
attribute are generalized, enforcing generalization at the attribute level.
Step 7 assumes that the number of tuples to suppress is less than or equal to loss * IPTI. That is,
the frequencies associated with tuples in freq that are less than k, together total no more than loss * PTI.
The suppresso method in sub-step 7.1 can be found in Figure 42. It traverses through the tuples of freq
replacing the tuples whose frequencies are. less than k with suppressed values for all the attributes of
those tuples, thereby suppressing those tuples. Suppression is enforced at the tuple-level. Complimentary
suppression is performed so that the number of suppressed tuples adheres to the k requirement. The
reconstructO method in sub-step 7.2 can also be found in Figure 42. It produces a table, which becomes
MGT, based on freq. Specifically, the values stored for each tuple in freq appear in MGT as they do in
freq and are replicated in MGT based on the stored frequency. Therefore, IPT = IMGTI.
While the core Datafly algorithm is a simplification of the Datafly system that works only across
the attributes of the quasi-identifier QI, it can be extended easily to have the generalized table include
attributes not in the quasi-identifier. This can be done by assigning a unique identifier to each tuple in PT
and then storing along with each tuple in freq, the unique identifiers of the corresponding tuples in PT.
The unique identifiers are stored in freq but are not modified or included in step 1 through step 7.1 of the
core Datafly algorithm. The reconstructO method in sub-step 7.2 however, is modified to link each tuple
from freq to corresponding tuples in PT using the unique identifiers and thereby expand the tuples stored
in T to include the additional unchanged attributes of PT that do not belong to QI.
RaeBirth~ate Gendler ZIP" Ple
black 1965 male 02141 short of breath
black 1965 male 02141 chest pain
black 1965 female 02138 painful eye
black 1965 female 02138 wheezing
black 1964 female 02138 obesity
black 1964 female 02138 chest pain
white 1964 male 02139 obesity
white 1964 male 02139 fever
white 1967 male 02138 vomiting
white 1967 male 02138 back pain
Figure 43 Table MGT resulting from Datafly, k=2, Ql={Race, Birthdate, Gender, ZIP}
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Example.
The private table PT shown in Figure 34 includes unique labels, t] through t12, associated with
each tuple. These labels are useful for linking the Datafly generalization to the original table.
Given PT and the domain generalization hierarchies based on the depictions in Figure 33 (on
page 104), the core Datafly algorithm provides the table MGT, as shown in Figure 43, as a
generalization of PT over the quasi-identifier QI = {Race, BirthDate, Gender, ZIP} with no
more than loss= k/IPTI, which is 2/12 (or 17%) of the tuples of PT suppressed. MGT adheres to a
k-anonymity requirement of k=2. Here is a walk through the Datafly algorithm as it constructs
MGT.
Figure 44 shows the contents of freq after step 3 of the core Datafly algorithm, before any
generalization is performed. The sequences of values, considered as a unit across QI in freq, are
each unique. The numbers appearing below each column in the tabular view of the attributes of
Ql in freq report the number of distinct values found in each attribute of QI in freq. For
example, there are 2 distinct values, namely "black" and "white" associated with the attribute
Race; there are 12 distinct values associated with BirthDate; 2 with Gender; and, 3 with ZIP.
In Figure 44, the BirthDate attribute has the largest number of distinct values (12) of any
attribute of Q1 in freq; so, at sub-step 6.1, the generalize() method re-codes those values to
month and year of birth in accordance with the domain generalization hierarchy associated with
BirthDate. On the second iteration of steps 4 through 6, the BirthDate attribute again has the
largest number of distinct values (12) of any attribute of Ql in freq; so again, these values are
recoded. This time values associated with BirthDate report only the year of birth, as shown in
Figure 45. The two tuples identified as t7 and t8 in Figure 45 do not occur k times (only once
each). In order for this generalization to be a solution, these two tuples in freq would have to be
suppressed. That would be 2/12 (or 17%) of the tuples in PT, which is in accordance with the
allowable loss of tuples due to suppression (based on loss). Therefore, a solution is found. Figure
43 shows the final result.
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Race 151rthDate Gnder IZIP
black 9/20 male 02141
blackI 2/14/65male 0214T
white 8/13/64 male 02139
white 5/5/64 male 02139
white 2/13/67 male 02138
white 3/21/67 male 02138
2 12 2 3
Figure 44 freq at an intermediate stage o
Race BirthDte Gender ZIP
black 1965 male 02141
black 1965 female 02138
black 1964 female 02138
white 11964 male 02138
white 1965 femalp 021391
white 1964 male 02139
white 1967 male 021381
#occurs
1 ti
1 t2
1 t3
1 t4
1 t5
1 t6
1 t7
1 t8
1 t9
1 t1o
1 tIl
1 t12
r the core Data
#Occurs
2 tl,t2
2 t3, t4
2 t5, t6
1 t7
I t8
2 t9, tl0
2 t11, t12
Fly algorithm
Figure 45 freq at another intermediate stage of the core Datafly algorithm
6.3 Comparison to MinGen
A comparison to MinGen [94] requires examining: (1) the computational complexity of the
algorithm to ensure it operates in reasonable time; (2) the correctness of the algorithm in terms of k-
anonymity protection; and, (3) whether the algorithm distorts minimally. These are discussed in the
following subsections.
6.3.1 Complexity of the core Datafly algorithm
The core Datafly algorithm listed in Figure 39 with supporting methods in Figure 40 and Figure
42 was not written as efficiently as possible. Nevertheless, here is a walk through the algorithm noting
the computational complexity of each part. Its computational complexity is governed by step 4 through
step 6 of the core Datafly algorithm. In the worst case, where 1freqj = PTJ on the first iteration, step 5
executes JPTJ times on the first iteration and fractions of PTJ on subsequent iterations. The construction
of a frequency list requires visiting each element of a frequency list and if changes are made due to
generalization, the element is removed and then the modified element added. In order to avoid
duplication of elements in a frequency list, all elements in the frequency list are compared to the element
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that is to be inserted. If the elements of freq were stored in a binary tree, then such a comparison could
be done in log(Ifreql) time. In the worst case, 1freqj = IPTI; in all cases, Ifreqj IPTI. Similarly, in this
case, step 6 executes the generalize( method in O( 1Q11 9 IPT log IPTI), if freq was stored as a binary
tree, or O( 1Q11 * IPT12) as the methods are written. The outer loop from step 4 through step 6 executes
QTI
Z DGH Ai times in its worst case, which requires each attribute to generalize one step at a time to its
maximal element. So, the overall complexity for the core Datafly algorithm in general is
0 IQTI IQTj
orr1 DGH A I* PTI . In most databases, IJ << JPTJ and DGH AiI << IPTI. So, the overall
complexity for the core Datafly algorithm in general is O( 1Q11 9 IPTI log IPTI), if freq was stored as a
binary tree, or O( 1QI e IPT12) as the methods are written. In comparison to the computational complexity
of MinGen [95] and Equation 1 (on page 90), the computational complexity of the core Datafly
algorithm is practical but not extremely fast.
6.3.2 Correctness of the core Datafly algorithm
The correctness of the core Datafly algorithm relies on its ability to produce solutions that adhere
to a given k-anonymity requirement, assuming of course a proper quasi-identifier and a proper value for k
have been provided. In this subsection, I will show that the core Datafly algorithm provides solutions that
correctly adhere to a given k-anonymity requirement.
The enforcement of a k-anonymity requirement is based on step 5, step 6 and step 7 of the core
Datafly algorithm. At the conclusion of step 5, the following assertion is true: belowk stores the total
number of tuples not adhering to the k-anonymity requirement. Assume loss has not been inflated. Its
minimal required value, based on the stated assumptions by the algorithm, is loss * IPT = k. Then, step 6
executes in all cases where belowk > k, and iteratively generates attributes until belowk k. The
convergence is assured by the singleton maximal element constraint on each domain generalization
hierarchy [96]. Therefore, step 7 executes only if belowk k. Sub-step 7.1 executes the suppress()
method. There are two cases to consider - namely, when belowk = k and when belowk < k.
Case 1. If belowk = k, step 2 of the suppresso method will provide suppressed values in freq for
what corresponds to k tuples in the final table, and these tuples are exactly those tuples for which belowk
corresponds - i.e., the tuples that do not adhere to k-anonymity.
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Case 2. If belowk < k, step 2 of the suppressO method behaves as described in case 1 above,
except the tuples with suppressed values in freq will themselves not total k occurrences. Therefore, the
suppressed tuples do not themselves adhere to k-anonymity. In this case, additional tuples are suppressed
so that the total number of suppressed tuples adhere to the k-anonymity requirement. The tuples selected
for such complementary suppression come from tuples in freq that already adhere to the k-anonymity
requirement. In the suppress() method listed in Figure 42, a tuple in freq which adheres to the k-
anonymity requirement and has the fewest number of occurrences in the resulting table is selected. It's
position in freq is denoted by smallest. [In the full-blown version of the Datafly System, the data holder
selects whether a tuple with the fewest, or with the most number of occurrences is used.] In an effort to
minimize the suppression, if freq [smallest] has at least k + (k-belowk) occurrences, then only (k-belowk)
occurrences are suppressed. All tuples in the resulting table therefore, have at least k indistinguishable
tuples occurring over Q1.
6.3.3 Summary data attack thwarted by the core Datafly algorithm
The enforcement of the k-anonymity requirement even on suppressed tuples protects Datafly
from an inference attack based on summary data. If the frequencies of values contained within the
privately held information are released separately for each attribute, which is often the case in statistical
reports and summary data, then this information can be used to infer suppressed values if the suppressed
values themselves do not adhere to the k-anonymity requirement imposed on the other released values.
Example.
Summary data for the privately held information PT in Figure 34 is shown in Figure 46. Suppose
table T in Figure 47 was released as a generalization of PT that satisfied a k-anonymity
requirement where k=2 over the quasi-identifier Ql={Race, BirthDate, Gender, ZIP}. Except for
the single suppressed tuple, k-anonymity is satisfied for all the other tuples. However, using the
summary data, the missing tuple can be inferred exactly. To combat this problem, the k-
anonymity requirement must be satisfied on all values, including suppressed ones. The Datafly
solution shown in Figure 43 does not have this problem.
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Race Frequency
black 6
white 6
BirthYear
1964 5
1965 5
1967 2
Gender
male 6
female 6
Problems
back pain 1
chest pain 2
fever 1
hypertension 1
obesity 2
painful eye 1
short of breath 2
vomiting I
wheezing 1
Figure 46 Summary data for PT in Figure 34
ace Ged Z Problem
black 1965 male 0214* short of breath
black 1965 male 0214* chest pain
black 1965 female 0213* painful eye
black 1965 female 0213* wheezing
black 1964 female 0213* obesity
black 1964 female 0213* chest pain
white 1964 male 0213* short of breath
white 1964 male 0213* obesity
white 1964 male 0213* fever
white 1967 male 0213* vomiting
white 1967 male 0213* back pain
Figure 47 Generalization of PT in Figure 34
6.3.4 Distortion and the core Datafly algorithm
In terms of assessing the quality of generalized data that adhere to a k-anonymity requirement, it
is important to note whether: (1) the resulting data are minimally generalized - i.e., not a generalization
of another generalization that satisfies the same k-anonymity requirement; and, (2) the data are minimally
distorted - i.e., of all minimal generalizations that satisfy the k-anonymity requirement, none have more
precision retained in the data. In this subsection I will show that the core Datafly algorithm does not
necessarily provide minimally generalized solutions or minimally distorted ones, even though its
solutions do adhere to a k-anonymity requirement.
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One of the problems is that Datafly makes crude decisions - generalizing all values associated
with an attribute or suppressing all values within a tuple. Algorithms that make decisions at the cell-level
can potentially provide better results.
Example.
Given the privately held information PT in Figure 34, the Figure 43 provides table MGT, where
Datafly(PT)=MGT for k=2, quasi-identifier Ql={Race, BirthDate, Gender, ZIP}, and
Vi=1,...,IQII, DGHAi are domain generalization hierarchies based on the depictions in Figure 33.
The precision, Prec(MGT) with respect to DGHAi is 0.750. In comparison, Figure 35 provides
GT1, where MinGen(PT)=GT1. It is a k-minimal distortion of PT over Q1 with respect to
DGHAi where Prec(GT1)=0.83. The MinGen result therefore has less distortion based on cell-
level generalization and suppression.
Another problem is the heuristic that guides the core Datafly algorithm's selection of which
attribute to generalize. The approach of selecting the attribute with the greater number of distinct values,
as is done in the generalizeo method, may be computationally efficient, but can easily lead to
unnecessary generalization. Any attribute that is not in the domain of its maximal element could be
selected for generalization, though some choices are better than others. The heuristic used in the core
Datafly algorithm makes the assumption that having more distinct values associated with an attribute in a
table is a perfect predictor of the distance between tuples and of the optimal generalization strategy [97].
Neither of these assumptions is valid. As a result, the core Datafly algorithm can provide more
generalization than is needed.
Example.
Given the privately held information PT and the generalizations of PT named GT 1 ,o], GT[1,1],
GTo,21 and GTo,11 in Figure 27, GT1 ,.o, GT[1,1] and GT[0 ,21 all satisfy a k-anonymity requirement
where k=3, the quasi-identifier is Q={Ethnicity, ZIP}, and where Vi=1,...,IQII, DGHA are
domain generalization hierarchies based on the depictions in Figure 26 but where a domain
containing the single suppressed value has been affixed atop each. The first iteration of the core
Datafly algorithm would provide GT0 ,1 because there are 3 distinct values for Ethnicity and 4
distinct values for ZIP in PT. However, GTo,11 does not satisfy the k-anonymity requirement, so
another iteration occurs. There are 3 distinct values for Ethnicity and 2 distinct values for ZIP in
GTro,1], so GT[1,1] emerges as the Datafly solution. This table does satisfy the k-anonymity
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requirement. However, GT[l,o] also satisfies the k-anonymity requirement and it has less
generalization. In fact, GT[,o] Datafly(PT)=GT[l.
6.4 Datafly as an anonymous data system
Datafly uses the following disclosure limitation techniques: de-identification, equivalence class
substitution, generalization, and suppression. Below is a description of the framework in which Datafly
operates.
S = {subjects whose information is included in PT}
P = set of all people whose information could possibly be in PT
PT = privately held information about S
QI set of attributes with replications in E
U = {existence ofpeople implied by equivalence class assignments} u'P
RT = Datafly(PT)
E = set of publicly available information in today's society
G = set of standard communication methods.
f = Datafly System
The system A(S, P, PT, QI, U, {RT}, E, G, Datafly) is an ADSo.
Informal proof.
If QI contains all attributes replicated in E, A adheres to k-map protection, where k is enforced
on RT. That is, for each value of QI released in RT, there are at least k tuples having that value,
including suppressed tuples; for completeness, see earlier discussion [98].
So, A is an ADSO.
Datafly is an ADSO in cases where the quasi-identifier is correctly chosen because in those cases
each tuple released by Datafly will indistinctly map to at least k entities.
6.5 Future work
1. The core Datafly algorithm does not typically provide k-minimal generalizations [99]. Revise
the core Datafly algorithm, or construct a similar algorithm, that makes decisions based on
126
Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection
enforcing generalization at the attribute level and suppression at the tuple level and that
operates in real-time, yet provides k-minimal generalizations.
2. Similar to the item above, revise the core Datafly algorithm, or construct a similar algorithm,
that makes decisions based on enforcing generalization at the attribute level and suppression
at the tuple level and that operates in real-time, yet provides k-minimal distortions [100]
based on a precision metric [101] specific to attribute level generalization and tuple level
suppression.
3. The core Datafly algorithm relies on a heuristic to guide its generalization strategy. This
heuristic selects the attribute of the quasi identifier having the greater number of distinct
values in the modified table as the attribute to generalize. As was discussed earlier [102], this
heuristic is computationally efficient but provides no protection against unnecessary
generalization. There are many other heuristics that are just as computationally efficient.
Perform an analysis that compares a set of such heuristics (including the random selection of
an attribute) to optimal results. A nearest neighbor strategy based on distance vectors is used
in the k-similar algorithm, which appears in a subsequent chapter [103]; perhaps it could be
adapted to attribute-level generalization and tuple-level suppression.
4. The core Datafly algorithm presented in Figure 39 was not written to be as computationally
efficient as possible. For example, given a private table PT, the original Datafly system
could operate in O( IPTI log IPTI ) time. Examine the core Datafly algorithm and its
supporting algorithms and improve their computational complexity or prove the minimum
complexity required for this approach. Examine and describe best case, worst case and
general case scenarios.
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Chapter 7 Results: p-Argus
In 1996, The European Union began funding an effort that involves statistical offices and
universities from the Netherlands, Italy and the United Kingdom. The main objective of this project is to
develop specialized software for disclosing public-use data such that the identity of any individual
contained in the released data cannot be recognized. Statistics Netherlands has already produced a first
version of a program named ji-Argus that seeks to accomplish this goal [104]. The p-Argus program is
considered by many as the official confidentiality software of the European community. A presentation
of the concepts on which p-Argus is based can be found in Willenborg and De Waal [105]. p-Argus is
surprisingly similar to my Datafly system even though the systems were developed at roughly the same
time with no prior knowledge of each other and the systems are from different academic traditions. In
comparison, as you will see, Datafly tends to over-distort data while p-Argus tends to under-protect data.
7.1 Overview of the p-Argus System
The program p-Argus, like the Datafly System, provides protection by enforcing a k requirement
on the values found in a quasi-identifier. It generalizes values within attributes as needed, and removes
extreme outlier information from the released data. The data holder provides a value of k and specifies
which attributes are sensitive by assigning a value to each attribute between 0 and 3 denoting "not
identifying," "most identifying," "more identifying," and "identifying," respectively. The program then
identifies rare and therefore unsafe combinations by testing some 2- or 3-combinations of attributes
declared to be sensitive. Unsafe combinations are eliminated by generalizing attributes within the
combination and by local cell suppression. Rather than removing entire tuples when one or more
attributes contain outlier information as is done in the Datafly System, the p-Argus System simply
suppresses or blanks out the outlier values at the cell-level. The resulting data typically contain all the
tuples and attributes of the original data, though values may be missing in some cell locations.
Each unique combination of values found within sensitive attributes constitutes a bin. When the
number of occurrences of such a combination is less than the minimum required bin size (also known as
a k requirement), the combination is considered unique and termed an outlier. Clearly for all
combinations that include unique identifiers like Social Security numbers, all such combinations are
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unique. Values associated with outliers must be generalized or one value from each outlier combination
must be suppressed. For optimal results when suppression is performed, the program should suppress
values that occur in multiple outliers giving precedence to the value occurring most often.
The responsibility of when to generalize and when to suppress lies with the data holder. For this
reason, the p-Argus program operates in an interactive mode so the data holder can see the effect of
generalizing and can then select to undo the step. Once a data holder decides to suppress, the selection
of which cells require suppression is performed automatically by the program. This is in sharp contrast to
Datafly, which automatically produces a complete solution based on data holder specifications. In p-
Argus, a data holder is not even notified whether a current solution satisfies a k requirement across the
quasi-identifier, so the data holder can easily continue and overly distort data or stop prematurely and
under protect data. In addition, there are many possible ways a data holder could rank identifying
attributes, and unfortunately different identification ratings typically yield drastically different results.
So, ratings and results reported on p-Argus in this book are based on the most secure possible using the
g-Argus program and therefore, reported use of p-Argus assumes an extremely knowledgeable data
holder.
p-Argus only uses attribute-level generalization and cell-level suppression. Equivalence class
substitution is not provided, as was with Datafly, so the ability to link data across tables to the same
person is lost without consistent replacement of identifiers, which provide such links. In fairness to p-
Argus, the current version does not work across multiple tables and as a result it does not take into
account many related issues including facilities for longitudinal studies, analysis of the number of
records per person, etc, but future versions may do so.
7.2 Abstract of the p-Argus System
I have not found an algorithmic description of pL-Argus in conversation with or in publication by
Statistics Netherlands or any other party. Textbook descriptions of how generalization, which they term
re-coding, and cell suppression work, as well as instructions and examples of the use of p-Argus, and a
copy of the software were graciously provided by Statistics Netherlands. From these, I have reverse
engineered p-Argus and produced the p-Argus algorithm shown in Figure 50 with supporting methods
found in Figure 51 through Figure 62. By "reverse engineering", I mean that the names of methods and
implementation specifics reported in Figure 50 through Figure 62 are created by me in such a way that
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the overall behavior of each phase of the program agrees, except where noted, with the actual R-Argus
program when provided the same information. The primary phases of the pt-Argus algorithm are provided
in Figure 48. During this process of reverse engineering and construction of the algorithm, several
shortcomings of the actual p-Argus implementation were found and are discussed. So in reality, the pL-
Argus algorithm I provide in Figure 50 and supporting methods generates solutions that are better
protected than those released by the actual program.
Primary phases in the p-Argus algorithm are as follows:
A. Automatically generalize each attribute independently until it
adheres to k.
B. Automatically test 2- and 3- combinations of attributes and
note outliers.
C. Data holder decides whether to generalize an attribute and if
so, identifies the attribute to generalize.
D. Repeat steps B and C until data holder has no more attributes
to generalize.
E. Automatically suppress values that occur in multiple outliers,
where precedence is given to the value occurring most often.
Figure 48 Primary phases of pL-Argus algorithm
The basic phases of the p-Argus algorithm are listed in Figure 48. The program begins in phase
A by automatically generalizing each attribute independently until each value associated with an attribute
appears at least k times. In phase B, the program then automatically tests combinations of attributes to
identify those combinations of attributes whose assigned values in combination do not appear at least k
times; such combinations of values are termed outliers. Afterwards, the data holder, in phase C, decides
whether to generalize an attribute and if so, identifies the attribute to generalize. Phases B and C repeat
until the data holder no longer selects an attribute to generalize. Finally, the program in phase E,
automatically suppresses values that occur in multiple outliers, where precedence is given to the value
occurring most often.
One shortcoming of the actual p-Argus implementation appears in phase B in Figure 48.
Attributes considered sensitive or likely candidates for linking are rated as being either "most
identifying" (Most), "more identifying" (More), or "identifying (Identifying) by the data holder. In
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general, the pt-Argus approach concerns examining 2- and 3- combinations across these classes of
attributes. However, pL-Argus does not actually test all 2- and 3- combinations. Figure 49 reports which
combinations p-Argus does and does not test. It is easy to envision situations in which unique
combinations appear in combinations not examined by p-Argus.
Combination p-Argus Tests
Identifying x Identifying x Identifying No
Identifying x Identifying x More No
Identifying x Identifying x Most No
Identifying x More x More No
Identifying x More x Most Yes
Identifying x Most x Most Yes
More x More x More No
More x More x Most only if lIdentifying > 1
Most x Most x More only if |Identifying|> 1
Most x Most x Most Yes
Identifying x Identifying No
Identifying x More Yes
Identifying x Most Yes
More x More only if IIdentifying|> 1
More x Most Yes
Most x Most Yes
Figure 49 Combinations of More, Most, Identifying tested by p-Argus
Figure 49 shows there are 9 combinations involving each of the classes Most, More and
Identifying. However, jt-Argus examines only 8 combinations involving Most, 6 involving More and 4
involving Identifying. So, the sensitivity ranking assigned to an attribute by a data holder relates to the
number of combinations that are examined and that include the attribute. Even then however, not all
possible combinations are examined. If a class has no attributes, then any combination involving it is not
computed. In three cases, the size of Identifying determines whether combinations of attributes that do
not even include Identifying are checked. For example, if only Most and More have attributes and
Identifying is empty, then only the combinations identified as More x Most and Most x Most x Most are
examined.
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Example.
Let Most = {SSN}, Identifying = {Birthdate, Gender, ZIP} and More be empty. In this case, only
Identifying x Most 2-combinations are examined. Yet, 87% of the population of the United
States is considered uniquely identified by {Birthdate, Gender, ZIP}. [106]
Figure 50 contains my description of the pt-Argus algorithm. Figure 51 through Figure 62 provide
supporting methods. A description of the general operation of the algorithm and an example using these
algorithms are provided following the listings.
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p-Argus Algorithm
Input: Private Table PT; quasi-identifier Q I = (A1, ... , An), k-anonymity constraint k; domain
generalization hierarchies DGHAi, where i=l,...,n with accompanying functionsfAi, and
Most, More and Identifying, which are disjoint sets of attributes over the quasi-identifier
QI.
Output: MT a generalization of PT[Ql]
Assumes: Most, More and Identifying are disjoint divisions of the attributes over the quasi-
identifier Ql. That is, QI= Most u More u Identifying and Most r-n More = 0 and Most
r- Identifying = 0 and More r- Identifying = 0. PT includes an attribute id that serves as
a unique identifier (or key) for each tuple in PT.
algorithm g-Argus:
IIConstruct afrequency list containing unique sequences of values across the quasi-identifier in PT,
IIalong with the number of occurrences of each sequence and the id's of the tuples having that sequence.
1. let freq be an expandable and collapsible Vector with no elements initially. Each element is of
the form (QI,frequency, SID, outliers), where SID = {idi: ]t[id]e PT[id]->t[id]=id,};frequency
= ISIDI; and, outliers = 0. Therefore, freq is also accessible as a table over (Ql,frequency, SID,
outliers).
2. freq +- freqSetup(freq, PT, QI)
II generalize each attribute of QI to adhere to k
3. for each aeQl do:
3.1. let V be a frequency list of the same type as freq
3.2. V +- freqConstruct(a;)
3.3. if freqMin(V) < k then do:
3.3.1. freq +- generalize(a;)
3.3.2. go to step 3.2
II check 2- and 3- combinations across Most, More, Identifying
4. CombinationTest(Most, More, Identifying)
5. ReportOutliers(freq) I show data holder outliers
6. while (data holder wants to generalize an attribute a) do:
6.1.freq <- generalize(aj)
7. if (data holder is not done) then do:
7.1. freq +- ResetOutliers(freq)
7.2. go to step 4
IIsuppress outliers and end
8. freq+- SuppressOutliers(freq)
9. MT +- reconstruct(freq)
10. return MT
Figure 50 pi-Argus algorithm
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i-Argus freqSetup Algorithm
Input: freq, PT, QI
Output: Updates and returns freq, a frequency list
// This method constructs afrequency list from PT based on QI.
algorithm freqSetup:
1. 1et pos <- 1, total <- 0
2. while total # IPT do
2.1. freq[pos] <- (t[Q], occurs, sid, 0)
where t[QI]e PT[QI], (t[Q I],_)o freq,
occurs = IPT - IPT[QI] - {t[QI]}I
sid= {t[id] : t[QI,id]e PT[QI,id]
2.2. pos <- pos + 1, total +- total + occurs
3. return freq
Figure 51 p-Argus freqSetup algorithm
Figure 52 pi-Argus freqConstruct algorithm
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p-Argus freqConstruct Algorithm
Input: Ax, ... , AY, which is a list of one or more attributes and each such attribute is an element
of QI.
Output: V, a frequency list based on freq[A,,...,A,].
Assumes: Ax,...,A, contains no duplicates and each is a member of Ql and freq is available for use.
I This algorithm constructs afrequency list from the tuples of freq over a subset of attributes ofQI.
algorithm freqConstruct:
1. let V be a frequency list of the same type as freq. V initially has no elements.
2. for pos <- 1 to IfreqI do:
1 .1 . (t, occurs, sid, outliers) +- freq[pos]
1.2.V <-VectorAdd(V, t[A,,...,A,], occurs, sid)
3. return V
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p-Argus VectorAdd Algorithm
Input: V, t, occurs, sid
Output: Updates and returns V, a frequency list
// This method adds the tuples associated with (t, occurs, sid) to V avoiding duplication
algorithm VectorAdd:
2. forpos <- Ito lVI do:
3.4. let (ti, occurs,, sid, outliers,) <- V[pos]
3.5. if t1 = t then do:
3.5.1. V[pos] +- (t, occurs + occurs,, sid, u sid, 0)
3.5.2. return V
4. V[pos+1 ] +- (t, occurs, sid, 0) //add to end
5. return V
Figure 53 p-Argus VectorAdd algorithm
p-Argus freqMin Algorithm
Input: V, a frequency list based on freq[A,,...,As].
Output: an integer reporting the smallest number of occurs in V
// This method returns the minimum number of occurrences in V
algorithm freqMin:
1. let min +-IPTI
2. forpos <- Ito IVI do:
1.1. (t, occurs, sid, outliers) +- V[pos]
1.2. if occurs < min then do:
1.2.1. min <- occurs
3. return min
Figure 54 p-Argus freqMin algorithm
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p-Argus generalize Algorithm
Input: attr, which is an attribute of Ql
Output: updates and returns freq
Assumes: freq and domain generalization hierarchy DGHattr with accompanying functionfja, are
available for use; and attreQl
II This method generalizes all values associated with attr in freq.
algorithm generalize:
1. let V be a frequency list of the same type as freq. V initially has no elements.
2. for pos <- 1 to freqI do:
2.1. ([va1 . Van], occurs, sid, outliers) <- freq[pos]
2.2. if Vatr is not maximal element of DGHattr then do:
2.2.1. if attr = a, then do:
2.2.1.1. V +- VectorAdd(V, [fattr(Va),...,Van], occurs, sid, 0)
2.2.2. else if attr = an then do:
2.2.2.1. V +- VectorAdd(V, [va1,...far(van)], occurs, sid, 0)
2.2.3. else do:
2.2.3.1. V +- VectorAdd(V, [Val,... far(Va,.), ... ,van], occurs, sid, 0)
3. freq<-V
4. return freq
Figure 55 t-Argus generalize algorithm
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pt-Argus CombinationTest Algorithm
Input: Most, More and Identifying, which are disjoint sets of attributes over the quasi-identifier
QI.
Output: Updates and returns outliers in freq.
Assumes: Most, More and Identifying are disjoint sets of attributes over the quasi-identifier Ql.
Each cell of outliers is initialized to 0 and outliers is available for use.
II This method computes 2- and 3- way combinations across Most, More, and Identifying.
II This method selects those combinations the actual p-Argus program would compute.
II Notice it is not all 2- and 3- combinations.
algorithm CombinationTest:
1. if IMostl= 0 then return 0
2. if JMorel= 0 and 1Identifying = 0 then return 0
// guarantee: IMost 1- 1
3. if IMost 3 then do:
3.1 MarkOutliers3(Most) II Most x Most x Most
4. if jMostl 2 then do:
4.1 MarkOutliers2 (Most, 0) II Most x Most
4.2 if 1Identifyingl 1 and JMorel 1 then do:
4.2.1 MarkOutliers2 (Most, More) II Most x Most x More
4.3 if IIdentifying 1 then do:
4.3.1 MarkOutliers2 (Most, Identifying) II Most x Most x Identifying
5. if JMorel 2 then do:
5.1 MarkOutliers (Most, More, 0) II Most x More
5.2 if 1Identifying 1 then do:
5.2.1 MarkOutliers2 (More, 0) // More x More
5.2.2 MarkOutliers2 (More, Most) // More x Morex Most
6. if JMorel 1 and 1Identifyingl 1 then do:
6.1 MarkOutliers (Most, More, Identifying) // Most x Morex Identifying
6.2 MarkOutliers (More, Identifying, 0) II Morex Identifying
7. if 1Identifyingl 1 then do:
7.1 MarkOutliers (Most, Identifying, 0) II Mostx Identifying
8. return
Figure 56 p-Argus CombinationTest algorithm
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i-Argus MarkOutliers Algorithm
Input: S1, S2, S3, which are subsets of QI
Output: Updates outliers in freq and returns updated freq
Assumes: S1, S2 and S3 are disjoint sets of attributes over the quasi-identifier QI and freq is
available for use.
II This method computes the sub-tables SI x S2 x S3 and marks outliers
algorithm MarkOutliers:
1. for i<-1 to 1Ql do:
1.1.forj<- 1 to Q11I do:
1.1.1. if aieSi and ajeS2 then do:
1.1.1.1. if IS31= 0 then do:
1.1.1.1.1. V +- freqConstruct(aj, a)
1.1.1.1.2. freq +- MarginalUpdate(V)
1.1.2. else do:
1.1.2.1. for k +- I to Q1 do:
1.1.2.1.1.1. if akeS3 then do:
1.12.11.1.V +- freqConstruCt(aj, ay, a)
1.1.2.1.1.1.2. freq +- MarginalUpdate(V)
2. return freq
Figure 57 ji-Argus MarkOutliers algorithm
p-Argus MarkOutliers2 Algorithm
Input: S1, S3, which are subsets of QI
Output: Updates outliers in freq and returns updated freq
Assumes: S1, S3 are disjoint sets of attributes over the quasi-identifier QI and freq is available for
use.
II This method computes the sub-tables SI x SI x S3 and marks outliers
algorithm MarkOutliers2:
1. for i+-1 to 1Q11 do:
1.1. forj <- i+1 to 1Q11 do:
1.2.2. if aieSi and a eSi then do:
1.2.2.1. if IS31= 0 then do:
1.2.2.1.1. V +- freqConstruct(a, a;)
1.2.2.1.2. freq +- MarginalUpdate(V)
1.2.2.2. else do:
1.2.2.2.1. for k+- ito JQ11 do:
1.2.2.2.1.1. if akeS3 then do:
1.2.2.2.1.1.1. V - freqConstruct(a, a;, ak)
1.2.2.2.1.1.2. freq +- MarginalUpdate(V)
2. return freq
Figure 58 p-Argus MarkOutliers2 algorithm
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Figure 59 p-Argus MarkOutliers3 algorithm
i-Argus MarginalUpdate Algorithm
Input: V, which is a frequency list based on freq[Ax,.]..,A,, and A, which is a set of attributes
where each attribute is a member of Ql.
Output: Updates outliers in freq and returns the updated freq.
Assumes A is a non-empty subset of Q1 and freq is available for use.
II This method records outliers by storing the combination of attributes (A) known not to adhere to k
IIin freq.
algorithm MarginalUpdate:
1. forpos +- I to IVI do:
1.1. (t, occurs, sid, outliers) +- V[pos]
1.2. if occurs < k then do:
1.2.1. for pos, +- 1 to ifreql do:
1.2.1.1. let (ti, occurs,, sid, outliers,) +- freq[posi]
1.2.1.2. if Isidin sidl > 1 then do:
1.2.1.2.1. outliers, <- outliers, u {A}
1.2.1.2.2. freq[pos,] +- (ti, occurs,, sid, outliers,)
2. return freq
Figure 60 p-Argus MarginalUpdate algorithm
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Input: S1, which is a subset of QI.
Output: Updates outliers in freq and returns updated freq
Assumes: Si is a non-empty subset of Ql and freq is available for use.
// This method computes the sub-tables SI x SI x S I and marks outliers
algorithm MarkOutliers3:
1. for i-i to 1Ql| do:
a. forj +- i+1 to 1QI1 do:
i. for k +-j+1 to lQl do:
1. if aieSJ and aieS] and akeSi then do:
a. V +- freqConstruct(a, a,, ak)
b. freq +- MarginalUpdate(V)
4. return freq
Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection
p-Argus resetOutliers Algorithm
Input: freq
Output: updates and returns freq
// This method sets all outliers in freq to the empty set.
algorithm resetOutliers:
1. forpos <- I to IVJ do:
1.1. (t, occurs, sid, outliers) <- V[pos]
1.2. V[pos] +-(t, occurs, sid, 0)
2. return freq
Figure 61 p-Argus resetOutliers algorithm
g-Argus SuppressOutliers Algorithm
Input: freq
Output: Updates and returns freq.
I This method suppresses one value of each combination known to be an outlier in a tuple.
algorithm SuppressOutliers:
1. forpos +- I to 1freqj do:
1.1. ([val,...,vajn], occurs, sid, outliers) +- freqlpos)
1.2. if occurs < k then do:
1.2.1. while Ioutliersl> 0 do: IIactual p-Argus program does not exhaust outliers!
1.2.1.1. let max <- 0
1.2.1.2. for i <- I to |QI do:
1.2.1.2.1. let total<- 0
1.2.1.2.2. for each seoutliers do:
1.2.1.2.2.1. if ages then do:
1.2.1.2.2.1.1. total - total + 1
1.2.1.2.3. if total> max then do:
1.2.1.2.3.1. max <- total
1.2.1.2.3.2. attr +- a
II attr is most frequent attribute in outliers
1.2.1.3. outliers +- { s : ske outliers, attre sk}
1.2.1.4. if attr = a, then do:
1.2.1.4.1. freq[pos] <- ([null,...,Van], occurs, sid, outliers)
1.2.1.5. else if attr = an then do:
1.2.1.5.1. freq[pos] - ([Va,...,null], occurs, sid, outliers)
1.2.1.6. else do:
1.2.1.6.1. let a; be attr, where QI=a,...,;.,,a, a ...,an
1.2.1.6.2. freq[pos] <- ([val,...,a..j,null,aj ...,van], occurs, sid, outliers)
2. freq <- freqCleanup(freq) // consolidates elements to avoid supplicate values over QI
3. return freq
Figure 62 p-Argus SuppressOutliers algorithm
140
Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection
As introduced earlier, the basic steps, A through E, of the p-Argus algorithm are enumerated in
Figure 48. The algorithm listed in Figure 50 along with its supporting methods is more detailed but
follows these same basic steps. Below is a walk through the detailed version of the g-Argus algorithm.
Given a private table PT, a quasi-identifier Ql=(A1 ,...,A,), a k-anonymity requirement k, domain
generalization hierarchies DGHAi, where i=1,...,n with accompanying functionsfAi, and Most, More and
Identifying, which are disjoint sets of attributes over the quasi-identifier QI, the g-Argus algorithm, listed
in Figure 50, generates a generalization of PT[QI]. The algorithm assumes Most, More and Identifying
are disjoint divisions of the attributes over the quasi-identifier QI. That is, (QI= Most u More u
Identifying) and (Most r-n More = 0) and (Most n Identifying = 0) and (More rn) Identifying = 0). PT is
also required to have a unique identifier associated with each of its tuples; in this case, PT includes an
attribute id that serves as a unique identifier (or key) for each tuple in PT.
The pt-Argus algorithm begins in steps I and 2 by constructing a frequency list named freq.
Conceptually I define a frequency list as simply a vector. But as the primary data structure in this
algorithm, my notion of a frequency list is that it describes a table T. Each element in the frequency list
freq corresponds to one or more tuples in table T. The frequency list freq begins by describing the table
PT and each table T subsequently described in freq is a generalization of PT. Frequency lists are also
used to store variations and subsets of freq during the operation of the algorithm.
Each element in a frequency list F based on a table T consists of (1) values assigned to the quasi-
identifier [VAI,...,vAn]; (2) the number of tuples in T, referred to as occurs, having that assignment of
values; (3) the set of tuple identifiers, referred to as SID, in T to which the values vAi,...,vAn refer, and, (4)
a set of attributes, referred to as outliers, that are initially set to the empty set but at one point in the
algorithm contain the attributes for which the assigned values occur less than the k requirement warrants.
The invariant ISIDI = occurs holds in F. Each sequence of values [vA,,...,vA] is unique in F.
Step 1 and step 2 of the t-Argus algorithm listed in Figure 50 produces a frequency list freq
based on the tuples of the privately held table PT. The method freqSetup() defined in Figure 51 performs
the construction.
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Step 3 of the p-Argus algorithm listed in Figure 50 generalizes each attribute in freq so there are
at least k occurrences of each value reported for an attribute. Recall an earlier lemma in which a table T
that satisfies a quasi-identifier QI=A1 ,...,A, must have at least k occurrences of each t[A]eT where
i=1,...,n [107]. Step 3 of the p-Argus algorithm automatically generalizes attributes until this condition is
satisfied. Success is guaranteed by the single maximal element requirement of each domain
generalization hierarchy DGHAi where i=1,...,n [108].
The heart of the p-Argus algorithm resides in steps 4 through 8 of the listing in Figure 50. These
steps concern examining values associated with 2- and 3- combinations of attributes across the quasi-
identifier QI. The data holder provides the attributes of Q1 by providing the 3 sets named Most, More and
Identifying. The set named Most consists of attributes of QI the data holder considers "most identifying".
The set named More consists of attributes of QI the data holder considers "more identifying". And, the
set named Identifying consists of attributes of QI the data holder considers merely "identifying".
In step 4, values associated with 2- and 3- combinations of attributes across More, Most and
Identifying are examined to determine which combinations of values do not adhere to the k requirement.
These values are considered outliers, are the attributes associated with these values are recorded as
outliers for these tuples in freq. As step 5, these outliers are displayed for the data holder to inspect. In
the next paragraphs, I described the generation and inspection of these combinations in detail.
The method Combination Testo, listed in Figure 56, generates the 2- and 3- combinations that are
examined in p-Argus. As discussed earlier and listed in Figure 48, the actual p-Argus program does not
examine all 2- and 3- combinations of values across the attributes of Most, More and Identifying. Instead,
it examines a subset of these combinations based on the rank order of More, More and then Identifying.
The method CombinationTesto explores only those combinations examined by the actual g-Argus
program as listed in Figure 49.
The actual work of generating the sub-tables that represent the 2- and 3-combinations and
marking the outliers found is done by three methods. These are MarkOutliersO, MarkOutliers2O and
MarkOutliers3O. Each of these methods receives a combination based on Most, More, Identifying and 0
as arguments.
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The method MarkOutliersO, listed in Figure 57, takes 3 arguments Si, S2, and S3, and computes
sub-tables based on S1 x S2 x S3. Each element in S1, S2 and S3 is assumed to be an element of QI. The
method then explores S1 x S2 if S3 = 0 or S1 x S2 x S3 if S3 w 0. The arguments S1 and S2 are required
and cannot be 0, but S3 can be 0. It is assumed that (Si r) S2 = 0). If S3 # 0, then it is also assumed
that (SI rn) S3 =0) and (S2 n S3 = 0).
To make sure duplicate combinations are not explored when examining combinations across the
same set, MarkOutliers2O and MarkOutliers3O are used. The method MarkOutliers3O, listed in Figure
59, is used when a 3-combination is explored across a single set of attributes. For example, Most x Most
x Most is examined by executing MarkOutliers(Most).
Similarly, MarkOutliers2O, listed in Figure 58, is used when a 2- or 3-combination involves
repeating the first set. For example, Most x Most is examined by executing MarkOutliers2 (Most, 0) and
Most x Most x More is examined by executing MarkOutliers2(Most, More).
The methods MarkOutliersO, MarkOutliers2O and MarkOutliers3O work as follows. First, they
generate a frequency list V that contains a sub-table from freq based on values associated with 2 or 3
combinations of the attributes provided as parameters. This is done using the method freqConstructo,
which is listed in Figure 52. The method freqConstructo is given a sequence of attributes As,...,A, and
generates V from freq[As,...,A,]. The methods MarkOutliersO, MarkOutliers2O and MarkOutliers3O
then record in freq those combinations of values in V that do not adhere to k. This is done using the
method MarginalUpdate(), which is listed in Figure 60. The method MarginalUpdateo records
combinations of values associated with Ax,...,4 in V that do not adhere to the k requirement by
appending {Ax,... ,4} to the outliers of freq for each associated tuple.
In step 5 of the p-Argus algorithm, which is listed in Figure 50, the tuples and combinations of
attributes containing outliers is displayed for the data holder's inspection. The ReportOutlierso method,
a listing of which is not provided, merely visits each element of freq. If the element has a non-empty
value for outliers, then the corresponding combinations of attributes contained in outliers are displayed.
The purpose is for the data holder to decide whether to generalize any attributes or whether to stop
execution. The generalize() method, which is listed in Figure 55, replaces the values associated with an
attribute in freq with their generalized replacement. Step 6 of the p-Argus algorithm allows the data
holder to generalize as many attributes of Q1 as desired.
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At step 7 of the p-Argus algorithm, which is listed in Figure 50, the data holder can decide to
have the 2- and 3- combinations re-analyzed, presumably after some attributes have been generalized. If
the combinations are to be re-analyzed, the values associated with outliers recorded in freq are initialized
to 0 and execution continues at step 4, thereby repeating steps 4 through 7. The resetOutlierso method,
which is listed in Figure 61, sets the values associated with outliers in freq to the empty set.
Alternatively, the data holder can decide to conclude the program; in which case, step 8 and step
9 of the p-Argus algorithm, which are listed in Figure 50, execute. Step 8 involves suppressing a value of
each combination of values known to be an outlier in a tuple. This is done by executing
SuppressOutliers0, which is listed in Figure 62. The operation of this method is described below.
The SuppressOutliers0 method visits each element in freq that does not adhere to the k
requirement. Clearly, from the operation of the p-Argus algorithm, it can be shown that each such
element will not necessarily have a non-empty outliers value because there may exist 4-combinations
across QI and there may exist larger combinations of values across Q1 in the data that are unique. In
addition there may exist 2- or 3-combinations across QI that are unique and not identified because those
combinations were not examined by CombinationTesto at all. These possibilities pose serious problems
for the way in which p-Argus has been implemented.
Each element in freq is visited in SuppressOutlierso. If the value for outliers associated with that
element is not empty, then the value associated with an attribute occurring most frequently in that
element's outliers is suppressed (i.e., a suppressed value is one that is assigned a null value in the
method). The while0 loop in the SuppressOutliers method continues in step 1.2.1 until all combinations
identified in outliers has a value in the combination of values suppressed. This is in sharp contrast to the
actual pt-Argus program. In the actual p-Argus program, each such combination is not exhausted. As a
result, some combinations of values whose attributes are identified in outliers may not have values
suppressed even though all combinations reported in outliers is known to not adhere to the k requirement.
This is obviously a problem with the p-Argus implementation and not a limitation of its approach.
The final step of the pi-Argus algorithm is to construct a table based on the descriptions of tuples
in freq. The reconstructo method, which is listed in Figure 42, works the same in p-Argus as in Datafly.
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It can be shown that the final table resulting from the jL-Argus algorithm is a generalization of the
original table provided because the only operations on the data were generalization and suppression.
Example
The private table PT shown in Figure 34 includes unique labels, t] through t12, associated with
the id attribute. These labels are useful for linking the resulting generalization to the original
table. Given PT and the domain generalization hierarchies based on the depictions in Figure 33
(on page 104), the p-Argus algorithm, which is listed in Figure 50, provides the table MT, as
shown in Figure 75, as a generalization of PT over the quasi-identifier Q1 = {Race, BirthDate,
Gender, ZIP}, where Most = {BirthDate}, More = {Gender, ZIP} and Identifying = {Race}. The
actual p-Argus program provides the table MTactual shown in Figure 76 as a generalization of
PT over Q1. Both MT and MTactual are supposed to adhere to a k-anonymity requirement of
k=2. Here is a walk through the pt-Argus algorithm to demonstrate how MT and MTactual are
constructed.
Figure 63 shows the contents of the frequency list freq after step 2 of the p-Argus algorithm
completes. Each sequence of values across QI is unique in PT and so each tuple has a distinct
corresponding element in freq.
Race Birth Sex ZJP
black 9/1965 male 02141
black 2/1965 male 02141
black 10/1965 female 02138
black 8/1965 female 021381
black 11/1964 female 02138
black 12/1964 female 02138
white 10/1964 male 02138
white 3/1965 female 02139,
white 8/1964 male 021391
white 5/1964 male 02139
white 2/1967 male 021381
white 3/1967 male 02138
occurs s1d outlers
1 {tl} 0
1 {t2} 0
1 {t3} {
1 {t4) {
1 {t5) O
1 {t6} {
1 {t7} {}
1 {t8} )
1 {t9} {}
1 {t1O} {
1 {t11} {
1 {t12} {
Figure 63 freq afterfreqSetup() in p-Argus algorithm step 2
Figure 64 shows the contents of freq after step 3 of the jt-Argus algorithm completes. Each value
associated with each attribute in QI adheres to the k-requirement. That is, each value has at least
k occurrences; in this example, k=2. In order to achieve this in freq, values associated with
BirthDate were generalized to the year of birth.
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Race Birth Sex ZIP occurs sid outliers
black 1965 male 02141 2 {tlt2} {}
black 1965 female 02138 2 {t3,t4} 0
black 1964 female 02138 2 {t5,t6} 0
white 1964 male 02138 1 {t7} {
white 1965 female 02139 1 {t8} {}
white 1964 male 02139 2 {t9,t10} 0
white 1967 male 02138 2 {t11,t12} {}
Figure 64 freq after generalize loops in pt-Argus algorithm, step 3
Step 4 of the pt-Argus algorithm executes CombinationTestO, which is listed in Figure 56. This
method computes 2- and 3-combinations across Most, More and Identifying to determine which
combinations of values, if any, do not occur at least k times; recall, in this example k=2. It begins
by examining Most x More combinations. Figure 65 shows the frequency list V generated by
MarkOutliersO at step 5.1 in CombinationTestO when it examines BirthDate x Sex. As Figure 65
shows, all combinations of values for these attributes found in freq occur at least k times.
Birth Sox occurs sid outliers
1965 male 2 {tl,t2} {}
1965 female 3 {t3,t4,t8} {}
1964 female 2 {t5,t6} 0
1964 male 3 {t7,t9,tlO} {}
1967 male 2 {tll,t12} {
Figure 65 V at Most x More in Combination Testo, step 5.1
Continuing the examination of Most x More combinations, Figure 66 shows the frequency list V
generated by MarkOutliers0 at step 5.1 in CombinationTesto when it examines BirthDate x ZIP.
The combination where BirthDate=" 1965" and ZIP="02139" occurs only once and appears in the
tuple identified as t8 in PT. As a result, outliers in freq is updated to include {Birthdate, ZIP}
for that element. Depictions of the resulting V and freq tables are shown in Figure 66.
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Birth ZIP occurs
1965 02141 2
1965 02138 2
1964 02138 3
1965 1021391 1
1964 102139 2
1967 02138 2
V
Race Birth Sex ZIP occurs
black 1965 male 02141 2
black 1965 female 02138 2
black 1964 female 02138 2
white 1964 male 02138 1
white 1965 female 02139 1
white 1964 male 02139 2
white 1967 male 02138 2
freq
sid outliers
{t1,t2) {
{t3,t4} {
{t5,t6,t7} {
ft8) 0
{t9,t10} 0
{tll,t12} {
Sid
{tl,t2}
{t3,t4}
{t5,t6}
{t7}
{t8}
{t9,tl 0)
{t 11,t12}
outliers
0
0
{{birth,zip))
{}
{}
Figure 66 freq and V at Most x More in Combination TestO, step 5.1
The next combinations examined result from More x More, but there is only one such
combination, namely Sex x ZIP. Figure 67 shows the frequency list V generated by
MarkOutliers2O at step 5.2.1 in CombinationTestO when it examines Sex x ZIP. The
combination where Sex="female" and ZIP="02139" occurs only once and appears in the tuple
identified as t8 in PT. As a result, outliers in freq is updated to include {Sex, ZIP} for that
element. Depictions of the resulting V and freq tables are shown in Figure 67.
Se Zi P occurs sid outliers
male 02141 2 {t1,t2} {
female 02138 4 {t3,t4,t5,t6} 
male 02138 3 {t7,t11,t12) 0
female 02139 1 {8} 0
male 02139 2 {t9,t10} 0
V
Race Birth Sex ZIP occurs sid outliers
black 1965 male 02141 2 {tl,t2} 0
black 1965 female 02138 2 {t3,t4} 0
black 1964 female 02138 2 {t5,t6} 0
white 1964 male 02138 1 {t7} {}
white 1965 female 02139 1 {t8} {{birth,zip), {sex,zip))
white 1964 male 02139 2 {t9,t1} {
white 1967 male 02138 2 {tl1,t12} 0
freq
Figure 67 freq and V at More x More in Combination Testo, step 5.2.1
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The next combinations examined result from More x More x Most, but there is only one such
combination, namely BirthDate x Sex x ZIP. Figure 68 shows the frequency list V generated by
MarkOutliers2O at step 5.2.2 in CombinationTesto when it examines BirthDate x Sex x ZIP.
The combination where BirthDate="1964", Sex="male" and ZIP="02138" occurs only once and
appears in the tuple identified as t7 in PT. Likewise, the combination where BirthDate=" 1965",
Sex="female" and ZIP="02139" occurs only once and appears in the tuple identified as t8 in PT.
As a result, outliers in freq is updated to include {BirthDate, Sex, ZIP} for those elements.
Depictions of the resulting V and freq tables are shown in Figure 68.
occurs
1965 male 02141 2
196 le 2138 2
i1AAl famla N71q 9
sid outliers
{tl,t2} {}
{t3,t4} 0
{t5,t6} 0
{t7) 0
Wts 0
[t9,t10} {
tH1,t12} 
V
Race Birth Sex ZIP
black 1965 male 02141
black 1965 female 02138
black 1964 female 02138
white 1964 male 02138
white 1965 female 02139
white 1964 male 02139
white 1967 male 02138
occurs
2
2
2
2
2
sid
{tl,t2)
{t3,t4}
{t5,t6}
{t7}
{t8}
{t9,tl 0}
{t 1,t12}
freq
outliers
0
{{birth,sex,zip))
{{birth,zip), (sex,zip), (birth,sex,zip))
0
0
Figure 68 freq and V at More x More x Most in Combination Testo, step 5.2.2
The next combinations examined result from Most x More x Identifying. These are the specific
combinations Race x BirthDate x Sex and Race x BirthDate x ZIP. Figure 69 shows the
frequency list V generated by MarkOutliersO at step 6.1 in CombinationTestO when it examines
Race x BirthDate x Sex. The combination where Race="white", BirthDate="1965" and
Sex="female" occurs only once and appears in the tuple identified as t8 in PT. As a result,
outliers in freq is updated to include {Race, BirthDate, Sex} for this element. Depictions of the
resulting V and freq tables are shown in Figure 69.
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Race Birth _E occurs
black 1965 m 2
black 1965 f 2
black 1964 f 2
white 1964 m 3
white 1965I f I
white 1967 m 2
V
Raci Birth Sex ZIP occurs
black 1965 male 02141 2
black 1965 female 02138 2
black 1964 female 02138 2
wIte 1964 male 02138 1
white 1965 female 02139 1
white 1964 male 02139 2
white 1967 male 02138 2
Sid
{tl,t2}
{t3,t4}
{t5,t6}
{t7}
{t8}
{t9,tl}
{t1 1,t12}
sid outliers
{tl,t2} 0{t3,t4} 0{t5,t6} {
{t7,t9,tl} 0
{t8} 0{t11,t12} 0
outfers
{}
{}
{}
{{birthsexzip}}
{{birth,zip}, (sex,zip), (birth,sex,zip), (race,birth,sex))
0
0
freq
Figure 69 freq and V at Most x More x Identifying in Combination TestO, step 6.1
Figure 70 shows the frequency list V generated by MarkOutliersO at step 6.1 in
CombinationTestO when it examines Race x BirthDate x ZIP. The combination where
Race="white", BirthDate="1964" and ZIP="02138" occurs only once and appears in the tuple
identified as t7 in PT. Likewise, the combination where Race="white", BirthDate="1965" and
ZIP="02139" occurs only once and appears in the tuple identified as t8 in PT. As a result,
outliers in freq is updated to include {Race, BirthDate, ZIP} for these elements. Depictions of
the resulting V and freq tables are shown in Figure 70.
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Race Birth ZIP occurs sid outliers
black 1965 02141 2 {tl,t2} {
black 1965 02138 2 {t3,t4} {}
black 1964 02138 2 {t5,t6} {}
white 1964 02138 1 {t7} {}
white 1965 02139 1 {8} 0
white 1964 02139 2 {t9,t10} {}
white 1967 02138 2 {tl1,t12) O
V
Race Birth Sex ZIP occurs sid outliers
black 1965 male 02141 2 {tl,t2} {}
black 1965 female 02138 2 {t3,t4} {}
black 1964 female 02138 2 {t5,t6} {}
white 1964 male 02138 1 {t7} {{birth,sex,zip), (race,birth,zip))
{{birth,zip), (sex,zip), {birth,sex,zip), {race,birth,sex),
white 1965 female 02139 1 {t8} {race,birth,zip)}
white 1964 male 02139 2 {t9,t10} {}
white 1967 male 02138 2 {tl1,t1 2) {
freq
Figure 70 freq and V at Most x More x Idenqfying in Combination TestO, step 6.1
The next combinations examined result from More x Identifying. These are the specific
combinations Race x Sex and Race x ZIP. Figure 71 shows the frequency list V generated by
MarkOutlierso at step 6.2 in CombinationTestO when it examines Race x Sex. The combination
where Race="white" and Sex="female" occurs only once and appears in the tuple identified as t8
in PT. As a result, outliers in freq is updated to include (Race, Sex} for this element. Depictions
of the resulting V and freq tables are shown in Figure 71.
Race Sex occurs sid outliers
black male 2 {tlt2} 0
black female 4 {t3,t4,t5,t6} 0
white male 5 {t7t9,t9O,t1,t12} {}
white female I {t8} 0
V
Race Birth Sex ZIP occurs sid outiers
black 1965 male 02141 2 {t1,t2} {
black 1965 female 02138 2 {t3,t4)
black 1964 female 02138 2 {t5,t6} {
white 1964 male 02138 1 {t7} {{birth,sexzip}, {race,birth,zip}}
{{birth,zip}, {sex,zip}, {birth,sex,zip},
white 1965 female 02139 1 {t8} {race,birth,sex}, {race,birth,zip), {race,sex)}
white 1964 male 02139 2 {t9,t}10}
white 1967 male 02138 2 {t11,t12} 0
freq
Figure 71 freq and V at More x Identifying in Combination TestO, step 6.2
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Figure 72 shows the frequency list V generated by MarkOutlierso at step 6.2 in
CombinationTestO when it examines Race x ZIP. None of the combinations appear less than k
times. As a result, freq is not modified.
| MV occurs sid outliers
black 02141 2 {tl,t2} 0
black 02138 4 {t3,t4,t5,t6} {
white 02138 3 {t7,t11,t12} {
white 021391 3 {t8,t9,t10} 0
Figure 72 V at More x Identifying in Combination Testo, step 6.2
The next combinations examined result from Most x Identifying. This is the specific combination
Race x BirthDate. Figure 73 shows the frequency list V generated by MarkOutliersO at step 7.1
in CombinationTesto when it examines Race x BirthDate. The combination where Race="white"
and BirthDate="1965" occurs only once and appears in the tuple identified as t8 in PT. As a
result, outliers in freq is updated to include {Race, BirthDate} for this element. Depictions of
the resulting V and freq tables are shown in Figure 73.
Race Birth occurs sid outliers
black 1965 4 {t1,t2,t3,t4} {
black 1964 2 {t5,t6} 0
white 1964 3 {t7,t9,t10} 0
1white 1965 1 (18} 0
white 1967 2 {t11,t12} 0
V
Race Birth Sex ZIP occurs sid outliers
black 1965 male 02141 2 {tl,t2} 0
black 1965 female 02138 2 {t3,t4} 0
black 1964 female 02138 2 {t5,t6} 0
white 1964 male 02138 1 {t7) {{birth,sex,zip}, {racebirth,zip}}
{{birth,zip}, {sex,zip}, {birth,sex,zip},
{race,birth,sex}, {race,birth,zip},
white 1965 female 02139 1 {t8} {race,sex}, {race,birth}}
white 1964 male 02139 2 {t9,t10} 0
white 1967 male 02138 2 {tl1,t12} 0
freq
Figure 73 freq and V at Most x Identifying in Combination Testo, step 7.1
That concludes the examination of combinations of values that occurs at step 4 of the p-Argus
algorithm. The contents of outliers in freq are displayed and the data holder is solicited for an
attribute to generalize or not. This example continues as option 1, in which no further
generalization is selected and as option 2, in which ZIP is generalized.
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Example, continued with option 1
In this option, the example continues with no further generalization is selected. So, execution of
the p-Argus algorithm proceeds to step 8.
Figure 74 shows freq at the start of SuppressOutlierso. The attributes within the outliers for an
element in freq are examined. The value associated with the attribute occurring in the most
number of members of outliers is suppressed. This process continues until all members of a
value associated with outliers contain at least one suppressed value. In Figure 74 there are two
elements of freq that have non-empty values for outliers. These are the elements associated with
7 and t8.
41
38
Ila
2 {t1,t2}
2 {t3,t4}
2 {t5,t6}
1 {t7}
u
{{irth,sex,zip},
{race,birth,zip}}
{(rth,zip}, {sex,zip},
{birhsexzip},{race, it,se},
{race,birth,zip}, {race sex},
vte 1965 female 02139 1 {t8} {race,irth}}
i 964 male 021391 2 {t9,t1} {
white 1967 male 02138 2 {t11,t12} {}
Figure 74 freq at SuppressOutlierso in p-Argus algorithm, step 8
The value of outliers for the element associated with t7 is {{BirthDate, Sex, ZIP}, {Race,
BirthDate, ZIP}}. The attributes BirthDate and ZIP occur most frequently, so either can be
suppressed. BirthDate is selected. That means, the value associated with BirthDate for this
element will be suppressed. At that time, the outlier combination BirthDate x Sex x ZIP and
Race x BirthDate x ZIP will each contain a suppressed value, so no further suppression is
needed for the element associated with t7.
The value of outliers for the element associated with t8 is {{BirthDate, ZIP}, {Sex, ZIP},
{BirthDate, Sex, ZIP}, {Race, BirthDate, Sex}, {Race, BirthDate, ZIP}, {Race, Sex}, {Race,
BirthDate}}. The attribute BirthDate occurs most frequently, so it will be suppressed. That
means, the value associated with BirthDate for this element will be suppressed. At that time, the
remaining outlier combinations associated with t8 are {{Sex, ZIP}, {Race, Sex}}. The attribute
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Sex now occurs most frequently, so it will also be suppressed. That means, the values associated
with BirthDate and with Sex for this element will be suppressed. No further suppression is
needed for the element associated with t8.
Figure 75 shows the final result from the p-Argus algorithm, which is listed in Figure 50.
t9 white 1964 male 02139
t10 white 1964 male 02139
t11 white 1967 male 02138
t12 white 1967 male 02138
MT
Figure 75 Result from p-Argus algorithm listed in Figure 50
Unfortunately, as was pointed out earlier, the actual pi-Argus algorithm does not exhaust all
known outlying combinations of values when deciding on which values to suppress. Figure 76
shows the results when the private table PT along with the parameters specified in this example
was provided to the actual p-Argus program. Fewer cells are suppressed even though the
combinations of values identified as outliers were the same.
id Race BirthDate Gender ZIP
t1 black 1965 male 02141
t2 black 1965 male 02141
t3 black 1965 female 02138
t4 black 1965 female 02138
t5 black 1964 female 02138
t6 black 1964 female 02138
t7 white 1964 male 02138
t8 white female 02139
t9 white 1964 male 02139
t10 white 1964 male 02139
tIl white 1967 male 02138
t12 white 1967 male 02138
MT actual
Figure 76 Actual result from the real pt-Argus program
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Example, continued with option 2
In this option, the example has proceeded to step 6 of the p-Argus algorithm as before. In this
option however, execution continues by assuming the data holder selects ZIP as the attribute to
generalize, where as the previous option assumed no attributes were selected to generalize. The
contents of freq before this decision is made are shown in Figure 73. The generalizeO method is
listed in Figure 55. It replaces the values associated with ZIP in freq with the values that appear
one level up ZIP's value generalization hierarchy, which is shown in Figure 33. The result is to
replace the 5-digit ZIP values with their first 4-digits. Step 7 of the p-Argus algorithm resets the
values associated with outliers in freq to the empty set. The resulting contents of freq from
theses steps are shown in Figure 77. The tuple identified as t8 remains an outlier.
Race Birth Sex ZIP
black 1965 male 0214*
black 1965 female 0213*
black 1964 female 0213*
white 1965 female 0213*1
white 1964 male 0213*
white 1967 male 0213*1
occurs sid outliers
2 {t1,t2} {
2 {t3,t4}
2 {t5,t6} 0
1 {t8} 0
3 {t9,t10,t7} 
2 {t11,t12} {
Figure 77 freq after generalize ZIP
Execution of the p-Argus continues by looping back to step 4. The method CombinationTestO,
which is listed in Figure 56, computes 2- and 3-combinations across Most, More and Identifying
to determine which combinations of values, if any, do not occur at least k times. In this case, only
some combinations of values involving the tuple identified as t8 do not adhere to the k
requirement. The specific combinations are listed in the contents of freq shown in Figure 78.
Race Birth Sex ZIP occurs sid outliers
black 1965 male 0214* 2 {tl,t2} {
black 1965 female 0213* 2 {t3,t4} {
black 1964 female 0213* 2 {t5,t6} {}{frace,birth,sex),
frace,birth,zip}, frace,sex},
white 1965 female 021 1 {t8} {race,birth}}
white 1964 male 0213* 3 {t9,t10, t7} {
white 1967 male 0213* 2 {tl1,t12} 0
Figure 78 freq with outliers updated
That concludes the examination of combinations of values that occurs at step 4 of the p-Argus
algorithm. The contents of outliers in freq are displayed and the data holder is solicited for an
attribute to generalize or not. At this time, the data holder is assumed not to opt for further
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generalization. As a result, step 8 of the p-Argus algorithm executes. The SuppressOutlierso
method executes; it is listed in Figure 62.
The value of outliers for the element associated with t8 is {{Race, BirthDate, Sex}, {Race,
BirthDate, ZIP}, {Race, Sex}, {Race, BirthDate} }. The attribute Race occurs most frequently, so
it will be suppressed. No further suppression is needed for the element associated with t8
because all members of outliers now contain a suppressed value. The final table resulting from
the p-Argus algorithm based on the option of generalizing ZIP is shown in Figure 79.
id Race BirthDate Gender ZIP
t1 black 1965 male 0214*
t2 black 1965 male 0214*
t3 black 1965 female 0213*
t4 black 1965 female 0213*
t5 black 1964 female 0213*
t6 black 1964 female 0213*
t7 white 1964 male 0213*
t8 1965 female 0213*
t9 white 1964 male 0213*
t1O white 1964 male 0213*
t11 white 1967 male 0213*
t12 white 1967 male 0213*
MT
Figure 79 Resulting table from p-Argus algorithm with manual generalize ZIP
7.3 Comparison to Mingen
A comparison to MinGen [109] requires examining: (1) the computational complexity of the
algorithm to ensure it operates in reasonable time; (2) the correctness of the algorithm in terms of k-
anonymity protection; and, (3) whether the algorithm distorts minimally. These are discussed in the
following subsections.
7.3.1 Complexity of the p-Argus algorithm
The g-Argus algorithm listed in Figure 50 with supporting methods in Figure 51 through Figure
62 was not written as efficiently as possible. Nevertheless, here is a walk through the algorithm noting
the computational complexity of each part.
ThefreqSetupo method, which is listed in Figure 51, is executed in step 2. If the contents of PT
is sorted over the attributes QI beforehand, then the determination of how many tuples in PT[QI]
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correspond to the same element in freq can be determined in O(IPTI log IPTI) time. Otherwise, the
construction of freq and the determination of the number of tuples in PT[QI] that correspond to an
element in freq is performed in O(IPT 2) time.
The sub-steps of step 3 of the p-Argus algorithm operate 1Q11 times. On each iteration of these
sub-steps, a frequency list is generated and generalization may be performed. The construction of a
frequency list requires visiting each element of a frequency list and if changes are made due to
generalization, the element is removed and then the modified element added. In order to avoid
duplication of elements in a frequency list, all elements in the frequency list are compared to the element
that is to be inserted. If the elements of freq were stored in a binary tree, then such a comparison could
be done in log(Ifreql) time. In the worst case, 1freql = IPTI; in all cases, 1freqj IPTI. Step 3.3 can loop as
IQT
much as Z DGH Ai times in its worst case, which requires each attribute to generalize one step at a
time to its maximal element. Because IDGHA <<PT in almost all cases, this term is dropped. In the
listing of thefreqConstructo and generalizeo methods provided, the contents of freq are not stored in a
binary tree and so the computation, in the worst case is, O(IPT 2) time. Because this process is done on
each iteration, the computational time for step 3 of the p-Argus algorithm is O( 1Q11 o IPT log IPTI), if
freq was stored as a binary tree, or O( 1QI o IPT12) as the methods are written.
Steps 4 through 7 of the p-Argus algorithm perform a loop of reviewing 2- and 3- combinations,
displaying them, and possibly generalizing an attribute. This loop is executed one or more times,
depending on the data holder. The number of iterations is not likely to be large, so in this computation I
will consider it a negligible constant.
Step 4 of the p-Argus algorithm executes the Combination TestO method. The goal of this
method is to generate some 2- and 3-combinations and then determine which, if any, adhere to the k
requirement. The number of 2- combinations, assuming all such combinations within Q1 are to be
examined, would be Q11! and 3-combinations would be .Q11! - These are roughly
2(I Q I-2)! 6( QI 1 -3)!
characterized as O(IQI12). With the constructions of frequency lists included, the computational time for
this step is O( IQ112 0 IPTI log IPTI), if freq was stored as a binary tree, or O( IQ112 0 IPT12) as the methods
are written.
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Step 5 is a walk through each element of freq reporting the value of outliers for that element.
That executes in 1freqj time. In the worst case 1freql = PTI, so this step executes in O(IPTI) time. Each
iteration of the loop in step 6 of the p-Argus algorithm, if executed at all, executes in is O( PT log PT),
if freq was stored as a binary tree, or O( 1PT12) as the methods are written. Step 7, like step 5 is a walk
through each element of freq and so, it executes in 1freqj time. In the worst case Ifreqj = PTI, so step 7
executes in O(IPTI) time.
The SuppressOutliers 0 method in step 8 of the p-Argus algorithm has an outer loop that visits
each element of freq, and within the outer loop are inner loops based on the contents of outliers for that
element. In the worst case, 1freqj = PT and Ioutliers is nearly IQ112. The method freqCleanupo executes
in O( 1PT log IPT), if freq was stored as a binary tree, or O( 1PT 2) otherwise. So, the computation of the
method is O(Q113 0 JPT + JPT log IPT) if freq is stored as a binary tree or O(IQI!3 * JPTj +!PT 2)
otherwise.
Step 9 of the p-Argus algorithm executes the reconstructo method, which visits each element of
freq and generates tuple(s) for MT based on the element. This method executes in 1freq time, which is
O(IPT).
Finally, the overall computational complexity of the p-Argus algorithm listed in Figure 50 is
characterized by O(IQ113 0 JPT + PT log IPT) if freq is stored as a binary tree or O(IQ11 3 , PT! +!PT 2)
otherwise. In most databases, Q11 <<IPTI. So, the overall complexity for the p-Argus algorithm is O(IPT
log IPT) if freq is stored as a binary tree or O(IPT 2) otherwise. In comparison to the computational
complexity of MinGen [110] and Equation 1 (on page 90), the computational complexity of the p-Argus
algorithm is practical and extremely fast.
7.3.2 Correctness of the p-Argus algorithm
The correctness of the p-Argus algorithm relies on its ability to produce solutions that adhere to
a given k-anonymity requirement, assuming of course a proper quasi-identifier and a proper value for k
have been provided. In this subsection, I will show that the p-Argus algorithm provides solutions that do
not necessarily adhere to a given k-anonymity requirement. As a result, tables generated by p-Argus may
not provide adequate protection. Here is a walk through the program, noting correctness problems.
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After step 3 of the p-Argus algorithm listed in Figure 50 concludes, each value associated with
each attribute is guaranteed to appear at least k times. While this is a necessary condition to satisfy the k
requirement, it is not itself sufficient to ensure that combinations of values also adhere to the k
requirement. This note is not a claim of an error in correctness as much as a clarification that step 3 does
not itself guarantee adherence to the k requirement.
Example.
Consider the private table PT shown in Figure 34 with a quasi-identifier Q = {Race, Gender}
and a k-anonymity requirement of k=2. Each value associated with Race and each value
associated with Gender appears more k times, but in combination ["white", "female"] occurs
only once.
In order to make sure combinations of values adhere to the k requirement, values must be
examined in combination. Step 4 of the pt-Argus algorithm executes the CombinationTestO method to
examine combinations of values. Unfortunately, not all possible combinations across the quasi-identifier
are examined. Only some 2- and 3- combinations are examined. There may be 4-combinations or beyond
that are unique and not examined and there may be 2- or 3-combinations not examined at all. As a result,
the p-Argus algorithm at this step cannot guarantee that all combinations of values adhere to the k
requirement.
Example.
Consider the private table PT shown in Figure 34 with a quasi-identifier QI = {Race, BirthDate,
Gender, ZIP}, where Most = {BirthDate}, More = (Gender, ZIP} and Identifying = {Race} and
a k-anonymity requirement of k=2. The actual p-Argus program provides the table MTactual
shown in Figure 76 as a generalization of PT over QI. Notice however that the tuple identified as
t7 is unique over QI. It contains the unique occurring 4-combination ["white", "1964", "male",
"02138"]. Therefore, MTactual does not satisfy the k requirement.
Only election by the data holder to generalize an attribute in step 6 of the t-Argus algorithm and
the automatic suppression of values done by the SuppressOutliers() method in step 8 of the pt-Argus
algorithm are ways to further distort data after step 3. Unfortunately, neither of these steps ensures that
combinations of values adhere to the k requirement. Actions taken by theses steps do not necessarily
enforce the k requirement.
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A data holder's decision to generalize or not is made before the results of suppression are
determined. Yet, the responsibility of adhering to the k requirement is passed to the data holder, who
must specify whether further generalization is needed, and if so, which attribute(s) to generalize. These
decisions are made with limited and indirect information from the pt-Argus algorithm.
Example.
Consider the private table PT shown in Figure 34 with a quasi-identifier QI = {Race, BirthDate,
Gender, ZIP}, where Most = {BirthDate}, More = {Gender, ZIP} and Identifying = {Race} and
a k-anonymity requirement of k=2. Figure 75 shows the result from the p-Argus algorithm with
no additional generalization elected. There is no recommendation as to whether an attribute
should be generalized and if so, which one(s). Figure 79 shows the results from the g-Argus
algorithm after values associated with ZIP were generalized. There is no preference posed by the
algorithm for one solution over another even though one is more distorted than the other and
because of the uniqueness of suppressed values, neither solution adheres to the k-anonymity
requirement.
The data holder may incorrectly believe that the suppression process in step 8 will ensure
adequate protection, because the pt-Argus algorithm performs suppression automatically after
generalization decisions by the data holder conclude. But the SuppressOutliersO method is problematic.
Some combinations of values whose attributes are identified in outliers may not have values suppressed
values in the resulting table even though all combinations reported in outliers is known to not adhere to
the k requirement. This is obviously a problem with the real p-Argus implementation.
Example.
Consider the private table PT shown in Figure 34 with a quasi-identifier QI = {Race, BirthDate,
Gender, ZIP}, where Most = {BirthDate}, More = {Gender, ZIP} and Identifying = {Race} and
a k-anonymity requirement of k=2. Figure 76 shows the actual result from the real p-Argus
program. In comparison, Figure 75 shows the result from the p-Argus algorithm. Notice that in
the actual result, values related to the tuple identified as t7 are not suppressed even though
CombinationTesto identified {BirthDate, Sex, ZIP} and {Race, BirthDate, ZIP} as combinations
that had values within t7 that did not adhere to the k requirement; see Figure 74.
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7.3.3 Summary data attack on pt-Argus results
p-Argus does not enforce the k-anonymity requirement on suppressed values. As a result, tables
released from p-Argus can be vulnerable to inference attacks based on summary data. If the frequencies
of values contained within the privately held information are released separately for each attribute, which
is often the case in statistical reports and summary data, then this information can be used to infer
suppressed values if the suppressed values themselves do not adhere to the k-anonymity requirement
imposed on the other released values.
Example.
Summary data for the privately held information PT in Figure 34 is shown in Figure 46. Given a
quasi-identifier QI = {Race, BirthDate, Gender, ZIP}, where Most = {BirthDate}, More =
(Gender, ZIP} and Identifying = {Race} and a k-anonymity requirement of k=2, table MT in
Figure 79 results from executing the p-Argus algorithm on PT with QI and k. In this case, values
associated with ZIP were generalized. Except for suppressed values, k-anonymity is satisfied for
all other tuples. However, using the summary data, the missing or suppressed values can be
inferred exactly. To combat this problem, the k-anonymity requirement must be satisfied on all
values, including suppressed ones. Figure 80 shows a generalization of MT in which k-anonymity
is also enforced on suppressed values. As you can see, the summary information does not allow
one to confidently infer the suppressed values.
id Race BirthDate Gender ZIP
ti black 1965 male 0214*
t2 black 1965 male 0214*
t3 1965 female 0213*
t4 1965 female 0213*
t5 black 1964 female 0213*
t6 black 1964 female 0213*
t7 white 1964 male 0213'
t8 1965 female 0213*
t9 white 1964 male 0213*
t1O white 1964 male 0213*
tl1 white 1967 male 0213*
t12 white 1967 male 0213*
Figure 80 Table from pt-Argus algorithm (Figure 79) with complementary suppression added
It is important to realize that avoidance of a summary data attack is not wholly resolved by
merely providing k indistinguishable tuples containing suppressed values. Inferences about the
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suppressions must not be further distinguished by the non-suppressed values. Within the k-anonymity
framework, probabilistic attacks on distorted values are not necessarily resolved.
Example.
Summary data for the privately held information PT in Figure 34 is shown in Figure 46. Given a
quasi-identifier QI = {Race, BirthDate, Gender, ZIP}, where Most = {BirthDate}, More =
{Gender, ZIP} and Identifying = {Race} and a k-anonymity requirement of k=2, table MT in
Figure 75 results from executing the pi-Argus algorithm on PT with QI and k. Except for
suppressed values, k-anonymity is satisfied for all other tuples. However, using the summary
data, the missing or suppressed values can be inferred exactly. To combat this problem, the k-
anonymity requirement must be satisfied on all values, including suppressed ones. Figure 81
shows a generalization of MT in which k-anonymity is also enforced on suppressed values.
However, the summary data informs that one of the suppressed tuples pertains to a "male" and
the other a "female". If the non-suppressed values that are associated with these tuples in PT
were gender specific, then values for gender could be confidently inferred and the k requirement
would no longer be valid.
id Rece BirthDate ender ZIP
t1 black 1965 male 02141
t2 black 1965 male 02141
t3 black 1965 female 02138
t4 black 1965 female 02138
t5 black 1964 female 02138
t6 black 1964 female 02138
t7 white
t8 white
t9 white 1964 male 02139
t10 white 1964 male 02139
tl1 white 1967 male 02138
t12 white 1967 male 02138
Figure 81 Table from i-Argus algorithm (Figure 75) with complementary suppression added
7.3.4 Distortion and the p-Argus algorithm
In terms of assessing the quality of generalized data that adhere to a k-anonymity requirement, it
is important to note whether: (1) the resulting data are minimally generalized - i.e., not a generalization
of another generalization that satisfies the same k-anonymity requirement; and, (2) the data are minimally
distorted - i.e., of all minimal generalizations that satisfy the k-anonymity requirement, none have more
precision retained in the data. In this subsection I will show that the .t-Argus algorithm does not
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necessarily provide minimally generalized solutions or minimally distorted ones, even in cases where its
solutions do adhere to a k-anonymity requirement.
On the one hand, t-Argus makes crude decisions - generalizing all values associated with an
attribute. On the other hand, p-Argus suppresses values at the cell level. Algorithms that make all
decisions at the cell-level can potentially provide optimal results.
Example.
Given the privately held information PT in Figure 34, the Figure 79 provides the table MT,
where pt-Argus(PT) = MT for k=2, quasi-identifier Q={Race, BirthDate, Gender, ZIP}, where
Most = {BirthDate}, More = {Gender, ZIP} and Identifying = {Race}, and Vi=1,...,IQII, DGHAi
are domain generalization hierarchies based on the depictions in Figure 33. The Figure 80
provides table MGT, where MGT is MT with complementary suppression added. MT does not
adhere to the k-anonymity requirement; MGT does. The precision, Prec(MGT) with respect to
DGHAi is 0.754. In comparison, Figure 35 provides GT1, where MinGen(PT)=GT1. It is a k-
minimal distortion of PT over Q1 with respect to DGHAi where Prec(GT1)=0.83. The MinGen
result therefore has less distortion based on cell-level generalization and suppression. Notice that
although Prec(MT)=0.85, MT does not adhere to the k-anonymity requirement.
Another problem is the data holder's unrestricted and mostly unguided selection of which
attribute, if any, to generalize. There is no recommendation made or sufficient metrics provided for the
data holder to make an informed decision. The pt-Argus algorithm makes the assumption that the data
holder knows best, which is reasonable only if sufficient information about the ramifications to
protection and distortion are provided to the data holder about such decisions at the time the data holder
must decide. This is especially important because the subject data at that time reside in such an
intermediate state that the resulting consequences are not necessarily clear. The absence of this
information allows the data holder to guide the pt-Argus program into providing results that are more or
less generalized than needed.
Example.
Given the privately held information PT in Figure 34, the Figure 75 and the Figure 79 provide
versions the tables MT1 and MT2, respectively, where t-Argus(PT) = MT1 and pt-Argus(PT) =
MT2 for k=2, quasi-identifier Q1={Race, BirthDate, Gender, ZIP}, where Most = {BirthDate},
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More = {Gender, ZIP} and Identifying = {Race}, and Vi=l,..., QII, DGHAi are domain
generalization hierarchies based on the depictions in Figure 33. Table MT1 has values associated
with ZIP generalized, as directed by the data holder. The Figure 80 provides table MGT1, where
MGT1 is MT1 with complementary suppression added. Likewise, The Figure 81 provides table
MGT2, where MGT2 is MT2 with complementary suppression added. Neither MT1 nor MT2
adhere to the k-anonymity requirement; but MGT1 and MGT2 do. The precision, Prec(MGT1)
with respect to DGHAi is 0.754. The precision, Prec(MGT2) with respect to DGHAi is 0.792. So,
MGT1 does more distortion than is necessary. The data holder made the decision to generalize
the values of ZIP with only the information provided in Figure 74. At that time, it is not clear
that MGT1 would be more distorting and further, it is not clear that selecting another attribute
other than ZIP to generalize would not reveal better results.
A third problem is the selection of values to suppress. After some values may have been
generalized, combinations of 2 and 3 values that do not occur at least k times in the data are identified in
the p-Argus algorithm. As stated earlier, these are termed outliers. At least one value in each outlier
combination is to be suppressed. Even though the actual p-Argus algorithm identifies all such
combinations, it does not suppress a value from each combination, and so, it can leave data vulnerable.
See Figure 74 and Figure 76 versus Figure 74 and Figure 75 for an example.
7.4 Comparison to Datafly
I will briefly compare the results of these two systems. In the Datafly System, generalizing
across a quasi-identifier ensures that the corresponding tuples will adhere to the k requirement. The g-
Argus program however, only checks some 2- or 3- combinations; there may exist unique combinations
across 4 or more attributes that would not be detected. Treating a quasi-identifier as a single attribute that
must adhere to the k requirement, as done in the Datafly System provides more secure releases of data.
Further, since the number of attributes, especially demographic attributes, in a health database is large,
this strategy of examining only some 2- and 3-combinations may prove to be a serious handicap when
using the p-Argus system with health data.
While both p-Argus and Datafly employ attribute-level generalization, p-Argus employs cell-
level suppression where Datafly suppresses at the tuple level. Therefore, the granularity of distortion is
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better with p-Argus. Results produced by p-Argus can be less distorting than with Datafly, even when
both adhere to k-anonymity.
7.5 p-Argus as an anonymous data system
p-Argus uses the following disclosure limitation techniques: de-identification, generalization,
and suppression. Below is a description of the framework in which p-Argus operates.
S = {subjects whose information is included in PT}
P = set of all people whose information could possibly be in PT
PT = privately held information about S
QI = set of attributes with replications in E
U = P
MT = p-Argus (PT)
E = set of publicly available information in today's society
G = set of standard communication methods.
f = p-Argus algorithm
The system A(S, P, PT, QI, U, {MT}, E, G, p-Argus) is not an ADSo.
Informal proof.
Let PT be data in Figure 34.
There can exist fewer than k tuples in MT having the same values across QI,
as shown in Figure 75 and Figure 76.
So, k-map protection is not provided and A is not an ADSO.
7.6 Future work
1. One could view the contents for the frequency list used in both the Datafly algorithm
and the p-Argus algorithm as a matrix. Doing so, allows one to explore linear algebra
techniques as ways to identify outliers by likening the frequencies to coefficients in a
system of simultaneous equations. Some progress along these lines has resulted from
linear programming approaches that utilize cell suppression [111]. Explore the use and
deployment of linear algebra techniques as solutions to these kinds of problems.
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2. The p-Argus algorithm, which is listed in Figure 50, can be completely automated to
work without data holder intervention and also made to adhere to k-anonymity while
distorting the data as minimally as possible given the application of generalization
enforced at the attribute level and suppression enforced at the cell level. Modify the
algorithm along these lines to construct an Optimal p-Argus algorithm and report on
its computational complexity and correctness.
3. Prove that a solution based on the pt-Argus approach must examine all combinations
of values within the quasi-identifier. Or, show where tradeoffs are possible to examine
fewer combinations of values.
4. The p-Argus algorithm presented in Figure 50 was not written to be as
computationally efficient as possible. Examine this algorithm and its supporting
algorithms and improve the computational complexity or prove the minimum
complexity required for this approach. Examine and describe best case, worst case and
general case scenarios.
5. The SuppressOutlierso algorithm, which is listed in Figure 62, selects values to be
suppressed from each combination of values known to be an outlier in a tuple. The
algorithm selects the value within the tuple that occurs the most often in all
combinations identified as outliers. The strategy of selecting the most frequent value
is done repeatedly on the values of a tuple until each combination of values identified
as being an outlier contains at least one value that is suppressed. This approach may
not necessarily provide the least distorting results. That is, there may exists situations
in which the heuristic of suppressing the most frequently occurring value in this
situation leads to unnecessary suppression. Prove whether this heuristic always
provides a minimal number of suppressed values; and if not explore other strategies or
algorithms that provide a minimal number of suppressed values. Set covering
techniques may be useful.
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Example
Given the privately held information PT in Figure 34, the Figure 76 provides the table
MT, where p-Argus(PT) = MT for k=2, quasi-identifier Qk={Race, BirthDate, Gender,
ZIP}, where Most = {BirthDate}, More = {Gender, ZIP} and Identifying = {Race},
and Vi=l,...,fQIl, DGHAi are domain generalization hierarchies based on the depictions
in Figure 33. Figure 75 shows the intermediate sate of the data including outliers
before SuppressOutliers 0 executes. The outliers for the tuples identified as t8 are
shown in Figure 82. Each outlier combination appears as a row. Each attribute aligns
vertically. The attribute for Birth (for BirthDate) appears most often (5 times). It is
suppressed, leaving the combinations {zip, sex} and {sex, race} as outlier
combinations with no suppressed value. Of these attributes, sex (for Gender) appears
most often. So it is suppressed. Therefore, for tuple t8 the values associated with
BirthDate and Gender are suppressed, as shown in Figure 75.
birth zip
zip sex
birth zip sex
birth sex race
birth zip race
sex race
birth race
Figure 82 Combinations of attributes containing outliers
However, Figure 83 shows the same outlier combinations as those in Figure 82 but
with zip and race selected for suppression. Both the solution posed in Figure 82, which
suppresses the values associated with birth and sex, and Figure 83, which suppresses
the values associated with zip and race, provide the same amount of distortion when
applied to t8 because both solutions suppress two values. Both solutions also provide
the same protection in that each outlier combination for t8 has at least one value
suppressed.
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birth zig
z!g. sex
birth zip sex
birth sex race
birth zip race
sex race
birth race
Figure 83 Combinations of attributes containing outliers
6. Implement a version of the pt-Argus approach using suppression as the only disclosure
limitation technique employed. The CombinationTesto algorithm, which is listed in
Figure 56, and the SuppressOutliers() algorithm, which is listed in Figure 62, form the
basis for this revised approach. Once the revision is working, assess it computational
complexity, correctness and data distortion. Then, revise the approach further to get
results that are correct with minimal distortion. (This is related to #5 above.)
7. Improve the p-Argus algorithm by providing complementary suppression so that
resulting tables are not vulnerable to summary attacks. This involves enforcing the k
requirement on suppressed values.
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Chapter 8 Results: k-Similar
In Chapter 6, the Datafly System was shown to sometimes over distort data. In Chapter 7, the pi-
Argus System was shown to sometimes fail to provide adequate protection. In this chapter, I present my
k-Similar algorithm, which uses generalization and suppression to find optimal solutions such that data
are minimally distorted while still being adequately protected. Decisions are automatically made at the
cell level that adhere to a given k-anonymity requirement [112] and that maximize the precision metric
[113]. The k-similar algorithm achieves these goals by looking at the computational disclosure control
problem as one of data clustering. In the well-known k-nearest neighbor or k-cluster algorithm [114], for
example, data are partitioned into k groups based on minimizing a distance between tuples. In contrast,
my k-similar algorithm divides data into groups such that the size of each group consists of k or more of
the "closest" tuples; in this case, closeness is based on a minimal distance measure derived from distance
vectors [115].
8.1 Overview of the k-Similar algorithm
More generally, the k-similar algorithm provides a solution to finding similarity matches in high
dimensional space with data consisting of primarily categorical values. In this setting, traditional mining
approaches have faced tremendous difficulty primarily because of troubles measuring "distance" between
categorical values. The k-similar approach is based on combining generalization and suppression and on
using the resulting hierarchies as a semantically useful grouping that reflects a partial ordering on values.
By cell generalization, I mean that a value can be replaced by a less precise but semantically consistent
alternative. Cell suppression in this context is considered the most general value possible because
semantically no information is released. The distance between two values can then be measured in terms
of the minimal level up the generalization hierarchy at which the two values have a common ancestor.
This precision metric provides the basis for a semantically meaningful measure of distance [116]. Given
a table and a value for k, the k-similar algorithm groups the tuples of the table in as many clusters as
necessary such that each cluster contains at least k of its closest tuples. In terms of anonymity, having k
tuples that are indistinguishable is the basis for k-anonymity protection.
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8.2 Abstract of the k-Similar algorithm
The k-Similar algorithm is not a complete system like Datafly or p-Argus. It is intended to fit
within a system, such as Datafly's, replacing the core operational algorithm found there with the k-
Similar algorithm. (A description of the overall Datafly System is provided on page 110.) Here is a
summary of the setting in which the k-Similar algorithm operates.
Using the Datafly System as a shell for the k-Similar algorithm, the data holder provides an
overall anonymity level (A), which is a value between 0 and 1. The data holder also provides a profile of
the recipient by providing a linking likelihood (Pf) for each attribute that is also a value between 0 and 1.
Based on these values an overall value for k is computed and quasi-identifier(s) are determined. For
example, subsets of attributes where P=1 are treated as one concatenated attribute, or quasi-identifier,
which must satisfy a k-anonymity requirement. Each attribute has a replacement algorithm that either
uses equivalence class substitution, such as SSNs, or generalization based on a domain generalization
hierarchy specific to that attribute. In summary, the k-Similar algorithm merely replaces the core Datafly
algorithm within the system. The k-Similar algorithm therefore works with a quasi-identifier and a k-
anonymity requirement that is to be enforced on the quasi-identifier. For convenience, I consider all
attributes of the quasi-identifier as having equal weights (specifically, P=1 for each attribute of the
quasi-identifier though a weighted precision metric has been provided [117]); and, I address only
generalizable attributes of the quasi-identifier in isolation, ignoring those that would utilize equivalence
class substitution.
Before I introduce the k-Similar algorithm itself, let me first expand the earlier discussion on
distance vectors [118].
8.2.1 Distance vectors expanded
The k-similar algorithm uses generalization with suppression to group the closest k or more
tuples together into clusters. Closeness between tuples can be determined in terms of the value
generalization hierarchies [119] for the attributes. Basically, the distance between values is the level of
the generalization hierarchy at which the values have the same ancestor.
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Definition. distance between values
Let A be an attribute, v, and v2 be values associated with A, and fjeDGHA, for i=l,...,h. The
distance between the values v, and v2 is the smallest h for whichf;(.. .f,(vi)...) =fl(...f,(V2)...).
Given the definition above, the distance between values is the length of the shortest path from
the ground domain to the domain in DGHA in which both values share the same generalized value. By
extension, the distance between two tuples can be expressed as a vector denoting the distance between
values for each attribute. This is presented in the following definition of a distance vector.
Definition. distance vector with respect to tuples
Let t1[A 1,...,A] and t;[A ,...,An] be two tuples. The distance vector of t to t is the vector DVj =
[dl,...,d,] where each dz, where z=1,...,n, is the distance between t4[Az] and t;[Az].
The relationship between the minimal generalization of a table and the distance vectors between
tuples forms the basis for understanding the k-similar algorithm.
Example
Given the privately held information PT in Figure 84, the Figure 85 shows the distance vectors
between every two tuples in PT. The quasi-identifier is Qk={HomeZIP, HospitaZIP, WorkZIP}
and Vi=1,...,IQII, DGHA and VGHA are the domain and value generalization hierarchies DGHZIP
and VGHzlp based on the depiction in Figure 33. As shown in Figure 84, the distance vector of t]
to t2 is DVt1 t2 = [0,1,0] because ti[HomeZIP] is the same value as t2[HomeZIP], and
t][WorkZIP] is the same value as t2[WorkZIP], but t1[HospitalZIP] is NOT the same value as
t2[HospitalZIP]. They can become the same value if they were generalized 1 level up VGHzlp.
Likewise, the distance vector of ti to t3 is DVt1, 3 = [0,0,2] because tJ[HomeZIP] is the same
value as t3[HomeZIP], and tl[HospitalZIP] is the same value as t3[HospitalZIP], but
tl[WorkZIP] can become the same value as t3[WorkZIP] if they were generalized 2 levels up
VGHzlp. Similarly, the distance vector of t] to N is DVt1.14 = [0,1,1]; the distance vector of t2 to
t3 is DVt2,t3 = [0,1,2]; the distance vector of t2 to t4 is DVt2 ,t = [0,0,1]; and, the distance vector
of t3 to N is DVt3, 4 = [0,1,2].
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ti
t2
t3
t4
Al A2 A3
Home ZIP Hos ital ZIP Work ZIP
02138 02138 02138
02138 02139 02138
02138 02138 02141
02138 02139 02139
Figure 84 Private Table PT
[0,0,2]
[0,1,0] [0,1,2]
t2 0,0,1 4
Figure 85 Clique showing distance vectors between tuples of Figure 84
To interpret distance vectors, the k-similar algorithm uses a distance function dist based on the
precision metric Preco and therefore, is typically defined as the sum of the normalized value of each
element in the vector [120]. That is, given a vector V,,= [d,, ..., d,] associated with attributes, {A 1,...,A4}:
distV X'=Z di
DGHAl
Other distance functions correspond to different precision metrics. For example, using a
weighted precision metric [121] would warrant the use of a corresponding weighted distance function.
However, the distance function used must not only relate to the precision metric used but must also
satisfy the properties of Euclidean geometry listed in Figure 86 for all possible tuples x, y, and z.
(1) dist(V,)>! 0;
(2) dist(V,) = 0 iff x =y;
(3) dist(Vy) = dist(Vx); and
(4) dist(Vxy ):(dist(Vx,) + dist(V., )).
Figure 86 Euclidean Properties of distance function
Lastly, Figure 87 contains operations and relations on distance vectors that determine a partial
ordering on distance vectors and that determine containment. These are used by the k-similar algorithm,
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which is presented later in this subsection. In each of these cases, let V,,= [d, 1, ..., dy] and Vz= [dd,
d.,] be distance vectors between tuples.
(1) V, < V, iff d, < di, for all i=1,...,n.
(2) V, = V, iff di = d., for all i=1,...,n
(3) V, E V = [min(dj, di ), ... , min(dyn, dcn)]
(4) V,, ( V = [max(d1 , d 1), ... , max(dyn, d.n)]
Figure 87 Relations on distance vectors
Definition. maximal distance vector
Given a table T[QI] and a set of tuples {t1 [QI], ... , tn[Ql]} where for =1,...,m, tie T and m > 2,
the maximal distance vector across the set of tuples is V, 1  V;,2 ( ... E V;,m,where j is 1, 2,.
or m.
The maximal distance vector across a set of tuples in a table is the distance vector that reports for
each attribute, the level up the value generalization hierarchy for that attribute, at which all values
associated with that attribute in the set of tuples is the same. It is computed by iteratively applying the S
operator, defined in Figure 87, to all distances of one tuple in the set t to all the other tuples. The result is
the maximum level up the value generalization hierarchy that the tuple t; must combine with the other
tuples.
Example
Given the privately held information PT in Figure 84, the Figure 85 shows the distance vectors
between every two tuples in PT. The quasi-identifier is QI={HomeZIP, HospitalZIP, WorkZIP}
and Vi=l,...,IQII, DGHAj and VGHAI are the domain and value generalization hierarchies DGHzlp
and VGHzjp based on the depiction in Figure 33. The maximal distance vector of {t, t2} is DVt1e2
= [0,1,0]. This is the same as the distance vector between the two tuples.
The maximal distance vector of {t 1 , t2, t3} is [0,1,2]. The maximal distance vector of {It, t2 , t4} is
[0,1,1]. The maximal distance vector of {t 2 , t3 , t} is [0,1,2]. And, the maximal distance vector of
{ti, t2 , t3 , t4} is [0,1,2].
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Theorem 7
Given a table T[Ql] and a set of tuples S = {t 1[QI], ... , t .[QI]} where Vi=1,...,m, tjeT, the
maximal distance vector DVs across S is the minimal distortion required to make the tuples of S
indistinguishable over QI.
Proof.
Let DVs be the maximal distance vector across S.
Assume DVs does not represent a minimal distortion of S.
Then there must exist a distance vector DV' that provides a minimal distortion of S such that
dist(DV') < dist(DVs).
1 , e Q1, di'< dsj where DV'=[ ... ,d,',...] and DVs =
This is a contradiction because di'= dj.
So, DVs must be a minimal distortion of S.
8.2.2 The k-Similar algorithm
This subsection begins with a general description of the overall operation of the algorithm.
Following this high-level description is the algorithmic listing of the k-Similar algorithm along with
supporting algorithms. After the listings is a walk through the algorithm, without and then with
examples.
The basic phases of the k-Similar algorithm are provided in Figure 88. The program begins in
phase A by testing for some base conditions, which are: (1) if the number of tuples in the table is 0, the
empty table is returned; (2) if the number of tuples in the table is less than k, an error results; and, (3) if
the number of tuples in the table is greater than or equal to k, but less than 2k, all the tuples are
generalized into one cluster that is returned as the solution.
In all other cases, the program continues by automatically computing distance vectors between
every two tuples and organizing the result into a clique. Each distance vector recorded on an edge of the
clique reports the generalization needed in order for the two incident tuples to have the same generalized
result.
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In phase B, the program walks the edges of the clique to identify groups of k tuples that are
"closest" in terms of distance vectors. A set of k tuples that are minimally distant denote a possible
cluster of tuples in the generalized solution. Each of tuple in the cluster appears in the generalized
solution with the same generalized values. The set of all k-sized clusters determined to minimally include
a tuple is called mins. Each cluster is called a "minimal". The remainder of the algorithm works with
mins and subsets and partitions of mins to identify which group of clusters in mins best accounts for all
the tuples that when generalized in accordance to their designated clusters would yield minimal
distortion in the overall generalized solution.
Some of the clusters in mins may consist of tuples that if their attributes were generalized to the
same values would not limit the ability of other tuples to combine with their closest tuples. I term such a
cluster a "complementary minimum". In phase C, the program traverses through mins identifying any
complementary minimums. Phase D handles the situation if complementary minimums are found in mins
and phase E handles the situation if no complementary minimums are found.
In phase D, if complementary minimums exist in mins, then each such cluster is removed from
further consideration. That is, the tuples that comprise a complementary minimum are generalized
together and added to the generalized solution. Recall, a cluster in mins, from phase B, identified its
constituent tuples as being minimally distant and the cluster as containing k tuples. Therefore, if the
cluster is a complementary minimum, it provides a solution for its constituent tuples.
Clusters remaining in mins, after complementary minimums are removed, have groups of clusters
that share tuples. The program is recursively run on each connected partition of the remaining clusters in
mins.
Phase E concerns partitions of mins that have no complementary minimums. This is a special
situation in which groups of clusters share one or more common tuples. These common tuples are held
aside and the program recursively run on the result. When execution returns from the recursion, the
tuples, which were previously held aside, are added to the results so that the overall distortion is minimal.
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Basic operation of the k-Similar algorithm is as follows:
A. Compute distance vectors between every two tuples in the table T[Ql]. The
result is a clique and is called clique.
B. Walk the edges of clique and identify the (k-1) tuples that are minimally
distant from each tuple. A set of tuples that are closest, based on distO applied
to their maximal distance vector, is termed a "minimal". The resulting set of
"minimals" for all tuples is called mins.
C. Identify elements of mins that are isolated from other minimals in mins. Such
elements represent tuples that if they are excluded from the clique would not
limit other tuples from combining with their closest tuples. Such a set of tuples
is termed a "complementary minimum". The set of all complementary
minimums found in mins is called complements.
D. If complementary minimums exist in mins, then for each element of
complements: (1) put the corresponding tuples in the solution table, all
minimally generalized to be indistinguishable; and, (2) remove those tuples
from further consideration. Recursively run the program on connected
partitions of the tuples remaining.
E. If no complementary minimums exist, then there exist a set of 1 to (k-1) tuples
that are common to all minimals in mins. In this case, remove the common
tuple(s) from consideration. Recursively run the program on the result and
then add the withheld tuple(s) so that the overall distortion after the withheld
tuple(s) are included is minimal.
Figure 88 Basic operation of k-Similar algorithm
Figure 89 contains a listing of the k-Similar algorithm. Figure 90 through Figure 102 provide
supporting methods. A description of the general operation of the algorithm and examples using these
algorithms are provided following the algorithm listings.
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k-Similar Algorithm
Input: Table T; quasi-identifier QI = (A1, ... , A,), k-anonymity constraint k; and domain and
value generalization hierarchies DG HAi and VGHAi, where i=1,...,n with accompanying
functionsfAi.
Output: A k-minimal distortion of T[QI]
Assume: ITI k
algorithm k-Similar:
1. Append an attribute ID to T. The associated values of ID in T are key identifiers that are unique for
each tuple of T; these values are numbered from 1 to ITI.
2. clique = CliqueConstruct( T[QI,ID])
3. clusts +- kSimilarRun(T, k, clique)
4. return TableConstruct(clusts)
Figure 89 k-Similar algorithm
CliqueConstruct
Input: Table T[Ql,1D]; where quasi-identifier QI = (A1, ... , A,), ID associates unique values
numbered from 1 to ITI to the tuples of T, and value generalization hierarchies VGHAi
and VGHAI, where i=1,...,n with accompanying functionsfA1 .
Output: clique, which is a clique of the tuples of T stored in a 2-dimensional array. Each node in
the clique is a tuple. Each edge records the distance vector that corresponds to the
distance between the tuples whose nodes are incident.
algorithm CliqueConstruct:
1. let clique be an initially empty 2-dimensional square array of size ITI by ITI.
2.1 for tuplefrom +- I to ITI do:
2.1.1 for tupleto +- I to ITI do:
2.1.1.1 if (tuplefrom # tupleto) then:
2.1.1.1.1 clique[tuplefrom, tupleto]
+- Distance(T[QI,ID=tupefrom], T[QI ,D=tupeto])
2. return clique
Figure 90 CliqueConstruct algorithm
Distance
Input: tj,t2 e T[QI]; where quasi-identifier Ql = (A,, ... , A,), and value generalization hierarchies
VGHAI, where i=1,...,n with accompanying functionsfA1 .
Output: [dj, ... , dn], which is a distance vector that corresponds to the distance between the tuples
t1 and t2 .
algorithm Distance:
1. DV +- [d 1 ,...,dn] where each d is the length of the unique path between t1[Ai] and t2[A] in VGHAi for i=1 ...
2. return DV
Figure 91 Distance vector algorithm
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kSimilarRun Algorithm
Input: Table T[QI,ID], where quasi-identifier Ql = (A,, ... , A,), ID associates unique values
numbered from 1 to ITI to the tuples of T; k-anonymity constraint k; value generalization
hierarchies VGHAi, where i=1,...,n with accompanying functionsfAi; and, clique, which
is a clique of the tuples of T where each node in the clique is a tuple and each edge
records the distance vector that corresponds to the distance between the tuples whose
nodes are incident.
Output: clusts, which is a vector of sets of ID values of tuples. Each member set identifies a
cluster of tuples that when generalized to respect to the distance vectors incident to the
tuples provide a set of "closest" tuples in a k-minimal distortion of T[Ql]
algorithm kSimilarRun:
1. if ITI= 0 then return 0
2. if jT| < k then error "Table must have at least k elements"
3. if |TI < 2*k then return { T[ID] } // make a cluster containing all tuples in T
4. mins <- GenerateMinimums(T[QI,D], clique, k)
5. complements +- FindComplements(mins)
6. if Icomplementsi > 0 then do:
6.1 let T2 be a table with no elements initially
6.2 forpos +- 1 to Icomplementsl do:
6.2.1 T2 <- {t[QI,ID] I t[QI,1D]e T[QI,lDe complements [pos]] }
6.2.2 T <- T - T2
6.2.3 if ( T > 0) then do: mins +- GenerateMinimums(T[QI,1D], clique, k)
7. return complements u kSimilarRunParts( T, mins )
Figure 92 kSimilarRun algorithm
177
Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection
kSimilarRunParts Algorithm
Input: Table T[QI,1D]; where quasi-identifier Ql = (A,, ... , An), ID associates unique values
numbered from 1 to ITI to the tuples of T, and mins, which is a vector of sets of ID values
of tuples. Each member set identifies a cluster of k closest tuples.
Output: clusts, which is a vector of sets of ID values of tuples. Each member set identifies a
cluster of tuples that when generalized to respect to the distance vectors incident to the
tuples provide a set of "closest" tuples in a k-minimal distortion of T[Ql]. Executes
kSimilarRuno mutually recursively, on connected groups within mins.
algorithm kSimilarRunParts:
1. if (T = 0) then return 0
2. (T1 , minsi, T 2 , mins2) <- Partition(T, mins)
3. if( IT1|1<2*k)then do:
3.1 return kSimilarRun(T 1 ) u kSimilarRunParts(T 2, mins2)
4. else do:
II assert: there exist tuple(s) common to all elements within partition T 1, based on mins 1
4.1 withheld <- CommonTuples(minsl, clique)
4.2 if ((IT 1! - withheld!) < 2*k) then do:
4.2.1 return addTuple(withheld, k, (minsl-withheld), clique)
u kSimilarRunParts(T 2, mins2)
4.3 mins3 <- kSimilarRun(T1Ql,1Do withheld], k, clique)
4.4 return addTuple(withheld, k, mins3, clique) u kSimilarRunParts(T 2, mins2)
Figure 93 kSimilarRunParts algorithm
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Figure 94 TableConstruct algorithm
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TableConstruct
Input: clusts, which is a vector of sets of ID values of tuples. Each member set identifies a
cluster of tuples that when generalized to respect to the distance vectors incident to the
tuples provide a set of "closest" tuples in a k-minimal distortion of T[QI], where quasi-
identifier QI = (AI, ... , An), ID associates unique values numbered from 1 to ITI to the
tuples of T, and clique, which is a clique of the tuples of T where each node in the clique
is a tuple and each edge records the distance vector that corresponds to the distance
between the tuples whose nodes are incident.
Output: GT, which is a minimal generalization of T[Ql]. Tuples identified within an element of
clusts are generalized to have the same values.
algorithm TableConstruct:
1. let GT <-0
2. for clustnum <- 1 to clustsi do:
2.1 let V be a distance vector of the form [d 1 , ... ,dn] where each d=0
and n is the number of attributes in the quasi-identifier Q I = (A1, ... , A,)
2.2 let aclust be an expandable and collapsible Vector whose elements
are initialized to clusts[clustnum]
2.3 for tupleto +- 2 to jaclust do:
2.4.1 V +- V B clique[ aclust[ 1], aclust[tupleto]] II compute maximal distance vector
2.4 for t +- 1 to jaclust do:
2.5.1 GT <- GT u GeneralizeTuple(T[QI,ID=t], V) II generalize each tuple in cluster
3. return GT
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AddTuple
Input: withheld, which is a set of unique values associated with tuples in T; k-anonymity
constraint k; clusts, also known as mins, is a vector of sets of ID values of tuples. Each
member set identifies a cluster of tuples that when generalized to respect to the distance
vectors incident to the tuples provide a set of "closest" tuples in a k-minimal distortion of
T[Ql], where quasi-identifier QI = (A,, ... , An), ID associates unique values numbered
from 1 to ITI to the tuples of T; and, clique, which is a clique of the tuples of T where
each node in the clique is a tuple and each edge records the distance vector that
corresponds to the distance between the tuples whose nodes are incident.
Output: clusts, which is a vector of sets of ID values of tuples that is the same as the original
value of clusts (also known as mins) provided to the algorithm except the returned value
has an element that includes the elements of withheld. The tuple(s) identified in withheld
replace tuple(s) in an original element of clusts such the overall loss of precision due to
generalization is minimized and all tuples remain included.
algorithm AddTuple:
1. let d <- oo, n +-0, c <-- 0
2. for clustnum +- 1 to |clustsl do:
1.1 if clustsclustnum] = 2 * k - Iwithheld then do:
1.1.1 testclust <- be an expandable and collapsible Vector whose elements
are initialized to clusts[clustnum]
1.1.2 (di, ci) <-addTupleMin(withheld, testclust, k, d, c, clique)
1.1.3 if (d, < d) then do:
1. 1. 1.1. d +- d,
1.1.1.2. n +- clustnum
1.1.1.3. c <- cl
temp <- clusts[n] u withheld
clusts[n] +- temp - c
clusts[ \clusts|+1 ] - c
return clusts
Figure 95 AddTuple algorithm
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AddTupleMin
and n is the number of attributes in
1.2. for tnum <- 2 to Ical do:
1.2.1 Va +- Va ( clique[ ca[1], ca[tnum] ]
1.3. da +- dist(Va) * cal
1.4. for tnum <- 2 to ICbl do:
1.4.1 Vb +- Vb ( clique[ Cb[l], cb[tnum] ]
1.5. db <- dist(Vb) * lcbl
1.6. if (da + db) < d) then do: return (da + db, ca)
1.7. else return (d, c)
2. else if Ical< (k-1) then do:
2.1. let Ca2 +- Ca, Cb2 <- Cb
2.2. Ca2[ lCa2+1 ] = cb2ll]
2.3. purge Cb2[1]
2.4. (d, c1 ) <- addTupleMin(ca2, Cb2, k, d, c)
2.5. if (d, < d) then do: d +- d, c +- cl
2.6. (d, cl) +- addTupleMin(ca 2, C2, k, d, c)
2.7. if (d, < d) then do: d+<- dj, c <- c,
2.8. return (d, c)
3. else while 1Cbl > 0 do:
3.1. Ca[ lCaI+1 ]<- Cb[l]
3.2. purge Cb[l] //cb has one less element
3.3. (di, c1) <- addTupleMin(ca, Cb, k, d, c)
3.4. purge ca[ |Cal ] // ca has one less element
3.5. if (d, < d) then do: d <- dl, c +- cl
4. return (d, c)
the quasi-identifier QI = (A1 , ... , A,)
Figure 96 addTupleMin algorithm
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Input: Ca, Cb, which are each a set of unique values associated with tuples in T;
k, which is a k-anonymity constraint;
d, which is distance;
c, which is a set of unique values associated with tuples in T.
clique, which is a clique of the tuples of T where each node in the clique is a tuple and
each edge records the distance vector that corresponds to the distance between the tuples
whose nodes are incident.
Output: (d, c), which is a vector of sets of ID values of tuples that is the same as the original
value of clusts (also known as mins) provided to the algorithm except the returned value
has an element that includes the elements of withheld. The tuple(s) identified in withheld
replace tuple(s) in an original element of clusts such the overall loss of precision due to
generalization is minimized and all tuples remain included.
Assumes distO function exists and computes non-negative distance from a distance vector based
on Preco, can be weighted or not.
algorithm AddTupleMin:
1. if Ical= k then do:
1.1. let Va, Vb be distance vectors of the form [d, ... ,dn] where each d=O
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GeneralizeTuple Algorithm
Input: Tuple t[Q 1,1D]; where quasi-identifier Q I = (A,, ... , An), ID associates unique values
numbered from 1 to ITI to the tuples of T, a distance vector V[d,...,d], and value
generalization hierarchies VGHAi, where i=1,...,n with accompanying functionsfA1 .
Output: G, which is a set containing the result of generalizing tuple t by V.
algorithm GeneralizeTuple:
1. let G <- { t2[QI] I t2[Ai] =fl(.. .fdi(v) ... ) where v = t[A] and V[.. .d,...] for all i=l,...,IQII }
2. return G
Figure 97 GeneralizeTuple algorithm
GenerateMinimums Algorithm
Input: Table T[Q1,ID]; where quasi-identifier QI = (A 1, ... , An), ID associates unique values
numbered from 1 to ITI to the tuples of T, k-anonymity constraint k, and clique, which is
a clique of the tuples of T where each node in the clique is a tuple and each edge records
the distance vector that corresponds to the distance between the tuples whose nodes are
incident.
Output: mins, which is a Vector of sets of ID values of tuples. Each member set identifies a
cluster of k-1 of t's closest tuples. Each member set includes t so the total cluster size is
k.
algorithm GenerateMinimums:
1. let mins be an expandable and collapsible Vector with no elements initially.
2. let stack be an empty Stack.
3. let zero be a distance vector [d, ... ,dn] where each d=O and n is the number of attributes in the
quasi-identifier QI = (A,, ... , An)
4. for tupleto +- I to Icliquel do:
4.1 mins = traverse(tupleto, tupleto+1, k, {tupleto}, zero, 00, mins)
I stack and clique are globally available across iterations of traverseo
5. return mins
Figure 98 GenerateMinimums algorithm
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FindComplements Algorithm
Input: mins, which is a set of sets of ID values of tuples. Each member set identifies a cluster of
k-1 of 's closest tuples. Each member set includes t so the total cluster size is k.
Output: distincts, which is a vector of sets of ID values of tuples. Each member set identifies a
cluster that can be partitioned as an independent sub-solution.
algorithm FindComplements:
1. let distincts be an expandable and collapsible Vector with no elements initially.
2. let allnodes +- 0
3. for pos <- I to Iminsl do:
3.1 allnodes <- allnodes u mins[pos]
4. for candidate <- 1 to Imins do:
4.1 let s <- allnodes - mins[candidate]
4.2 forpos <- 1 to Imins do:
4.1.1 temp <- mins[pos] r mins[candidate]
4.1.2 if ( temp # 0) then do:
4.2. 1. 1. s <- s - temp
4.3. if (s - allnodes - mins[candidate] ) then do:
4.3.1 distincts[ Idistinctsl + 1] <- mins[candidate]
5. return distincts
Figure 99 FindComplements algorithm
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Traverse Algorithm
Input: (node, next, k, path, mV, mdist, mins)
node which is the unique value associated with a tuple in clique that represents the
tuple "from" which distance will be measured to next on this iteration.
next which is the unique value associated with a tuple in clique that represent the
tuple "to" which distance will be measured from node on this iteration.
k which is the k-anonymity constraint
path which is the set of tuples comprising the shortest path from node to the tuple that
serves as the root of the traversal
mV which is a maximal distance vector from the tuple that serves as the root of the
traversal to node.
mdist which is the measure of distortion from the root of the traversal to node. It does
not include the distance from node to next.
mins which is a Vector of sets of ID values of tuples computed so far. Each member
set identifies a cluster of k-1 of t's closest tuples. Each member set includes t so
the total cluster size is k. At the end of the traversal this value provides the
answer. It is shared across iterations to track global information.
Output: mins, which is a Vector of sets of ID values of tuples. Each member set identifies a
cluster of k-1 of t's closest tuples. Each member set includes t so the total cluster size is
k.
Assumes distO function exists and computes non-negative distance from a distance vector based
on PrecO, can be weighted or not.
Assumes following exist and are globally available:
stack which is a Stack that contains information on each node from the root of the
traversal up to, but not including node. Each element of the stack contains values
of the form: (node, path, m V, mdist). It is shared across iterations to track global
information.
clique which is a clique of the tuples of T where each node in the clique is a tuple and
each edge records the distance vector that corresponds to the distance between
the tuples whose nodes are incident, t, which is an ID value unique to a tuple in
T.
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algorithm Traverse:
1. if (next > cliquel) and stackEmptyo then do:
1.1. return mins
2. else if (next > cliquel) then do:
2.1. (rooto, patho, mVo, mdisto) <- stackPopo
2.2. return traverse(rooto, node+1, k+1, patho, mins)
3. else if (next o T[ID] ) then do:
3.1. return traverse(node, next+1, 1, path, m V, mdist, mins)
4. V <- mV'@ clique[node, next]
5. d <- dist(Vi) * (pathl + 1)
6. p +- path u {next}
7. if (d, > mdist) then do:
7.1. return traverse(node, next+1, k, path, m V, mdist, mins)
8. else if (k 1) and (d, = mdist) then do:
8.1. mins[ Imins + 1] +- p,
8.2. return traverse(node, next+1, 1, path, mV, mdist, mins)
9. else if (k 1) then do: /1 and (d, < mdist) is implied
9.1. purge all elements from mins
9.2. mins[1]<-p
9.3. mdist <- d
9.4. mV<- V,
9.5. return traverse(node, next+1, 1, path, mV, mdist, mins)
10. else do: // k # 1 is implied
10.1. stackPush(next, p, VI, dj)
10.2. return traverse(next, next+l, k-1,pI, V1, di, mins)
Figure 100 Traverse algorithm
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Partition Algorithm
Input: Table T[Q1,ID]; where quasi-identifier QI = (A,, ... , An), ID associates unique values
numbered from I to ITI to the tuples of T; and, mins, which is a set of sets of ID values of
tuples. Each member set identifies a cluster of k-1 of t's closest tuples. Each member set
includes t so the total cluster size is k.
Output: (T 1, T2 , ins), where T1 u T2= T and T1 rn T2 = 0. The tuples of T1 identifies a
connected group of tuples that can be partitioned as an independent sub-solution. This
decision is based on the connectedness of elements within mins. The identifier ms
contains the subset of mins not accounted for by the tuples of Ti.
algorithm Partition:
1. let allnodes +- 0, ins <- 0
2. forpos +- I to Imins do:
2.1 allnodes <- allnodes u mins[pos]
3. let r <- mins[1] // test connectedness of mins[1]
4. forpos <- 2 to Imins do:
4.1 if ( mins[pos] r) r # 0) then do:
4.1.1 r <- r u mins[pos]
4.2 else do:
4.2.1 ins <- ins u mins[pos]
5. if ( mins # r ) then do:
5.1 return (T 1, r, T2 , ms) where T1 = It, I t, eT[QI,ID=t2] and t2er} and T2 = T-T1
6 else do:
6.1 return (T, r, 0, 0)
Figure 101 Partition algorithm
186
Computational Disclosure Control: A Primer on Data Privacy Protection
CommonTuples Algorithm
Input: mins, which is a set of sets of ID values of tuples. Each member set identifies a cluster of
k-1 of t's closest tuples. Each member set includes t so the total cluster size is k; and,
clique, which is a clique of the tuples of T where each node in the clique is a tuple and
each edge records the distance vector that corresponds to the distance between the tuples
whose nodes are incident, t, which is an ID value unique to a tuple in T
Output: withheld, which is a set of unique value associated with a tuple in T and that occurs in
each element of mins thereby making them "the" closest tuple to all tuples.
algorithm CommonTuples:
1. let withheld +- 0
2. for tnum <- 1 to Icliquel do:
2.1 let inall <- true
2.2 forpos +- 1 to Imins do:
2.2.1 if (tnum 0 mins[pos])
2.2.1.1 inall <- false
2.3 if ( inall true ) then do:
2.3.1 withheld +- withheld u {tnum}
3. return withheld
Figure 102 CommonTuples algorithm
As introduced earlier, the basic steps, A through E, of the k-Similar algorithm are enumerated in
Figure 88. The algorithm listed in Figure 89 along with its supporting methods is more detailed but
follows these same basic steps. Below is a walk through the detailed version of the k-Similar algorithm.
Afterwards are some examples.
Given a private table T, a quasi-identifier Ql=(A1 ,...,A,), a k-anonymity requirement k, domain
and value generalization hierarchies DGHA and VGHAi, where i=1,...,n with accompanying functionsfAi,
the k-Similar algorithm, listed in Figure 89, generates a k-minimal distortion of T[Ql].
The k-Similar algorithm listed in Figure 89 begins in step 1 by expanding T to include an
attribute labeled ID whose values serve as a unique identifier (or key) for each tuple in T. From this point
forward, the algorithm has the ability to uniquely refer to a tuple in T by using its associated value of ID.
Step 2 of the k-Similar algorithm listed in Figure 89 produces a clique of the tuples of T stored in
a 2-dimensional array named clique. The method CliqueConstructo listed in Figure 90 performs the
construction. Each node in the clique is a tuple. Each edge records the distance vector that corresponds to
the distance between the tuples whose nodes are incident. The method Distanceo listed in Figure 91
computes the distance vector between two tuples using the value generalization hierarchies VGHAi,
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where i=1,...,n with accompanying functionsfAi. The distance vector records the minimal generalization
strategy [122] needed for the two tuples to have the same generalized values.
The heart of the algorithm occurs in step 3 of the k-Similar algorithm listed in Figure 89. It
executes the method kSimilarRuno, which is listed in Figure 92, and which will be further described in
the next paragraphs. The kSimilarRuno method returns a set of clusters of tuples such that minimally
generalizing the tuples of each cluster together so they become indistinguishable results in a table that is
a k-minimal distortion of T[QI]. The method TableConstructO listed in Figure 94 takes the set of clusters
from kSimilarRuno, generalizes the tuples of each cluster, and then returns the generalized table. Each
cluster therefore, identifies a group of tuples that in the solution set are indistinguishable across Ql. So,
the k-Similar approach can be described as translating the problem into one of partitioning tuples. This is
done by kSimilarRuno.
The kSimilarRuno method listed in Figure 92 begins by testing for the base conditions in steps 1
through 3. These conditions are based on the size of the table provided to kSimilarRuno. Step 1: if the
number of tuples in the table is 0, an empty set of clusters is returned denoting the empty table. Step 2: if
the number of tuples in the table is less than k, an error results because the k requirement cannot be
satisfied on a table having less than k tuples. Step 3: if the number of tuples in the table is greater than or
equal to k, but less than 2k, all the tuples are generalized into one cluster designating that all the tuples of
the table are to be generalized together.
In step 4 of the kSimilarRuno method, which is listed in Figure 92, the program walks the edges
of clique using the method GenerateMinimumsO, which is listed in Figure 98, to identify groups of k
tuples that are "closest" in terms of distance vectors. The method traverseo, which is listed in Figure
100, performs the actual traversal on clique given a particular starting tuple t'. The method traverseo
returns the cluster(s) of size k containing t and t's closest tuples that when combined have less distortion
than any other combination of k tuples that include t. The method GenerateMinimumso executes
traverseO on each tuple. The end result is a set of all k-sized clusters determined to minimally include a
tuple. It is called mins. Each cluster in mins is called a "minimal". As described in the next paragraphs,
the remainder of the algorithm works with mins and partitions of mins to identify which group of clusters
in mins best accounts for all the tuples that when generalized in accordance to their designated clusters
would yield minimal distortion in the overall generalized solution.
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Some of the clusters in mins may consist of tuples that if their attributes were generalized to the
same values would not limit the ability of other tuples to combine with their closest tuples. I term such a
cluster a "complementary minimum". Step 5 of the kSimilarRuno method, which is listed in Figure 92,
executes the FindComplements() method, which is listed in Figure 99, to identify complementary
minimums within mins. Such clusters can be partitioned as an independent sub-solution. The resulting set
of complementary minimums found is called complements.
The sub-steps of step 6 of the kSimilarRun( method, which is listed in Figure 92, execute only if
complementary minimums are found in mins. In that case, complements returns as part of the solution
and kSimilarRunParts(, which is listed in Figure 93, executes on the remaining tuples and minimals to
recursively apply the algorithm on partitions of connected clusters. If no complementary minimums are
found, then complements has no elements, and so in step 7, kSimilarRunParts(, which is listed in Figure
93, executes on all the tuples and minimals under consideration.
The method kSimilarRunParts(, which is listed in Figure 93, employs mutual recursion by
executing kSimilarRun( on each connected partition of the remaining clusters in mins. The method
Partition(, which is listed in Figure 101, is used in step 2 of kSimilarRunParts( to identify connected
clusters within the given mins. If the returned partition has less than 2k elements, then in step 3.1,
kSimilarRun( is used to combine the tuples of that partition into a single cluster as part of the overall
solution.
If the returned partition, identified as T1, has 2k or more elements, then the partition has a special
configuration in which all minimals within the partition share one or more common tuples. This situation
is handled in step 4 of kSimilarRunParts(. In step 4.1, the method kSimilarRunParts( deploys the
method CommonTupleso, which is listed in Figure 102, to identify the set of 1 to (k-1) tuples that appear
within each cluster of the partition. These tuples are stored in a set called withheld. If the number of
tuples in the partition, not including the tuples withheld, is less than 2k, then the method addTuple(,
which is listed in Figure 95, executes to determine which clusters in the partition should include the
withheld tuples. The decision is made so that the overall result has minimal distortion. On the other hand,
if the number of tuples in the partition, not including the tuples withheld, is greater than or equal to 2k,
then kSimilarRun( is executed using mutual recursion on the partition not including the withheld tuples.
The method addTupleo then executes afterwards to determine which cluster(s) in the result will include
the withheld tuples.
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As stated earlier, the final step of the k-Similar algorithm uses TableConstructo, which is listed
in Figure 94, to construct a generalized table from the resulting set of clusters from kSimilarRuno. It can
be shown that the final table resulting from the k-Similar algorithm is a k-minimal distortion of the
original table using cell-level generalization and suppression.
Example
Given the private table PT shown in Figure 84, the domain and value generalization hierarchies
based on the depictions in Figure 33 (on page 104), and a k-anonymity requirement of k=2, the k-
Similar algorithm, which is listed in Figure 89, provides the table GT, as shown in Figure 104, as
a k-minimal distortion of PT over the quasi-identifier Ql = {HomeZIP, Hospita/ZIP, WorkZIP}.
Here is a walk through the k-Similar algorithm to demonstrate how MT is constructed.
Figure 84 shows the uniquely identifying values t], t2, t3 and t4 appended to the table after step
1 of the k-Similar algorithm executes. These values are associated with the ID attribute. Figure
85 shows clique, which is constructed after step 2 of the k-Similar algorithm concludes. The
nodes are the tuples of PT. The edges are labeled with the distance vectors between every two
tuples in PT.
None of the base conditions in the first 3 steps of kSimilarRuno are applicable. T in this case is
PT. It has 4 tuples and k=2, so ITI=2k. Figure 103 shows the value of mins after step 4 concludes.
The method GenerateMinimums0 identifies the set of minimals for each tuple by traversing
clique to identify each tuple's nearest (k-1) tuples. Traversing clique from t] provides the
minimal {tJ, t2}, from t2 provides the minimals {tJ, t2} and {t2, t4}, from t3 provides the
minimal {tl, t3}, and from t4 provides the minimal {t2, t4}.
{t], t2}
{ t2, N4}
{t], t3}
Figure 103 Resulting mins from GenerateMinimumso
The minimals {t], t3} and {t2, t4} are returned as complementary minimums by
FindComplemets0. So, complements = {{t], t3}, {t2, t4}} after step 5 of kSimilarRun0. When
step 6 of kSimilarRun0 concludes, T is empty. So, complements is returned at step 7 of
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kSimilarRuno as the set of clusters that are minimally distorting. The call to kSimilarRunPartso
in step 7 of kSimilarRuno returns 0 because T is empty. The final step of kSimilarO executes
TableConstructo on clusts ={ {t, t3}, {t2, t4}}. The result is shown in Figure 104 with the ID
values still appended for ease of reference.
The possible cluster combinations and their distortion are: {{tJ, t2}, {t3, t4}} at 8 levels of
generalization is 2.67; {{tl, t3}, {t2, t4}} at 6 levels of generalization is 2.00; and, {{t], t4}, {t2,
t3}} at 10 levels of generalization is 3.33. The combination of clusters with the least distortion is
{{tJ, t3}, {t2, t4}}, which is the same found by kSimilaro.
Al A2 A3
Home ZIP Ho. Ita'ZIP Wor ZIP
t 02138 02138 021**
t2 02138 02139 0213*
t3 02138 02138 021**
t4 02138 02139 0213*
Figure 104 Result from k-Similar applied to PT in Figure 84
Example
Given the private table PT shown in Figure 34 (on page 105), the domain and value
generalization hierarchies based on the depictions in Figure 33 (on page 104), a k-anonymity
requirement of k=2, the k-Similar algorithm, which is listed in Figure 89, provides the table GT,
as shown in Figure 104, as a k-minimal distortion of PT over the quasi-identifier QI = {Race,
BirthDate, Gender, ZIP}. Here is a walk through the k-Similar algorithm to demonstrate how MT
is constructed.
Figure 34 shows the uniquely identifying values t], t2, t3, ... , t12 appended to the table after step
1 of the k-Similar algorithm executes. These values are associated with the ID attribute. Figure
105 shows clique, which is constructed after step 2 of the k-Similar algorithm concludes. The
nodes are the tuples of PT. The edges are labeled with the distance vectors between every two
tuples in PT. The clique is stored in Figure 105 as a 2-dimensional array. Each row and each
column represent a tuple. The cell located at row t, and column t; stores the distance vector Vt.
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H__ t2 0#8 $7 # 0 t ' _0 f H2
tf 00 00 0 2 00 0 2 1 2 0 21 2 0 4 1 2 0 41 2 140212 1 4 0 2 1 4 0 2 1 3 0 2 1 3 0 2
#2 0200 0000 0212 0212 0412 0412 1402 1212 1402 1402 1302 1302
t3 0 2 1 2 0 21 2 0 0 0 0 02000400 1 41 0 1 2 0 1 1 411 14 1 1 1 3 1 0 1 31 0
N 0212 0212 0200 0 00000400 0400 1410 1201 1411 1411 1310 1310
tS 041 2 0 4120400 0400 0000 0200 1210 14011211 1211 1410 1410
S0412 0412 0400 0400 0200 000 0 1210 14011211 1211 1410 1410
t7 1 4 0 2 1 4 0 2 1 4 1 0 1 4 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 21 0 0 000 0 4 1 1 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 0
tO 1212 1212 1201 1201 1401 140 01 041 100 0 0410 0410 0311 0311
tO 1 4 0 2 1 4 0 2 1 4 11 1 4 11 1 2 11 1 21 1 0 2 0 1 0 4 1 0 000 0 0 2 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 4 0 1
tO 1402 1402 1411 1411 12111 1211 0201 0410 0200 0000 0401 0401
01 1302 1302 1310 1310 1410 1410 0400 0311 0401 0401 0000 0206
at 1302 1302 1310 1310 1410 1410 0400 0311 0401 0401 0200 0000
Figure 105 Clique showing distance vectors between tuples of Figure 34
None of the base conditions in the first 3 steps of kSimilarRunO are applicable. T in this case is
PT. It has 12 tuples and k=2, so ITI>2k. Figure 106 shows the value of mins after step 4
concludes. The method GenerateMinimumso identifies the set of minimals for each tuple by
traversing clique to identify each tuple's nearest (k-1) tuples. Traversing clique from t] provides
the minimal {t], t2}, from t2 provides {tJ, t2}, from t3 provides {t3, t4}, from t4 provides {t3,
t4, from t5 provides {t5, t6}, from t6 provides {t5, t6}, from t7 provides {t7, t9} and {t7, t1O},
from t8 provides {t3, t8} and {t4, t8}, from t9 provides {t9, t10}, from t1O provides {t9, t10J},
from t1 provides {tJJ, t12}, and from t12 provides {tlJ, t12}.
{ti, t2}
{t3, t4
{t5, t6}
{t7, t9}
{t7, t1O}
{t3, t8}
t4, t8}
{t9,tj 0}
{tI, t12}
Figure 106 Resulting mins from GenerateMinimumso
The minimals {t], t2}, {t5, t6} and {tlJ, t12} are returned as complementary minimums by
FindComplemetsO. So, complements = {{t, t2}, {t5, t6}, {tJ], t12}} after step 5 of
kSimilarRuno. When step 6 of kSimilarRuno concludes,T[ID] is {t3, t4, t7, t8, t9, tlO} with mins
= {{t3, t4}, {t3, t8}, {t4, t8}{t7, t9}, {t7, t10}, {t9, t1O}}. So, complements is returned at step 7
of kSimilarRuno as a set of clusters that are minimally distorting that comprise part of the
overall solution
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The call to kSimilarRunPartsO executes in step 7 of kSimilarRuno on the remaining tuples and
minimals. The Partition() method returns the partition {{t3, t4}, {t3, t8}, {t4, t8}} and the
subsequently{ {t7, t9}, {t7, t10}, {9, tlO}}. Each of these are clustered together in kSimilarRunO
to be: {t3, t4, t8} and {t7, t9, t1O} because each of these partitions have less than 2k (or 4) tuples.
The final step of kSimilaro executes TableConstructO on clusts ={ {t], t2}, {t5, t6}, {tJJ, t12},
{t3, t4, t8}, {t7, t9, t10}}. The result is shown as GT1 in Figure 35 (see page 105). The
appended ID values have been discarded.
In the example on page 125, MinGen(PT)=GT1. The same solution derived by k-Similaro was
determined to be a k-minimal distortion of PT over QI with respect to DGHAi where
Prec(GT1)=0.83.
8.3 Comparison to Mingen
A comparison to MinGen [123] requires examining: (1) the computational complexity of the
algorithm to ensure it operates in reasonable time; and, (2) the correctness of the algorithm. These are
discussed in the following subsections.
8.3.1 Complexity of the k-Similar algorithm
The k-Similar algorithm listed in Figure 89 with supporting methods in Figure 90 through Figure
102 was not written as efficiently as possible. Nevertheless, here is a walk through the algorithm noting
the methods that characterize the computational complexity.
The CliqueSetupo method, which is listed in Figure 90, is executed in step 2. Comparing every
two tuples and determining their distance vector is done in O(IT 2) time. The GenerateMinimums0
method, which is listed in Figure 98, working along with its accompanying traverse0 method, which is
listed in Figure 100, pose a serious problem for the computational speed of k-Similar(. As implemented,
they operate in combinatoric time because every combination of ITI tuples drawn k at a time are
examined. While some efficiencies may be possible in future versions, the version provided here is
combinatoric. Clearly, this overwhelms computational complexity of the remainder of the algorithm. The
efficiencies gained by partitioning the clusters into sub-clusters make the algorithm useful in some real-
world applications and dramatically improves the performance over MinGen. However, combiantoric
operation is not practical for most uses.
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More importantly however, the techniques presented in this algorithm concerning the use and
operations on distance vectors and partitions of clusters holds promise as ways to reduce the
computational complexity.
8.3.2 Correctness of the k-similar algorithm
The correctness of the k-Similar algorithm relies on its ability to produce solutions that adhere to
a given k-anonymity requirement, assuming of course a proper quasi-identifier and a proper value for k
have been provided. In this subsection, I will show that the k-Similar algorithm provides solutions that do
adhere to a given k-anonymity requirement. Here is a walk through the program, noting its correctness
with respect to the k requirement.
A result from k-Similar properly adheres to the k requirement if each and every cluster provided
by kSimilarRuno is of size k or more because TableConstructO merely generalizes the tuples identified
in each cluster provided from kSimilarRuno. A table must have at least k tuples to adhere to k-
anonymity. So, in step 3 of kSimilarRuno, a table that has k or more tuples, but less than 2k tuples,
results in a single cluster. This cluster is therefore of size k or more.
Execution of k-SimilarRuno continues for tables that have more than 2k tuples. The set of
minimals produced by GenerateMinimumsO at step 4 of kSimilarRunO have clusters of size k because
GenerateMinimumso traverses paths of k-1 in clique from a given tuple and returns the path with the
maximal distance vector that has the minimal distance. All minimals identified by GenerateMinimums0
therefore has k elements. of the minimals returned from GenerateMinimums0, some are identified as
complementary minimums and appended to the solution set. Each of these minimums is of size k.
Finally, in the case where non-complementary tuples are partitioned and each partition then
processed by the algorithm, each partition is guaranteed to have minimals of size k that have combined
into connected partitions. Therefore each partition is necessarily larger than k.
8.4 Comparison to Datafly and p-Argus
In comparison to Datafly and p-Argus, the k-Similar algorithm has greater precision because it
effectively uses generalization and suppression enforced at the cell level. datafly and p-Argus
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generalized values at the attribute level. Datafly suppressed at the tuple level, though ji-Argus suppressed
at the cell level. In some cases, Datafly may have less precision than p-Argus, but Datafly always
provides results that are adequately protected. On the other hand, p-Argus, in some cases, can provide
results that do not necessarily adhere to the k requirement. In comparison, k-Similar provides results that
are adequately protected and minimally distorted. On the other hand, Datafly and p-Argus operate in
real-time where k-Similar does not.
8.5 k-Similar as an anonymous data system
k-Similar uses the following disclosure limitation techniques: de-identification, equivalence class
substitution, generalization, and suppression. Below is a description of the framework in which k-Similar
operates.
S = {subjects whose information is included in PT}
P = set of all people whose information could possibly be in PT
PT = privately held information about S
QI = set of attributes with replications in E
U= P
RT = k-Similar (PT)
E = set of publicly available information in today's society
G = set of standard communication methods.
f = k-Similar
The system A(S, P, PT, QI, U, {RT}, E, G, k-Similar) is an ADSO.
Informal proof.
Let PT = data in Figure 34.
There cannot exist fewer than k tuples in RT having the same values across QI
based on the correctness of the k-Similar clustering algorithm.
So, k-map protection is provided and A is an ADSO.
8.6 Future work
1. The k-Similar algorithm, unlike Datafly and p-Argus made use of the value
generalization hierarchies to seamlessly integrate generalization and suppression
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together so as to be treated as one disclosure limitation technique. Incorporate
additional disclosure limitation techniques [124] into this approach.
2. The core Datafly algorithm relies on a heuristic to guide its generalization strategy.
This heuristic selects the attribute of the quasi identifier having the greater number of
distinct values in the modified table as the attribute to generalize. As was discussed
earlier [125], this heuristic is computationally efficient but provides no protection
against unnecessary generalization. There are many other heuristics that are just as
computationally efficient. Develop a nearest neighbor strategy based on distance
vectors, like those used in the k-similar algorithm, to perform attribute-level
generalization and tuple-level suppression that operates in real-time.
3. Construct a more efficient version of k-Similar by taking advantage of constraints
placed on distances rather than computing the distances of all combinations of k
tuples. If you do not compute a distance vector between two tuples but have
computed the distances of other tuples that include those tuples, then the ( and E
operations described in Figure 87 can be used to compute the range of possible values
for the distance vector between those two tuples.
4. The k-Similar algorithm has been described as a data-clustering algorithm that has a
symbiotic relationship to the k-nearest neighbor algorithm [126]. Compare and
contrast these two algorithms as general-purpose data clustering algorithms. Explore
ways distance vectors and value generalization hierarchies can be used to improve
results in k-nearest neighbor.
5. Earlier in this work, k-map, wrong-map and null-map forms of data protection were
introduced [127]. These later chapters have been narrowly focused on a version of k-
map protection called k-anonymity [128]. Explore disclosure control techniques and
systems that use other formal protection models.
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Chapter 9 Results: Scrub
Datafly [129], v-Argus [130], k-Similar [131] and even MinGen [132] all work with field-
structured data sets. My Scrub system, presented in this chapter, locates personally identifying
information in textual documents and within textual fields of a database. This is a change in format from
the earlier chapters. As you will see the problem of locating personally identifying information in text
can be very difficult, but even when it is resolved perfectly, the results are merely de-identified and not
typically rendered anonymous.
9.1 Overview of the Scrub System
The Scrub System, which locates and replaces personally identifying information in text
documents, textual fields of the database textual information found on the World Wide Web. A close
examination of two different computer-based patient record systems, Boston's Children's Hospital [133]
and Massachusetts General Hospital [134], quickly revealed that much of the medical content resided in
the letters between physicians and in the shorthand notes of clinicians. This is where providers discussed
findings, explained current treatment and furnished an overall view of the medical condition of the
patient.
At present, most institutions have few releases of data that include these notes and letters, but
new uses for this information is increasing; therefore, the desire to release this text is also increasing.
After all, these letters and notes are a valuable research tool and can corroborate the rest of the record.
The fields containing the diagnosis, procedure and medication codes when examined alone can be
incorrect or misleading. A prominent physician stated at a recent conference that he purposefully places
incorrect codes in the diagnosis and procedure fields when such codes would reveal sensitive information
about the patient [135]. Similarly, the diagnosis and procedure codes may be up-coded for billing
purposes. The General Accounting Office estimates that as much as 10% of annual Federal health care
expenditures, including Medicare, are lost to fraudulent provider claims [136]. If these practices become
widespread, they will render the administrative medical record useless for clinical research and may
already be problematic for retrospective investigation. Clinical notes and letters may prove to be the
only reliable artifacts.
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The Scrub System provides a methodology for removing personally identifying information in
medical writings so that the integrity of the medical information remains intact even though the identity
of the patient remains confidential. I term this process "scrubbing". Protecting patient confidentiality in
raw text is not as simple as searching for the patient's name and replacing all occurrences with a pseudo
name. References to the patient are often quite obscure; consider for example:
"...he developed Hodgkins while acting as the U.S. Ambassador to England and was diagnosed
by Dr. Frank at Brigham's."
Clinicians write text with little regard to word-choice and in many cases without concern to grammar or
spelling. While the resulting "unrestricted text" is valuable to understanding the medical condition and
treatment of the patient, it poses tremendous difficulty to scrubbing since the text often includes names
of other care-takers, family members, employers and nick names.
I examined electronically stored letters written by clinical specialists to the physician who
referred the patient. The letter in Figure 107 is a fictitious example modeled after those studied. It
contains the name and address of the referring physician, a typing mistake in the salutation line, the
patient's nick name, and references to another care-taker, the patient's athletic team, the patient's mother
and her mother's employer and phone number. Actual letters are often several pages in length.
Wednesday, February 2, 1994
Marjorie Long, M.D. RE: Virginia Townsend
St. John's Hospital CH#32-841-09787
Huntington 18 DOB 05/26/86
Boston, MA 02151
Dear Dr. Lang:
I feel much better after seeing Virginia this time. As you
know, Dot is a 7 and 6/12 year old female in follow up
for insulin dependent diabetes mellitus diagnosed in
June of 1993 by Dr. Frank at Brigham's. She is currently
on Lily Human Insulin and is growing and
gaining weight normally. She will start competing again
with the U. S. Junior Gymnastics team. We will
contact Mrs. Hodgkins in a week at Marina Corp
473-1214 to schedule a follow-up visit for her daughter.
Patrick Hayes, M.D. 34764
Figure 107. Sample letter reporting back to a referring physician.
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February, 1994
Erisa Cosborn, M.D. RE: Kathel Wallams
Brighaul Hospital CH#18-512-32871
Alberdam Way DOB 05/86
Peabon, MA 02100
Dear Dr. Jandel:
I feel much better after seeing Kathel this time. As
You know, Cob is a 7 and 6/12 year old female in follow-
up for insulin dependent diabetes mellitus diagnosed in
June of 1993 by Dr. Wandel at Namingham's. She is
currently on Lily Human Insulin and is growing and
Gaining weight normally. She will start competing again
with the . We will
Contact Mrs. Learl in a week at Garlaw Corp
912-8205 to schedule a follow-up visit for her daughter.
Mank Brones, M.D. 21075
Figure 108. Scrub System applied to sample in Figure 107.
Figure 107 shows a sample letter and Figure 108 shows its scrubbed result. Notice in the
scrubbed result that the name of the medication remained but the mother's last name was correctly
replaced. Dates were changed to report only month and year. The reference "U.S. Junior Gymnastics
team" was suppressed since Scrub was not sure how to replace it. The traditional approach to scrubbing
is straightforward search and replace, which misses these references; this is shown in Figure 109.
Wednesday, February 2, 1994
Marjorie Long, M.D. RE: Kathel Wallams
St. John's Hospital CH#18-512-32871
Huntington 18 DOB 05/26/86
Boston, MA 02151
Dear Dr. Lang:
I feel much better after seeing Kathel this time. As you
know, Dot is a 7 and 6/12 year old female in follow
up for insulin dependent diabetes mellitus diagnosed in
June of 1993 by Dr. Frank at Brigham's. She is currently
on Lily Human Insulin and is growing and
gaining weight normally. She will start competing again
with the U. S. Junior Gymnastics team. We will
contact Mrs. Hodgkins in a week at Marina Corp
473-1214 to schedule a follow-up visit for her daughter.
Mank Brones, M.D. 21075
Figure 109. Search-and Replace applied to sample in Figure 1-8.
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9.2 Human approach
The Scrub System was modeled after a human approach to the problem. It uses templates and
localized knowledge to recognize personally identifying information. In fact, the work on Scrub shows
that the recognition of personally identifying information is strongly linked to the common recording
practices of society. For example, Fred and Bill are common first names and Miller and Jones are
common last names; knowing these facts makes it easier to recognize them as likely names. Common
facts, along with their accompanying templates of use, are considered commonsense knowledge; the
itemization and use of commonsense knowledge is the backbone of Scrub.
I conducted an experiment to determine how well humans locate personally-identifying
information in letters between physicians. The subjects were 5 adults. None of the subjects had any
medical experience or experience with the information contained in the database.
Each of the adults were given a marker that writes in a read-through yellow color and seven (7)
printed letters. One of the letters appeared with all its text in uppercase but consisted of complete
sentences. The other letters were in standard letter format with upper-lower case. Each subject was asked
to highlight all information in each letter that personally identified any person and to do so within 30
seconds per letter.
All the subjects found all obvious references to names, addresses, organizations, cities, states, zip
codes and phone numbers (100%). More obscure occurrences such as nick names, abbreviations,
identification numbers and incorrect capitalization were sometimes missed (99%). References embedded
in the text that did not appear in upper-lower case were sometimes missed (95%) and performance on
identifying obvious references in the upper case letter was much worse than in the upper-lower case
counterparts (94% compared to 100%). Subjects reported reviewing most words in the letters but all
subjects stated they did not read the letters.
I sought to model the human approach because it did not require a complete semantic model. The
subjects used templates and localized knowledge to recognize personally identifying information.
Consider the list of names, phone numbers and dates in Figure 110. The writing conventions and
immediate context help identity the kind of information presented.
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Names Phone numbers Dates
Frank Graves 255-1423 March 1, 1991
F. R. Graves, MD (304) 255-1423 3/1/91
Dr. Graves 304/ 255-1423 first of March
Frank Red Graves 255-1000 ext 1423 1-MAR-91
"Red" Graves phone: 255-1423 03-01-91
frank red graves extension 1423 March 1st
Figure 110 Samples of personal information.
9.3 Computer approach
The Scrub System utilizes numerous detection algorithms competing in parallel to label
contiguous characters of text as being a proper name, an address block, a phone number, and so forth.
Each detection algorithm recognizes a specific kind of information, where recognizable kinds of
information can be thought of as fields such asfirst name, last name, street address, and date. There is at
least one detection algorithm for each kind of information.
Scrub Entities
1. identification (6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 11, 12, 13,
block 14, 25, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25]
2. mailing label (6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 11, 12, 13, 14,
17, 18]
3. address block (6, 7, 8, 9, 15)
4. full name (11, 12, 13, 14, 17]
5. location (7, 8, 15)
6. street 15. country
7. city 16. social security
8. state 17. title
9. zip 18. organization
10. phone 19. measurement
11. first name 20. age
12. middle name 21. date
13. last name 22. medical term
14. nick name 25. reference number
Figure 111 Some of the entities recognized by Scrub are listed above in relative order of precedence.
Figure 111 lists some of the types of entities detected by Scrub. For each entity there is a
detection algorithm and the precedence of the algorithm is based on the number of entities that constitute
the algorithm's assigned entity. Examples of constituent entities are listed in braces in Figure 111. For
example, detecting a geographical location may make it possible to identify a city, a state or a country.
The more constituents an entity has, the higher its precedence. Figure 111 shows five levels of
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precedence with identification block having the highest and entities 6 through 25 all having the same low
precedence.
Detection algorithms can be executed sequentially in order of precedence to avoid parallel
execution. For each character in the input text the detection algorithm with the highest precedence
reporting the greatest likelihood above a threshold value is considered to have identified an instance of
its entity. Figure 112 provides an overview.
address block
U
full name
phone number - r
s
first name -- y u
inputI
text t--
egin sentence s output
text
Figure 112 Block diagram of Scrub detection system.
Knowing what instances have already been found in the text can be quite useful in reducing
ambiguity. For example, if the system encountered the name "Virginia P. Weston" then later encountered
a sentence that read "After seeing Virginia this time, I feel much better," the system could more reliably
interpret the second reference to Virginia as a person's name and not the state. When an instance of an
entity is found in the text, its corresponding detection algorithm can post its results -- making them
available to all detection algorithms while processing the remainder of the document. In these cases, an
entity can only post values for its constituent entities and if there are no constituents, it can post for itself.
A few detection algorithms work differently. Some classify the format of the document as being
a letter, notes, or delimited text. These detectors continuously report findings. There are also special
detectors like those for medical terms and verbs whose instances are typically not replaced but are
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detected because having their results reduces the number of false positives. At run-time the user sets the
threshold and use of special detectors.
Figure 113 repeats the second column of Figure 110 but includes associated templates and
probabilities. The d is a digit, the asterisk (*) matches any wild character and the set notation denotes
possibilities. During a training session on the database, template probabilities are adjusted and their
effectiveness measured. If there is not enough variation between templates then performance will
deteriorate. If templates use features that are not present in the database, performance may deteriorate.
For example, if name templates expect names to be written in upper-lower case then these templates will
be useless if all text appears in uppercase. The training session pinpoints problem areas and weaknesses
beforehand.
Phone numbers Templates Likelihood
255-1423 ddd - dddd 40
(304) 255-1423 ( ddd ) ddd - dddd 85
304/ 255-1423 ddd / ddd - dddd 50
255-1000 ext 1423 ddd - dddd ext* d* 70
extension 1423 ext* d* 40
phone: 255-1423 {tel*, ph*} 90
ddd - dddd
Figure 113 Samples of templates and their probabilities.
As I've shown, the detection algorithms employ a host of lists. For example, detecting a first
name may use a stored list of common first names, the first names of all patients, words that sound like
first names or all three depending on the user's specifications. These lists are compiled beforehand.
Storage requirements and speed are dramatically reduced using multiple hashed Boolean lookup tables
[137] or in the case of words that sound like a group of words, using a table of orthographic rules [138].
With Boolean look-up tables, look-ups are done in constant time, 0(10) since there are 10 binary checks
per word. Using orthographic rules, look-ups require O(2n) time where n is the number of syllables in the
word. Storage using Boolean look-up tables require roughly 30 bits per word which is a tiny fraction of a
typical word list or dictionary [139].
9.3.1 Replacement Strategies.
Once personally identifying information is detected, it must be replaced with some pseudo-value.
There are several strategies for accomplishing this feat. Associated with each detection algorithm in
Scrub is a replacement algorithm that is responsible for producing the replacement text; these are the
same as was used in Datafly [140]. In general, the format of the replacement text matches the template
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that was recognized. If the detected entity was a date, for example, the replacement date may involve
lumping days to the first of the nearest month or some other grouping. On the other hand if the detected
entity was a first name, the typical strategy is to perform a hash-table lookup using the original name as
the key. The result of the look-up is the replacement text. This provides consistent replacements since
every time a particular name is encountered, it maps to the same replacement. In terms of the
replacement content, several other strategies are available including the use of orthographic rules called
Sprees" that replace personally identifying information with fictitious names that sound like reasonable
names but in fact belong to no known person.
9.4 Results
The Scrub System accurately found 99-100% of all personally identifying references in more
than 3,000 letters between physicians, while the straightforward approach of global search-and-replace
properly located no more than 30-60% of all such references; these values are summarized in Figure 114.
The database I used was a scrubbed subset of a pediatric medical record system [141;;-]. It
consisted of 275 patient records and included 3,198 letters to referring physicians. Many of the letters
were delimited notes but most were proper letters with a heading block, salutation and well-formed
sentences.
The higher figure for search and replace (84%) includes using additional information stored in
the database to help identify the attending physician's name, identifying number and other information.
Since the letters were properly formatted, the heading block was easily detected and compositional cues
were available using keywords like "Dear." This dramatically improved the results of the search-and-
replace method to around 84%; however, most references to family members, additional phone numbers,
nick names and references to the physician receiving the letter were still not detected, whereas Scrub was
able to correctly identify and replace these instances.
Method Letters
Straight search 37%
Search with cues 84%
Scrub( threshold 0.8) 98%
Scrub( threshold 0.7, 100%
false positive reduction)
Figure 114 Comparisons of Scrub to standard techniques
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9.5 Discussion
Despite this apparent success, the Scrub System merely de-identifies information and cannot
guarantee anonymity. Even though all explicit identifiers such as name, address and phone number are
removed or replaced, it may be possible to infer the identify of an individual. Consider the text in 115.
"At the age of two she was sexually assaulted. At the age of three she set fire to her
home. At the age of four her parents divorced. At the age of five she was placed in
foster care after stabbing her nursery school teacher with scissors."
Figure 115 Sample de-identified text
If her life continues to progress in this manner, by the age of eight she may be in the news, but
nothing in this text required scrubbing even though there would probably exist only one such child with
this history. An overall sequence of events can provide a preponderance of details that identify an
individual. This is often the case in mental health data, discharge notes and person-specific textual
information.
Although Scrub reliably locates explicitly identifying information in textual documents, it merely
de-identifies the result because its detectors are aimed primarily at explicitly identifying values.
Similarly, in field-structured databases de-identification typically provides insufficient protection, as was
demonstrated earlier in this document. Other values remaining in the data can combine uniquely to
identify subjects. The Scrub work demonstrates that this is as true in textual documents as it is in field-
structured databases. But perhaps more importantly, the Scrub work implies that solving the problem in
one data format (either textual documents or field-structured databases) will reveal comparable strategies
for solving the problem in the other format.
The Scrub System is both troublesome and insightful in another regard. While Scrub is
inadequate for privacy protection, it is quite useful in automatically detecting and gathering personally
identifying information from email messages, World Wide Web pages, and other textual information
appearing in an electronic format and then using the results to draw damaging inferences from other
publicly available field-structured data sets. In this way, Scrub demonstrates the symbiotic relationship
between data detective tools and data protection tools. Re-identification experiments and the tools used
to accomplish re-identifications improve our understanding of the identifiability of data and our tools for
rendering data sufficiently anonymous.
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9.6 Scrub as an anonymous data system
Scrub uses the following disclosure limitation techniques: de-identification, equivalence class
substitution, generalization, and suppression. Below is a description of the framework in which Scrub
operates.
S = {subjects whose information is discussed in textual documents PT}
P = set of all people whose information could possibly be PT
PT = set of documents about S
QI = set of attributes for which Scrub detectors are available
U = {d, x ... xdn} uP
RT = Scrub(PT)
E = set of publicly available information in today's society
G = set of standard communication methods.
f = Scrub System
The system A(S, P, PT, QI, U, {RT}, E, G, Scrub) is not an ADSO.
Informal proof.
Assume A is an ADSO.
Letp, be the person who is the subject of the text in Figure 115.
E includes newspaper reports and phone books that include pi's family.
By simply linking the information, p, can be re-identified, violating property 9 of an ADSO.
So, A is not an ADSO.
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Chapter 10 Discussion
The Scrub System demonstrated that medical data, including textual documents, can be de-
identified, but as I have shown, de-identification alone is not sufficient to protect confidentiality. Not
only can de-identified information often be re-identified by linking data to other databases, but also
releasing too many patient-specific facts can identify individuals. Unless society is proactive, the
proliferation of medical data may become so widespread that it will be impossible to release medical data
without breaching confidentiality. For example, the existence of rather extensive registers of business
establishments in the hands of government agencies, trade associations and firms like Dunn and
Bradstreet has virtually ruled out the possibility of releasing database information about businesses
[142].
The Datafly, t-Argus and k-Similar systems illustrated that medical information can be
generalized so that attributes and combinations of attributes adhere to a minimal k requirement, and by so
doing, confidentiality can be maintained. Such schemes can provide anonymous data for public use.
There are drawbacks to these systems, but the primary shortcomings may be counteracted by policy.
One concern with both pt-Argus, Datafly and k-Similar is the determination of the proper value
for k and its corresponding measure of disclosure risk. There is no standard that can be applied to assure
that the final results are adequate. It is customary to measure risk against a specific compromising
technique, such as linking to known databases that the data holder assumes the recipient is using.
Several researchers have proposed mathematical measures of the risk, which compute the conditional
probability of the linker's success [143].
A policy could be mandated that would require the producer of data released for public use to
guarantee with a high degree of confidence that no individual within the data can be identified using
demographic or semi-public information. Of course, guaranteeing anonymity in data requires a criterion
against which to check resulting data and to locate sensitive values. If this is based only on the database
itself, the minimum k and sampling fractions may be far from optimal and may not reflect the general
population. Researchers have developed and tested several methods for estimating the percentage of
unique values in the general population based on a smaller database [144]. These methods are based on
subsampling techniques and equivalence class structure. In the absence of these techniques, uniqueness
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in the population based on demographic attributes can be determined using population registers that
include patients from the database, such as local census data, voter registration lists, city directories, as
well as information from motor vehicle agencies, tax assessors and real estate agencies. To produce an
anonymous database, a producer could use population registers to identify sensitive demographic values
within a database, and thereby obtain a measure of risk for the release of the data.
The second drawback with the p-Argus, Datafly and k-Similar systems concerns the dichotomy
between researcher needs and disclosure risk. If data are explicitly identifiable, the public expects
patient permission to be required. If data are released for public use, then the producer must guarantee,
with a high degree of confidence, that the identity of any individual cannot be determined using standard
and predictable methods and reasonably available data. But when sensitive de-identified, but not
necessarily anonymous, data are to be released, the likelihood that an effort will be made to re-identify an
individual increases based on the needs of the recipient, so any such recipient has a trust relationship
with society and the producer of the data. The recipient should therefore be held accountable.
The Datafly, k-Similar and p-Argus systems quantify this trust by having the data holder identify
quasi-identifiers among the attributes requested by the recipient. But recall that the determination of a
quais-identifier requires guesswork in identifying attributes on which the recipient could link. Suppose a
quasi-identifier is incorrect; that is, the producer misjudges which attributes are sensitive for linking. In
this case, the Datafly, k-Similar and p-Argus systems might release data that are less anonymous than
what was required by the recipient, and as a result, individuals may be more easily identified. This risk
cannot be perfectly resolved by the producer of the data since the producer cannot always know what
resources the recipient holds. The obvious demographic attributes, physician identifiers, and billing
information attributes can be consistently and reliably protected. However, there are too many sources of
semi-public and private information such as pharmacy records, longitudinal studies, financial records,
survey responses, occupational lists, and membership lists, to account a priori for all linking possibilities.
10.1 Data sharing and risk
The increase in the availability of detailed data as well as inexpensive technology to process it, is
having a dramatic impact on research. Having more information available will probably lead to even
more and more studies because additional data can often help ensure the validity and generalizability of
study results. These will likely result in continued increase in data collected and shared. Therefore the
time is right to seriously examine data collection and sharing practices. Most person-specific data are
autonomously controlled and much of the information is replicated across collections. So, coherent and
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comprehensive approaches are needed. The time to make policy changes is now in order to prevent data
holders and governments from succumbing to the financial incentives that encourage sales of data.
10.2 Past practices may no longer be applicable
In 1997, the New England Journal of Medicine published an article by Melton [145] in which he
described an environment at the Mayo Clinic that had enjoyed a long tradition of sharing patient records
with researchers in an open manner with little or no privacy problems. Among other things, he questiond
why established and old data sharing practices that seem to have proven themselves to work sufficiently
in the past were no longer considered acceptable. An answer is that until recently there existed natural
limits that protected patient privacy which technology now erodes at an alarming rate. It was not our old
practices that protected our privacy. Instead, it was our old practices in the absence of current technology
that provided the protection.
For example, in an earlier time, if I wanted to receive research information from Mayo Clinic's
records, I would have to take time off from work, take a plane to Rochester, Minnesota, and then have
access to their files only during the times in which their records room was open. I could only leave with
that information I could write down during that time (assuming the absence of copiers). The physical
labor involved in manually reviewing records as well as the physical restrictions on entering the records
room provided economic boundaries that restricted the dissemination of person-specific data. Now
consider what is involved today if all of the records of the Mayo Clinic were available electronically. I
could access all of their information from anywhere in the world using a standard handheld computer and
ubiquitous network resources. I could have an exact copy in a matter of seconds and could further
distribute it widely to others, around the world, in a matter of minutes. Today's technology does pose
unparalleled threats to patient privacy.
Today's technology also makes access to the information easier within Mayo Clinic itself. As a
result, more data tend to be shared internally than ever before.
10.3 Risk and liability
Citizens in the United States are largely unaware of the loss of privacy and the resulting
ramifications that stem from having so much person-specific information available. Clearly a loss of
dignity and financial income can result when personal medical information is widely and publicly
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distributed. Yet, data holders make data sharing decisions to benefit themselves and minimize their own
risk. Doing so, does not always provide desirable protections for the persons whose information is
contained within the data.
The idea of "risk" concerns the likelihood of experiencing loss or damage. As a liability in the
context of this work, "risk" refers to an obligation the data holder has to the subjects whose information
is contained within the data and to society. So, both the data holder and the subjects of the data want no
harm to result from the sharing of data, but from the data holder's perspective such harm appears as legal
liability. As a result, actions the data holder may take to "protect" data are not the same as actions that
would "protect" the identities of the subjects. Instead, such actions are aimed at limiting the data holder's
liability regardless of their inefficiency in protecting subjects. Examples of such self-serving actions
include, but are not limited to: (1) making it difficult to identify the data holder as the source of shared
information; (2) making it difficult for society to know what is collected and to whom copies are given;
and, (3) making it legally difficult for a recipient of the data to publicly admit to being able to identify
subjects in data that the data holder asserts are anonymous. These kinds of actions help protect the data
holder, but do not protect the identities of the subjects. On the other hand, protections for subjects are
limited almost entirely to the protections that can be made available through policies, regulations and
laws. Therefore, it is essential that measurements of risk and characterizations of access policies be based
on society's perspective.
A Harris-Equifax poll [146] implies that the public would be willing to share information for
research provided researchers and others could not identify any person included in the released data.
Rendering data sufficiently anonymous, as is done with Datafly and k-Similar, would be a way in which
data could be more freely shared.
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Datafly heuristic, 125
Datafly System, 110, 128, 163
de-identified data, 45
Department of Health and Human Services, 41
disclosure, 54, 64
disclosure control, 17, 54
disclosure control function, 72
disclosure limitation techniques, 62, 79
disk storage per person, 42
disto, 171
distance between values, 170
distance function, 171
distance vector, 92, 169, 170
distance vector, maximal, 172
distortion, 95
domain generalization hierarchy, 86
encryption, 62
entity, 71
entity-specific data, 32
entity-specific table, 71
entropy, 95
European Union, 128
explicit-identifier, 74
Freedom of Information Act, 50
GDSP, 42
generalization, 62, 79, 86, 89
generalization of a table, 89
generalization strategy, 93
generalization, attribute, 79
generalization, cell, 79
GIC, 52, 114
global disk storage per person, 42
heuristic, 125
Hippocratic oath, 38
identifiable personal health information, 37
identity release, 78
inference, 54
International Classification of Disease (ICD-9), 114
k requirement, 111
k-anonymity, 83, 111, 161
k-anonymity requirement, 89
k-map, 111
k-map protection, 81
k-nearest neighbor, 60
k-Similar, correctness, 194
Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission, 52
maximal distance vector, 172, 173
MinGen, computational complexity, 101
minimal, 174, 188
minimal distortion, 95, 98, 173
minimal generalization, 91
NAHDO, 50
National Association of Health Data Organizations, 50
null map, 80
outlier, 128, 163
outliers, 112
person-specific data, 32
person-specific table, 71
perturbation, 62
population, 71
population register, 53
precision metric, 171
probabilistic attack, 161
profile, 111
profile value, 113, 114
pseudo-entities, 73
quasi-identifier, 64, 73
query restriction, 59
re-coding, 129
record linkage, 18
re-identification relation, 72
relation, 54
relational database, 54
rounding, 62
sampling, 62
scrambling, 62
Scrub System, 197, 198, 207
set covering, 165
Social Security number, 50, 51
statistical databases, 54
substitution, 62
summary data, 55, 123, 160, 161
summary data attack, 123, 160
suppression, 58, 79
suppression, attribute, 80
suppression, cell, 79
swapping, 62
table, 54, 71
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tuple, 54, 71
uniqueness in US population, 52
value generalization hierarchy, 87
voter list, 51
voters list, 112
wrong map, 80
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